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Abstract 
 
IT governance focuses on how leadership can be effective and efficient in guiding an 
organisation's use of technology to meet business needs. A collaborative business model of IT 
shared services provision is a complicated endeavour as it often involves multiple stakeholders 
having different objectives, resources, and capabilities. Over the past decade, numerous studies 
have shown that not all organisations achieve the full benefits they expect from shared services. A 
robust IT governance of shared services focuses not only internally, but also incorporates the 
viewpoints and guidance of its customers. Hence, the following research questions were explored. 
First, given a particular type of shared IT services delivery arrangement, what should be the IT 
governance structure (decision rights) adopted within an organisation? Second, are the decision 
rights and accountability allocated effectively? How does an organisation leverage IT governance 
practices to ensure desired business outcomes in a shared services environment? Accordingly, the 
goal of this research is to identify significant factors influencing the IT governance mechanisms. 
Based on the resource-based theory and agency theory, seven hypotheses are derived. The 
hypotheses were empirically examined using data obtained via an online survey. A survey 
methodology was used to collect data from top management and senior business managers of 
varying industries and organisation sizes. Two hundred and five valid responses from both shared 
services clients and providers were obtained. 
Contrary to expectations, the IT decision framework has a much-business centralised IT 
governance structure. The results indicate organisations govern IT differently in five decision areas 
depending on their shared services delivery arrangements. Organisations adopting limited shared 
services options centralise more of their IT decision rights. Organisations forming a joint service 
agreement with more business units utilise a federal approach. Those setting up a separate ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ employ a mixed IT governance model. Senior business leaders make the major IT 
decisions when external customer access is allowed. The findings also suggest that the business 
value generated from IT is characterised by an organisation’s ability to effectively align the IT 
decision rights and accountability structures. The formal and regular assessment of IT governance, 
however, has no significant association with the business value of IT. The use of monitoring 
mechanisms has positive impact on organisational performance, including independent review of 
shared IT operation, profession-wide oversight and joint working on shared IT products. The results 
of the study will be of interest to managers involved in IT shared services who wish to create IT 
governance mechanisms that support business goals, protect business investments in technology, 
and appropriately manage IT-related opportunities and risks.   
ii 
Declaration by author 
 
This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published 
or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly 
stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis. 
I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical 
assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial 
advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis 
is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree 
candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for 
the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have 
clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. 
I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University 
Library and, subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately 
made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. 
I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright 
holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the 
copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis. 
 
iii 
Publications during candidature 
 
No publications 
 
Publications included in this thesis 
 
No publications included 
 
Contributions by others to the thesis  
 
No contributions by others 
 
Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree 
 
None 
iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
The opportunity to do this thesis is no doubt one of my greatest blessings from God. It has 
been a very rewarding journey, especially to learn from many inspiring individuals. 
I would like to acknowledge with particular gratitude the assistance of my supervisors, 
Professor Peter Green and Professor Fiona Rohde. I am very proud for having the opportunity of 
working with them. I will certainly remember and cherish their advice, motivation, criticism, and 
guidance throughout my life. 
My appreciation goes to the members of my milestone committee, Associate Professor Marta 
Indulska, Dr. Peter Clutterbuck, Dr. Alistair Robb, for their useful contributions at various stages of 
my research. I would like to thank my colleagues and co-postgraduate students who have helped 
with developing and piloting the survey instrument.  
I am also greatly indebted to a number of other people, in particular, Mr. Simon Middap and 
Mr. Peter Weaver who have provided much needed support and encouragement. I am grateful to my 
previous employer, ENERGEX Pty Ltd for providing the resources to pursue a research higher 
degree.  
Finally, I want to give my warmest and deepest thanks to my family for their loving 
forbearance during the long period it has taken me to conduct the research and write up this thesis. 
  
v 
Keywords 
 
IT shared services, IT governance, resource-based view, agency theory, survey instrument, content 
validity, quantitative approach 
 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC) 
 
ANZSRC code: 080609 Information Systems Management, 70% 
ANZSRC code: 080610 Information Systems Organisation, 30% 
 
Fields of Research (FoR) Classification 
 
FoR code: 0806 Information Systems, 100% 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Adrian Giles Evett (AGE), whose practical 
knowledge of IT governance was unexcelled. 
  
vii 
Table of Contents 
 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Problem Definition and Objective ........................................................................................................................ 2 
1.2 Research Approach ............................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Thesis Contribution .............................................................................................................................................. 5 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.3.2 Practical Contributions ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.4 Thesis Roadmap ................................................................................................................................................... 6 
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH MODEL ..................................... 7 
2.1 Shared Services and Definition ............................................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1 Shared Services in General ...................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 IT Shared Services .................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 IT Governance and Definition .............................................................................................................................. 9 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches to IT Governance ......................................................................................................... 10 
2.3.1 Resource-based View .............................................................................................................................. 11 
2.3.2 Agency Theory ........................................................................................................................................ 12 
2.3.3 An Overarching Theory .......................................................................................................................... 14 
2.4 The Research Model ........................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4.1 The Construct Definitions ....................................................................................................................... 17 
2.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 20 
 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................................... 22 
3.1 The Detailed Research Model ............................................................................................................................ 22 
3.2 IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ....................................................................................................... 23 
3.2.1 Main Theoretical Predictions from Resource-based View ..................................................................... 23 
3.2.2 Main Theoretical Predictions from Agency View ................................................................................... 25 
3.2.3 Allocation of IT Decision Rights ............................................................................................................ 26 
3.3 IT Governance Structural Gap ............................................................................................................................ 33 
3.3.1 Presence of IT Governance Structural Gap ........................................................................................... 33 
3.3.2 Assessment of IT Governance Structural Gap ........................................................................................ 34 
3.4 Monitoring Mechanisms ..................................................................................................................................... 34 
3.4.1 Independent Review ................................................................................................................................ 35 
3.4.2 Profession-wide Oversight ..................................................................................................................... 36 
3.4.3 Joint Working ......................................................................................................................................... 37 
3.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 38 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 39 
4.1 Research Setting and Design .............................................................................................................................. 39 
4.2 Instrument Development .................................................................................................................................... 40 
4.2.1 Content Development ............................................................................................................................. 41 
4.2.2 Expert Judgment ..................................................................................................................................... 41 
4.2.3 Preliminary Review ................................................................................................................................ 46 
4.3 Pilot Study .......................................................................................................................................................... 47 
4.3.1 Pilot Study Participants .......................................................................................................................... 48 
4.3.2 Pilot Study Findings ............................................................................................................................... 48 
4.4 Data Collection Procedures ................................................................................................................................ 52 
4.4.1 Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................................... 52 
4.4.2 Survey Administration ............................................................................................................................ 52 
4.4.3 Sampling Frame ..................................................................................................................................... 53 
4.5 Data Preparation ................................................................................................................................................. 53 
4.5.1 Missing Data .......................................................................................................................................... 54 
4.5.2 Data Transformation .............................................................................................................................. 54 
4.6 Response Rate .................................................................................................................................................... 55 
4.7 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 56 
 DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING......................................................... 57 
5.1 Data Analysis Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 58 
5.2 Descriptive statistics ........................................................................................................................................... 58 
5.2.1 Demographics of Respondents ............................................................................................................... 59 
5.2.2 Comparison of Respondents ................................................................................................................... 61 
5.3 Exact Tests – Assessment of IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ......................................................... 63 
5.3.1 Characteristics of IT Governance Structure Distribution ...................................................................... 64 
5.3.2 Significance and Strength of Association ............................................................................................... 71 
5.3.3 Summary Results – Assessment of IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ..................................... 82 
viii 
5.3.4 Post Hoc Analysis – IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) .......................................................... 84 
5.3.5 Review of Research Question One – IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ................................. 90 
5.4 Partial Least Squares Analysis – Assessment of Business Value of IT .............................................................. 95 
5.4.1 Assessment of Measurement Model ........................................................................................................ 96 
5.4.2 Assessment of Structural Model ........................................................................................................... 101 
5.4.3 Summary Results – Assessment of Business Value of IT ....................................................................... 105 
5.4.4 Post Hoc Analysis – Business Value of IT ............................................................................................ 105 
5.4.5 Review of Research Question Two – Business Value of IT ................................................................... 116 
5.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 121 
 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................. 122 
6.1 Summary of Research Objectives..................................................................................................................... 122 
6.2 Summary of Research Findings ........................................................................................................................ 122 
6.2.1 IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ......................................................................................... 122 
6.2.2 IT Governance Structural Gap ............................................................................................................. 125 
6.2.3 Monitoring Mechanisms ....................................................................................................................... 127 
6.3 Limitations ....................................................................................................................................................... 129 
6.3.1 Threats to Internal Validity .................................................................................................................. 129 
6.3.2 Threats to External Validity ................................................................................................................. 130 
6.3.3 Threats to Construct Validity ............................................................................................................... 130 
6.3.4 Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity ............................................................................................ 131 
6.4 Implications ...................................................................................................................................................... 132 
6.4.1 Theoretical Implications ....................................................................................................................... 133 
6.4.2 Practical Implications .......................................................................................................................... 134 
6.4.3 Avenues for Future Research ............................................................................................................... 135 
6.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 137 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 138 
APPENDIX A: IT RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS ......................................................................... 152 
APPENDIX B: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS ................................................................................... 156 
APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE .......................................................................................................... 160 
APPENDIX D1: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT PRINCIPLES ............................................................ 175 
APPENDIX D2: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT INVESTMENT ......................................................... 178 
APPENDIX D3: CROSS-TABULATION OF BUSINESS APPLICATION NEEDS ........................... 181 
APPENDIX D4: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT ARCHITECTURE.................................................... 185 
APPENDIX D5: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT INFRASTRUCTURE ............................................... 189 
APPENDIX E: PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES OF GROUP COMPARISONS .................................... 192 
 
  
ix 
List of Figures & Tables 
Figure 2.1: Research Model .............................................................................................................................................. 15 
Figure 3.1: Detailed Research Model ............................................................................................................................... 23 
Figure 3.2: Allocation of Decision Rights ........................................................................................................................ 27 
Figure 4.1: Process of Survey Instrument Development .................................................................................................. 41 
Figure 5.1: Chapter Structure............................................................................................................................................ 57 
Figure 5.2: Assessment of Research Model – Part 1 ........................................................................................................ 63 
Figure 5.3: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT principles
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 5.4: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT Investment
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 67 
Figure 5.5: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for Business 
Application Needs ............................................................................................................................................................ 68 
Figure 5.6: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT 
Architecture ...................................................................................................................................................................... 69 
Figure 5.7: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT 
Infrastructure .................................................................................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 5.8: Assessment of Research Model – Part 2 ........................................................................................................ 95 
Figure 5.9: Path Analysis Model – Total Sample ........................................................................................................... 103 
Figure 5.10: Path Analysis Model – Shared Services Relationship ................................................................................ 107 
Figure 5.11: Path Analysis Model – Organisation Size .................................................................................................. 109 
 
Table 2.1: Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) ............................................................................................. 18 
Table 3.1: Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and IT Decision Domain ..................................................... 29 
Table 4.1: Elements of Research Setting .......................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 4.2: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Business Value ............................................................................ 44 
Table 4.3: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Independent Review .................................................................... 45 
Table 4.4: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Profession-wide Oversight .......................................................... 45 
Table 4.5: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Joint Working ............................................................................. 46 
Table 4.6: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Gap Assessment .......................................................................... 46 
Table 4.7: Respondent Profile for Completed Pilot Survey .............................................................................................. 48 
Table 4.8: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity .................... 49 
Table 4.9: Factor Loadings and Communalities Based on Maximum Likelihood Extraction .......................................... 50 
Table 4.10: Cronbach’s Alpha Results ............................................................................................................................. 51 
Table 4.11: Construct Operationalisation ......................................................................................................................... 55 
Table 5.1: Respondent Profile .......................................................................................................................................... 59 
Table 5.2: Organisation Profile ......................................................................................................................................... 60 
Table 5.3: Cross-Tabulation of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Organisation Size ........................ 62 
Table 5.4: Chi-Square Tests of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Organisation Size ........................ 62 
Table 5.5: Cross-Tabulation of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Relationship ................................ 62 
Table 5.6: Chi-Square Tests of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Relationship ................................ 63 
Table 5.7: Cross-tabulation – IT principles ...................................................................................................................... 73 
Table 5.8: Chi-Square Tests – IT principles ..................................................................................................................... 74 
Table 5.9: Symmetric Measures – IT principles ............................................................................................................... 74 
Table 5.10: Cross-tabulation – IT Investment .................................................................................................................. 75 
Table 5.11: Chi-Square Tests – IT Investment ................................................................................................................. 76 
Table 5.12: Symmetric Measures – IT Investment ........................................................................................................... 76 
Table 5.13: Cross-tabulation – Business Application Needs ............................................................................................ 77 
Table 5.14: Chi-Square Tests – Business Application Needs ........................................................................................... 78 
Table 5.15: Symmetric Measures – Business Application Needs ..................................................................................... 78 
Table 5.16: Cross-tabulation – IT Architecture ................................................................................................................ 79 
Table 5.17: Chi-Square Tests – IT Architecture ............................................................................................................... 79 
Table 5.18: Symmetric Measures – IT Architecture ......................................................................................................... 80 
Table 5.19: Cross-tabulation – IT Infrastructure .............................................................................................................. 80 
Table 5.20: Chi-Square Tests – IT Infrastructure ............................................................................................................. 81 
Table 5.21: Symmetric Measures – IT Infrastructure ....................................................................................................... 82 
Table 5.22: Summary Results of Total Sample ................................................................................................................ 83 
Table 5.23: Summary Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ............................................ 84 
Table 5.24: Results Group Comparison – Management Role ........................................................................................... 85 
Table 5.25: Results Group Comparison – Industry ........................................................................................................... 86 
Table 5.26: Results Group Comparison – Degree of Shared IT Services ......................................................................... 86 
Table 5.27: Results Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship ......................................................................... 87 
x 
Table 5.28: Summary Results of Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship..................................................... 87 
Table 5.29: Results Group Comparison – Organisation Size ........................................................................................... 88 
Table 5.30: Summary Results of Group Comparison – Organisation Size ....................................................................... 89 
Table 5.31: Results Group Comparison – Large Organisation Size x Shared Services Relationship ............................... 89 
Table 5.32: Results Group Comparison – Small Organisation Size x Shared Services Relationship ............................... 89 
Table 5.33: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) ....................................... 90 
Table 5.34: Quality Criteria of Measurement Model ........................................................................................................ 96 
Table 5.35: Reliability Measures ...................................................................................................................................... 97 
Table 5.36: Inter-Construct Correlations .......................................................................................................................... 98 
Table 5.37: Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings .................................................................................................. 98 
Table 5.38: Vertical Collinearity Estimates .................................................................................................................... 100 
Table 5.39: Descriptive Statistics for Each Construct .................................................................................................... 100 
Table 5.40: Quality Criteria of Structural Model ............................................................................................................ 102 
Table 5.41: Path Coefficient – Total Sample .................................................................................................................. 103 
Table 5.42: Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs ........................................................................................................... 104 
Table 5.43: Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²).................................................................................................. 104 
Table 5.44: Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) ................................................................................................ 104 
Table 5.45: Summary Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structural Gap and Monitoring Mechanism ................. 105 
Table 5.46: Results Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship ....................................................................... 108 
Table 5.47: Summary Hypotheses Testing for Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship .............................. 108 
Table 5.48: Results Group Comparison – Organisation Size ......................................................................................... 110 
Table 5.49: Summary Hypotheses Testing for Group Comparison – Organisation Size ................................................ 110 
Table 5.50: Results Profession-wide Oversight Comparison – Shared Services Relationship ....................................... 111 
Table 5.51: Results Profession-wide Oversight Comparison – Organisation Size ......................................................... 112 
Table 5.52: Pearson Correlations (Level Of Significance) of Business Value ............................................................... 114 
Table 5.53: Summary Hypothesis Testing for Group Comparison – Shared Services Delivery Arrangement .............. 115 
Table 5.54: Consolidated Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structural Gap and Monitoring Mechanism ............ 116 
Table 5.55: Decision Rights vs Accountability Gap by Management Role and IT Decision Domain ........................... 117 
Table 6.1: Summary Research Findings for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) .............................................. 123 
Table 6.2: Summary Research Findings for IT Governance Structural Gap .................................................................. 127 
Table 6.3: Summary Research Findings for Monitoring Mechanism ............................................................................. 129 
Table 6.4: Threats to Internal Validity ............................................................................................................................ 129 
Table 6.5: Threats to External Validity ........................................................................................................................... 130 
Table 6.6: Threats to Construct Validity ......................................................................................................................... 130 
Table 6.7: Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity ..................................................................................................... 131 
Table A.1: Resource Attribute and IT Decision Domain ................................................................................................ 152 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AVE Average Variance Extracted 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
COBIT Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
COO Chief Operating Officer 
CVR Content Validity Ratio 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
IS Information System 
IT Information Technology 
ITIL Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
KMO Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
PLS Partial Least Squares 
RBV Resource-based View 
SLA Service-Level Agreement 
SSC Shared Services Centre 
SSDA Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent global economic downturn has left its mark on both private and public sectors 
(e.g., Makkonen, 2013). Corporate executives struggle with competitive pressures to be aggressive 
in the market and often lack the required capital to develop important administrative and support 
functions. Research evidence reveals that, as organisations emerge from the recession, there is a 
common need to deliver competitive advantage that has led to an increased interest in a shared 
services model (HfS Research, 2011). While the notion of shared services is still under debate, it is 
broadly defined as the concentration of organisational resources performing “like” activities, 
typically spread across the organisation, to service multiple internal partners with the common goal 
of delighting external customers and enhancing corporate value (Schulman et al., 1999). Therefore, 
IT shared services is a collaborative business model of services provision by more than one 
business unit or organisation in which service aims and objectives are shared. This definition 
excludes outsourcing arrangements, i.e., third party vendors contractually charged with the 
provision of an organisation’s functions (Hirschheim et al., 2007). Lower costs, higher service 
levels, and greater responsiveness in delivering services to users are some positive outcomes of 
shared services applications. These outcomes are particularly relevant as internal services now need 
to be delivered with a service-oriented approach to all users within the organisation (Bergeron, 
2003; Goold, et al., 2001). Organisations, however, are also looking to gain more value from their 
shared services operations (Ernst & Young, 2013).  
The most popular support function targeted for shared services is IT services (Accenture, 
2011a; ATKearney, 2006). The proliferation of Intranet and Web service technologies based on 
commonly accepted standards allows for the sharing of a wide variety of IT functionality with 
efficient and reliable coordination mechanisms (Varian, 2002; Wagenaar, 2006). As technology 
becomes more pervasive, new organisational arrangements for shared services have become 
feasible. For example, the public sector is planning to invest in cloud computing infrastructure and 
increase the use of shared services to deliver its new whole-of-government IT strategy (CIO, 2013). 
With the appropriate shared services foundation in place, organisations could see the ripple effects 
of related advantages. These advantages include a clear path to private and community clouds, 
which build on core shared services components, such as shared business applications and service 
delivery models (CISCO, 2012). Unfortunately, organisations have often adopted a trial-and-error 
approach to develop and deploy the concept of shared services (Deloitte, 2009). The IT project 
failures and cost blowouts among various governments have led to questioning of the viability of 
the shared services approach (Queensland Audit Office, 2010). According to a recent survey from 
Deloitte, however, 95% of respondents believe that shared services will continue to be an important 
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and value-adding part of their organisations (Deloitte, 2013). Indeed, successful management of IT 
shared services was listed as one of the seven ‘habits’ of effective Chief Information Officers 
(CIOs) (Andriole, 2007).  
Some practitioners indicate IT governance is more crucial during an economic recession 
(Lebeaux, 2009). IT governance applies concepts borrowed from corporate governance to 
strategically drive and control IT, particularly in relation to two key-issues: the value IT delivers to 
an organisation and the control and mitigation of IT-related risks (Hardy, 2006; Peterson, 2003). 
Effective IT governance provides strategies that promote the effective management of IT resources 
so that these IT resources contribute to business value (Lainhart IV, 2001). The IT governance of 
shared services is a complicated endeavour as it often involves multiple stakeholders having 
different objectives, resources, and capabilities.  
The management and delivery of IT services in organisations constitutes a core interest of 
research in the academic discipline of information systems (IS) (Boynton & Zmud, 1987). Several 
operating frameworks to aid organisations in managing the delivery of IT services have arisen in the 
IS literature (Bharadwaj et al., 1999; Ray et al., 2005; Sambamurthy et al., 2003). The shared 
services concept still presents significant challenges and opportunities for organisations to improve 
performance (Ernst & Young, 2013; Provan & Milward, 2001). However, there are few studies on 
IT shared services and fewer yet that describe IT governance in a shared services environment.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 identifies the problems and states the research 
questions. Section 1.2 outlines the research approach. Section 1.3 discusses the theoretical and 
practical contributions of the research. Section 1.4 presents the thesis roadmap. 
1.1 Problem Definition and Objective  
The adoption of shared services delivery arrangements results in higher levels of 
interdependence across organisational boundaries and the possible need for supra-organisational 
connections (Janssen et al., 2009). To adopt such arrangements requires a need to change the 
existing ownership structure and agency relationship (ALGIM, 2010; Tomkinson, 2007). Therefore, 
shared services may have an impact on the IT governance, e.g., a trilateral relation is created 
between executive boards, business unit managers and shared services managers. It may not only be 
that the business unit managers are accountable to the executive board for performance, but the 
executive board also has a responsibility towards business unit managers to perform agreed services 
in a timely manner, according to specifications and costs. Although service-level agreements 
(SLAs) are commonly employed in the shared services environment, there is still much concern 
over the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms (Purtell, 2005). Hence, these mutual 
dependencies need to be coordinated using shared IT governance. 
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Studies have shown that not all organisations achieve the full benefits they expect from shared 
services (Deloitte, 2007). Reported direct cost savings due to deploying IT shared services are still 
not very well known and differ between sources (Strikwerda, 2006). For example, in a survey of 
210 senior managers, IBM found that the results of shared services have been ‘mundane rather than 
magical’ (IBM, 2005). Another study of 140 executives in North America and Europe found that 
actual benefits were less than the expected benefits in the majority of cases. Thirty-three percent of 
respondents reported no cost savings, and the average cost savings among the remainder was 14% 
(ATKearney, 2006). In Australia, the auditor-general has recently confirmed that shared services 
across government departments is far behind meeting its original savings target (The Age, 2013). In 
addition, business unit managers experience loss of control over their business system and some 
feel as if the corporate office is controlling them through the shared services providers. Complaints 
can also be heard regarding loss of market orientation, loss of customer responsiveness, lack of 
clear communication and decision-making. Given the long implementation times and obvious risks 
of achieving only mundane outcomes, senior executives seek advice on how to realise the full 
potential of shared services (Lacity & Fox, 2008). 
Governance for IT shared services often refers to two perspectives. The first perspective is the 
manner in which the shared services’ client is involved in the decision-making of the shared 
services’ provider. The second perspective is the governance within the client organisation itself. 
Much of the literature on IT shared services suggests that the client should be actively involved in 
the governance of the provider organisation (Cecil, 2000; Strikwerda, 2006; Ulbrich, 2006). Such 
involvement is appropriate if the provider and the client are in the same organisation under the same 
management. However, a separate and distinct organisation established to provide IT shared 
services is usually governed by its own management and it may not provide for client participation 
in its internal governance.  
From a strategic perspective, the role of governance is to ensure that the shared services 
operation remains aligned with the vision, mission, and guiding principles of the enterprise as a 
whole. From an operational perspective, the governance function establishes service expectations, 
and it monitors and improves service delivery (Accenture, 2007). The shared services operating 
model is unique and requires a robust governance approach that focuses not only internally, but also 
incorporates the viewpoints and guidance of its customers. When the governance structure (decision 
rights) framework is tightly constructed, it promotes accountability, stakeholder participation, and 
defined integration points for decision-making. Service delivery is paramount to the success of 
shared services and understanding customer requirements and monitoring the organisation's ability 
to ensure business outcomes is critical. To implement a new operating model requires changing 
behaviours in the organisation. Governance is one of the few key tools at the disposal of senior 
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management to facilitate the change (Schulman, et al., 1999; Weill and Ross, 2008) and governance 
represents the most important success factor for IT shared services delivery arrangements 
(Accenture, 2007; ATKearney, 2006). 
Thus, two research questions arise: 
1. Given a particular type of IT shared services delivery arrangement, what should be the IT 
governance structure (decision rights) adopted within an organisation? 
2. Are the decision rights and accountability allocated effectively? How does an 
organisation leverage IT governance practices to ensure desired business outcomes in a 
shared services environment?  
By examining aspects of the resource-based view and agency theory, this research develops 
and applies a conceptual framework which guides a comprehensive analysis of the relationships 
between IT governance and IT shared services delivery arrangements, as well as the factors 
determining the desired business outcomes from IT under such arrangements. The results of the 
study will be of interest to managers involved in IT shared services who wish to create IT 
governance mechanisms that support business goals, protect business investments in technology, 
and appropriately manage IT related opportunities and risks. 
1.2 Research Approach 
A set of hypotheses is proposed based on the research framework that integrates dimensions 
of IT governance structure and monitoring mechanisms applied to a shared services environment. 
Given the nature of the research objectives (i.e., to investigate what and how the defined variables 
from the research model should be related) and the adequate availability of prior evidence on which 
to formulate hypothesized relationships, a survey is the most appropriate research method for this 
study (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993).  
This study will utilise a ‘key informants’ methodology for data collection, a method that relies 
on a selected set of members to provide information about a social setting (Venkatraman, 1989). 
The ‘key informants’ methodology has been used to obtain quantifiable information on 
organisational structure, decision making distribution, within the group, and external relationships 
among groups that base their collaboration on the knowledge they share (Papoutsakis, 2008). Based 
on other IT studies, informants are not chosen at random; rather, they are chosen because they 
possess special qualifications such as status, experience, or specialised knowledge (e.g., Munoz-
Cornejo, 2007; Smith et al., 2014). In survey research, targeted respondents assume the role of a 
key informant and they provide information on an aggregated unit of analysis - a shared services 
client organisation in this study - by reporting on organisational properties rather than personal 
attitudes and perception. A damaging confound in utilising a key informant strategy is a lack of 
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knowledge by the respondent. Therefore, within the context of this study, it is important to identify 
organisations that actively engage in IT shared services arrangements, and to identify respondents 
within those organisations who are involved with, and most knowledgeable (at an organisational 
level) about, the IT governance activities.  
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
This research will enrich and expand the research into IT governance by examining the 
complexity of IT governance arrangements and their impacts on the business value of IT shared 
services. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
From a theoretical perspective, this research offers a conceptual framework to identify the 
factors influencing an organisation’s choice of IT governance structure formations and monitoring 
mechanisms. This research provides a more integrated approach to IT shared services governance 
issues and it develops an inter-disciplinary perspective by building on agency theory while 
considering the rich insights offered by complementary theories, such as the resource-based view of 
the firm. This research investigates how the resource-based view would utilise IT resources and 
their integration with the concept of organisational capabilities to enable IT governance capability 
for the organisation. This conceptualisation views IT governance as a capability, that if effectively 
developed and implemented, may improve the business value generated from the shared IT 
sourcing. By using quantitative data collected from shared services organisations to test the research 
model, the study also contributes to the ongoing debate on the potential of IT governance in 
delivering business value. Based on the results achieved, implications are presented for IS research, 
along with some prospective directions for shared services clients as well as providers for designing 
their shared IT governance. 
1.3.2 Practical Contributions 
This research is expected to help shared services organisations in a number of ways of which 
four are identified here. First, it provides insights for executive management relative to establishing 
an IT governance structure to match their shared services delivery arrangements. Second, it helps 
organisations guide the design of their monitoring mechanisms to implement the shared IT 
operation. Third, it assists IT management with identifying action plans for aligning their decision 
making structure with their accountability structure. Fourth, in the current economic situation of 
tightening IT budgets, the findings of this study give practitioners a more informed idea about 
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shared services organisations’ concerns for delivering the outcomes of IT shared services, allowing 
them to adjust their IT governance mechanisms appropriately. 
1.4 Thesis Roadmap  
To provide empirical evidence for the suggested relationships, this study uses a positivist 
research methodology that builds upon hypotheses, derived from theory and previous research. The 
core part of this study is, therefore, the conceptual foundation and empirical validation of IT 
governance in shared services.  
Chapter 2 summarises the conceptual foundations of this study. First, the two key research 
objectives of this study, shared services and IT governance, are defined. Second, basic concepts 
from the resource-based view and agency theory are presented and a research framework of IT 
governance, to be analysed in this study, is developed. The chapter closes with the constructs 
definitions and measures. 
Chapter 3 extends the theoretical basis from the resource-based view and agency theory 
approaches before integrating the theories during the development of empirically testable 
hypotheses from the research model developed in Chapter 2. The relationship between the shared 
services delivery arrangement and the IT governance structure for each IT decision domain is 
developed first, followed by the examination of the relationships between the IT governance 
structural gap, the monitoring mechanism, and their impacts on business value of IT. 
 Chapter 4 examines the research methodology adopted. The chapter starts with a brief review 
of the research design. The chapter describes the development of the survey instrument and pilot 
test, including their results and recommendations for the main study. This chapter also highlights 
any ethical considerations, the survey administration process, and the approach used to identify the 
organisations to contact in the course of the questionnaire distribution. The chapter discusses the 
data preparation and concludes with a summary of response rate. 
Chapter 5 commences by justifying the chosen analytical methodology, the exact test and 
partial least square approaches, and describes their underlying statistical concepts. After describing 
the method of data generation with an online survey, the data sets are tested for representativeness, 
evaluated in terms of their data quality, and assessed for potential biases. In addition, the required 
significance levels for the confirmatory approach are determined. The empirical results are the main 
contents of this chapter. The measures are tested for reliability and validity, followed by formal 
hypotheses testing. 
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the empirical results and derives implications for researchers and 
managers. Potential limitations of this study are discussed and avenues for further research are 
detailed. The chapter closes with a summary of the overall study and its findings. 
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH MODEL 
This chapter discusses the theoretical foundations upon which this research is built. Section 
2.1 reviews literature on shared services in general and IT shared services specifically. Section 2.2 
defines IT governance. Section 2.3 presents the conceptual framework for analysing the IT 
governance mechanisms for shared services. This section briefly synthesizes the extant literature 
relating to the resource-based view and agency theory. The research model is developed from these 
theoretical foundations in section 2.4. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.5. 
2.1 Shared Services and Definition 
The current literature is comprised of a wide variety of definitions and characteristics of 
shared services. What is identical in most sources, however, is a shared delineation of the concept 
of simple consolidation or centralisation while distinguishing shared services from traditional 
outsourcing concepts (e.g., Bergeron, 2003; Grant et al., 2007; Sako, 2010; Schulman et al., 1999; 
Singh & Craike, 2008; Ulbrich, 2006). 
2.1.1 Shared Services in General 
According to Accenture (2005, p.3), the definition of shared services is ‘the consolidation of 
support functions (such as human resources, finance, information technology, and procurement) 
from several departments into a standalone organisational entity whose only mission is to provide 
services as efficiently and effectively as possible.’ Through transferring administrative and 
transaction-oriented tasks into a separate business unit, retained functions can take on a more 
strategic role and focus on more value-adding tasks (Quinn et al., 2000). Shared services allow 
organisations to reduce costs through process standardisation and economies of scale. 
Standardisation reduces process duplication and economies of scale are achieved through 
combining processes previously carried out independently (Davenport, 2005).  
2.1.2 IT Shared Services 
For the purpose of this study, IT shared services is broadly defined as ‘a collaborative 
business model of IT shared services provision by more than one business unit or organisation in 
which service aims and objectives are shared.’ The definition implies the concept of shared services 
is more than centralisation of service within a single organisation. It also includes sharing with a 
separate and distinct organisation, but stresses there should be an agreement that emphasises 
‘shared’ responsibility for service end-results. In addition, this definition implies that the shared 
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services provider is typically responsible for providing services to an agreed service level and 
reporting on service performance. The definition is independent of the shared services delivery 
arrangements adopted and IT governance arrangements used to control the service provision. 
IT shared services arrangements could engage in transaction-based, expertise-based, and/or 
strategy-based activities (Aguirre et al., 1998). The primary focus of IT shared services has been the 
concentration of transaction-based services that are repetitive and similar for each business unit. 
Transaction-based services are routine, high volume tasks that are highly sensitive to scale, e.g., IT 
infrastructure support. Many knowledge-based activities (e.g., IT project management and IT 
planning) can be pooled together and, in a more enterprising and flexible way, made available to a 
wider range of internal and external stakeholders. Shared services transforms the business of IT by 
further integrating expertise-based and strategy-based services, e.g. multiple IT architectures and 
systems into a cohesive vision for IT to deliver maximum value to the organisation. 
To implement a new IT shared services delivery arrangement requires changing behaviours in 
the enterprise as organisations gradually shift from being the service provider to being customer-
driven and finally to being the business partner leveraging on the success achieved at each phase 
(Couto et al., 2002). Frequently referenced definitions exemplify how shared services addresses the 
problems of traditional modes of IT service delivery by breaking down the existing service 
provision functional silos (Ulbrich et al. 2010). Much of the existing IT literature on shared services 
has observed the intra-organisational shared services implementations (e.g., Goh et al., 2007; Lacity 
& Fox, 2008; Sia et al., 2010). The shared services model originally involved different departments 
within a large corporation, or businesses with the same parent ‘owner’, who set up a new business 
unit to take on all relevant IT services. An increasing interest and potential for service sharing 
suggests increasing value from achieving more savings and realising further improvements in 
operational efficiencies. As such, it is worthwhile to investigate the potential for similar 
organisations to share similar or common services. However, only limited relevant IT literature is 
dedicated to inter-organisational sharing IT services (e.g., Janssen & Joha, 2006).  
Shared services centres (SSCs) are an increasingly important and often-utilised approach to 
organising IT services (Schulz et al., 2009). Several studies from both industry and academia have 
assessed the implementation of SSCs in large corporations (Accenture, 2005; ATKearney, 2006; 
Janssen & Joha, 2007a). Many definitions exist, that differ in important characteristics, of the SSC 
concept. However, most definitions explicitly emphasise the independent organisational form of an 
SSC as a unit clearly separate from other areas with its own responsibilities and its own 
management. Frequently, the term ‘partly autonomous’ is used to signal that the SSCs are managed 
like separate businesses but still highly dependent on the parent company (Bergeron, 2003). Thus, 
the SSC typically belongs 100% to the corporation which at the same time is its main client. This 
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setup results in a very specific governance model and restricts the entrepreneurial freedom of the 
SSC. For instance, many SSC-internal decisions have to be agreed by the corporate group. 
2.2 IT Governance and Definition 
The IT governance literature includes a range of definitions providing different perspectives 
on the concept. Stated differently, IT governance is a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing 
the alignment of IT with business (Van Grembergen, 2000), the IT related decision-making 
framework (Broadbent, 2002), and the IT related structure within an organisation (Schwarz & 
Hirschheim, 2003). The available definitions differ considerably depending upon the researcher’s 
intention and approach to the research topic. The definition of IT governance has even been used to 
reflect the dynamic nature of the organisational environment (Patel, 2002).  
In broad terms, IT governance is the tension between the exercise of decision rights, as a 
subset of corporate governance, and the design and execution of structures and processes to 
implement organisational objectives (ITGI 2003, 2007b; Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008, 
2009). IT consumes considerable resources within modern organisations that both creates and 
mitigates risks. Building IT governance requires outlay of both money and managerial time 
resources. While focused primarily on the design of decision rights, Weill and Ross (2004) note that 
‘top performing’ enterprises more effectively bind IT and organisational processes, and generate 
significantly higher levels of return on their IT investments than do their competitors. 
Until the mid-1990’s, most information systems were targeted toward in-house use. IT 
governance, therefore, has often been applied from an internal perspective (Brown, 1999; Brown & 
Magill, 1994; Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999). In multi-business organisations, IT governance helps 
create synergies obtainable through shared, yet not identical, IT infrastructures, IT strategy making 
processes, IT vendor management processes, and IT human resource management processes. The 
lack of commonalities and the uniqueness of each component make the governance of IT in this 
context extremely challenging. 
The shared services delivery arrangements vary depending upon the degree to which the 
organisations are tightly linked. Shared services relationships, including inter-organisational 
relationships, also require the coordination of task and function interdependence. Such 
interdependence suggests that each participant could be independent of the others, or that each one 
could be dependent on the preceding one, depending on how the shared services relationships are 
set. It is important to note that there is a clear distinction between IT governance and IT 
management. IT management focuses on the effective and efficient internal supply of shared IT 
services and products and the management of shared IT operations. IT governance in turn is much 
broader and concentrates on performing and transforming IT to meet present and future demands of 
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the shared services customers and external customers (Van Grembergen & De Haes, 2009). This 
high-level focus of IT governance is confirmed in the IT definition of Information Technology 
Governance Institute, which states that ‘IT governance is the responsibility of executives and the 
board of directors’ (Information Technology Governance Institute, 2004). 
Weill and Ross (2004) define IT governance as ‘specifying the decision rights and 
accountability framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT.’ Furthermore, IT 
governance institutionalises best practices for monitoring IT performance to ensure that the 
enterprise's shared IT capabilities support its business objectives (Information Technology 
Governance Institute, 2004). For the purpose of this study, Weill and Ross’s definition of IT 
governance is adopted and expanded to emphasise the monitoring mechanisms. IT governance is 
therefore defined as ‘the distribution of IT decision rights and accountabilities among enterprise 
stakeholders and the mechanisms for monitoring decisions regarding IT.’ 
2.3 Theoretical Approaches to IT Governance 
A framework is necessary for systematically analysing and understanding the IT governance 
of the operation of shared services. Such a framework should provide the theoretical lenses through 
which the data will be analysed. The sharing of services concerns the unbundling and re-
concentration of resources to allow multiple users to obtain services from one supplier and to deal 
with changes in response to the external environment, such as legal, economic and technological 
changes. IT governance mechanisms may be limited by, and dependent on, the heterogeneous 
organisational resources participating in the shared services network (Janssen & Joha, 2007a). 
In this study, the resource-based view and agency theory are used to analyse and propose a 
structural mechanism for allocating IT decision rights and a process mechanism for monitoring IT 
governance capability. The resource centric approach views organisations as a bundle of resources 
(Barney, 1991). The resource-based view assumes that organisations possess resources (including 
IT) that differentiate them from their competitors (Barney, 1991). Thus, effective leveraging of IT 
resources is contingent upon how an organisation synchronizes its IT capabilities with other 
organisational capabilities (Prasad et al., 2010). The resource-based view provides suggestions on 
the synergy of these capabilities resulting in the creation of higher-level capability which is distinct 
to a shared services organisation, i.e., an effective IT governance structure. The theory is also 
recognised as an appropriate theoretical lens to examine IT business value (Patas et al., 2012). 
Agency theory is concerned with the ‘ubiquitous agency relationship’ in which one party (i.e., 
the principal) assigns tasks to another party (i.e., the agent) (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency problem 
arises due to a conflict of interest between the principal (i.e., shared services client) and the agent 
(i.e., shared services provider) in terms of work that has been delegated to the agent by the 
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principal. Practically speaking, agency theory is useful in evaluating control through which 
principals and agents can communicate economically. The traditional economic view of information 
asymmetry assumes one party in a transaction has information that the other party does not have. 
Such information affects the outcome of the transaction or induces behaviours that benefit the party 
possessing the private information. This asymmetry leads to moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the IT governance problem can also be viewed as an information 
asymmetry problem and governance practice can be viewed as the mitigation of such asymmetry. 
The agency theory provides the philosophical arguments on the need for an effective IT governance 
structure and monitoring mechanism. Before describing the proposed research model, the basic 
concepts of the resource-based view and agency theory are introduced in the following sections as 
they provide different perspectives on IT governance.  
2.3.1 Resource-based View 
The resource-based view (RBV) has emerged as an important explanation for persistent 
organisation-level performance differences (Leiblein, 2003). A seminal contribution to resource-
based theory is provided by Wernerfelt (1984), who proposes the notion of resource position 
barriers, i.e., barriers to imitation, and links resource attributes to profitability. Subsequent research 
examined how performance differences across organisations can be attributed to the variance in 
organisations’ strategic resources and capabilities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2005; Peteraf, 1993), including the analysis of resources in the 
context of interconnected organisations (Dovev, 2006). This perspective can be applied to a shared 
services environment, as it draws attention to managing IT resources efficiently and effectively, and 
providing the core business with high levels of IT services (Ray et al., 2005). 
First, the resource-based view of the firm argues that differential firm performance is 
fundamentally due to firm heterogeneity rather than industry structure (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Firms that are able to accumulate resources and capabilities that are rare, valuable, non-
substitutable, and difficult to imitate will achieve a competitive advantage over competing firms 
(Barney, 1991). Thus, the extant theory views the firm as the primary unit of analysis, and the 
search for competitive advantage has focused on those resources that are housed within the firm. 
This study, however, takes a broader view of resource-based theory. Each shared services delivery 
arrangement represents a different sourcing strategy and it has a collection of unique resources and 
capabilities that are used and shared by all the stakeholders. Therefore, a firm’s critical resources 
and capabilities may extend beyond the organisation boundaries encompassing inter-firm routines 
and processes (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Designing an effective IT governance structural capability is, 
thus, dependent on the resource characteristics of participating business units or organisations. The 
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resource-based view draws attention to identify an organisation’s unique IT governance resources 
and then help develop an effective IT governance structure in a unique way. 
Second, while acknowledging that the direct effect of IT rarely exists, more resource-based 
inquiry has shown that IT may still have an indirect effect on a firm’s competitive position or 
performance (Zhang, 2007). That is, despite lacking the characteristics required for sustainable 
competitive advantage, IT may exert positive influence on firm performance through their 
relationships with other organisational resources. Following the logic of resource complementarity 
(Teece, 1988), IT and strategy researchers have argued that firms whose IT are complemented by 
other firm-specific and hard-to-copy organisational resources are in a better position to defend their 
IT-derived competitive advantage than those that lack such resources (Bharadwaj, 2000; Byrd, 
2001). According to this line of reasoning, though the necessary software and hardware used by a 
firm’s IT can be easily imitated, it is more difficult for its competitors to copy the unique and 
intangible resources the firm uses in governing its IT. Moreover, blending IT with other 
organisational resources in devising decision making capability may create a complex set of 
complementary resources that are not easily matched by competitors, thus further sustaining IT-
based advantage (Bharadwaj, 2000).  
While resource-based view provides useful insights into the allocation of decision rights, it 
also suggests effective IT governance process mechanism, as an internal critical capability, can be a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage. In addition, appropriate IT governance structure in a 
shared services delivery arrangement can yield business value by ensuring shared IT is aligned to 
business strategy and objectives (Weill, 2004).   
2.3.2 Agency Theory 
The agency theory framework relates to the need for governance of an organisational resource 
(Mulili & Wong, 2011). This theory assumes the existence of an agency relationship in an 
organisation which results in agency costs. Agency costs refer to a decrease in shareholders wealth 
because of management’s opportunist behaviour. Internal governance structures such as an IT 
governance structure can effectively reduce the instances of such costs, hence increasing the 
business value of IT (Donald & Davish, 1991). 
Concerned with exchanges in which one party (principal) delegates work to another (agent), 
agency theory endeavours to surface contractual problems arising from the assumption that the 
agents will behave opportunistically if their interests are not aligned with those of the principals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is applicable when describing client-provider 
relationships in IT shared services arrangements. The cooperating parties are engaged in an agency 
relationship defined as a contract (e.g., service agreement) under which one or more persons (the 
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principal(s)) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). Typically, the 
shared services client organisation or business unit (principal) transfers property/decision rights to 
the shared services provider organisation or business unit (agent). In the context of IT, the assets (or 
resources) transferred might be infrastructure, systems and documentation, and/or employees. This 
study suggests the shared services relationships pose different risks and challenges to the client 
organisation, leading to different decision-making and controlling issues. 
Several primary agency problems arise in a shared services environment. First, the principal 
(shared services client) and agent (shared services provider) may have conflicting goals. The 
definition of the goals in shared services can be a controversial issue because no one has absolute 
authority within IT. The various stakeholders hold different, sometimes opposing views on IT goals 
and priorities. Even the sharing of some goals, however, does not necessarily mean that people 
agree either on which goals should be optimised, or on how to optimise them. The shared services 
providers, for example, want to maximize their own wealth, power and prestige while safeguarding 
their reputation. The owners of the client organisations want to maximize the value of their assets 
by pressuring the service providers to become more accountable in their use of IT resources and by 
expecting them to do more at a lower cost. Meanwhile, the users demand more IT sophisticated and 
responsive services to boost their own business performance. These interests often collide, as the 
shared services providers can take actions that increase their power, influence or prestige without 
increasing the value of the resources and the quality of services.  
Second, it is difficult or expensive for the principal (shared services client) to measure what 
the agent (shared services provider) is actually doing. According to agency theory, contracts are 
mechanisms for resolving, by ex ante stipulation, problems that arise from the imperfect alignment 
of interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a shared services environment, these contracts may be 
implicit, (based on unspoken mutual expectations, cultural norms, organisational culture) or explicit 
(based upon written representations, such as service-level agreements (SLAs)). However, these 
contracts are generally not legally binding (Knapp, 2013). The client organisation may deal with 
unclear, multi-interpretable or incomplete definitions about the scope of the services, the 
responsibilities of the business and shared services provider, and other important aspects (Janssen & 
Joha, 2004). Many SLAs are also not monitored regularly because the process of collecting data on 
SLA outcomes can be labourious and time-consuming (Huiji et al., 2009).  
Third, the principal (shared services client) and the agent (shared services provider) may 
adopt different actions because of different attitudes toward risk. This situation may be related or 
unrelated to their respective goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, the shared services 
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providers improperly use or adopt emerging IT technologies without considering their risks and 
maximising the benefits of new IT investment.  
Finally, a substantial level of information asymmetry may be expected within firms (Ni & 
Khazanchi, 2009; Sharma, 1997). For example, the IT manager in most organisations is a specialist 
and not a business manager. Similarly, the business manager is generally not an IT specialist and 
usually possesses minimal IT knowledge that is general in nature and may not be specific. Such 
information asymmetry also exists between shared services provider and shared services client in 
the context of IT governance. For example, IT knows the new technology developments and 
business may not foresee the benefits (i.e., IT specific knowledge). On the contrary, IT may not 
know the business issues sufficiently to leverage new technology (i.e., business specific 
knowledge). Jensen & Meckling (1998) suggest that getting specific knowledge used in decision-
making is costly, therefore, requires decentralising many decision rights in firms. 
While agency theory provides useful insights into the allocation of decision rights, it also 
provides a basis for devising monitoring mechanisms that minimise inefficiencies in the contractual 
structure of the firm that arise from imperfect alignment of interests between principals and agents.  
2.3.3 An Overarching Theory 
By integrating resource-based view and agency theory, this study suggests three principles for 
the client organisation to develop the IT governance capabilities: 
1. Align resource characteristics with the decision rights to exercise control over a particular 
IT asset, i.e., specify clearly relevant IT decision domains for the shared services client 
and the shared services provider (Barney, 1991; Wade & Hulland, 2004) – Resource-
based view. 
2. Align decision rights with specific knowledge useful to competently exercise those rights 
(because general knowledge is easily transferable, it is not necessarily required that 
decision rights and general knowledge be co-located) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This 
principle suggests that decision rights may be allocated to shared services providers to the 
levels at which managers have the specific knowledge to competently use those rights – 
Agency theory.  
3. Design monitoring mechanisms to minimise agency risks and ensure IT performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1985) – Agency theory.  
  
15 
2.4 The Research Model 
Implementing an effective IT governance framework facilitates the achievement of business 
value through IT (Agarwal & Sambamurthy, 2002). IT shared services operating models may be 
subject to change for various reasons, e.g., changing regulations, entering into new IT activities, and 
inter-partner learning. The choice of shared services delivery arrangement is of course relevant for 
the overall business value created from IT. However, for exploring the impact on IT governance, 
separate sourcing strategies can be seen (and assumed) as a given choice made by the organisation 
prior to devising appropriate IT governance mechanisms. Organisations recognise that ‘getting IT 
right’ will not be about technology, but about (shared) IT governance (Peterson, 2004). As shown in 
figure 2.1, this study proposes an integrated view of IT governance design to address both structural 
and monitoring capabilities, and their influences on business value of IT. The key elements of the 
research model are explored in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
Figure 2.1: Research Model 
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developing differentiated structural IT governance capabilities to proactively respond in an 
integrated manner to unanticipated changes (Agarwal & Sambamurthy, 2002; Hitt et al., 1998; 
Peterson et al., 2000).  
Different shared services delivery arrangements have different targeted levels of business 
process integration and standardisation for delivering IT services to customers (Tomkinson, 2007). 
Business strategies encompass a broad range of key managerial decision areas – IT decision 
domains that offer direction for developing and leveraging IT capabilities (Weill & Ross, 2004). A 
key aspect of IT governance concerns who decides the direction of IT. Much of the discourse on IT 
governance has been on the exercise of decision-making rights and the forms of IT organisational 
structure (Brown & Grant, 2005; Weill & Ross, 2004). Given different strategies and organisation 
forms, different shared services organisations will encourage different behaviours. Accordingly, the 
IT governance structure (decision rights) varies from more centralised to more decentralised 
approaches sometimes using a hybrid of both depending on their combinations of shared services 
delivery arrangements and IT decision domains.  
With decision rights comes accountability, which is a multi-faceted task involving the board, 
business and IT management. Ultimately, the board is responsible for all governance, but the board 
will expect or delegate an individual (e.g., the CEO or CIO) or group to be accountable for IT 
governance design, implementation, and performance, i.e., IT governance structure (accountability) 
(Weill & Ross, 2004). A variety of structural forms for accountability and systems of performance 
measurement have been proposed to ensure good organisational practices, e.g., COBIT and IT 
governance maturity assessment (Van Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen & De Haes, 2008). In 
the middle of figure 2.1, the two axes IT governance structural gap represent a continuous loop of 
identifying the difference between IT governance structure (decision rights) and IT structure 
(accountability), and assessing the results of the adopted IT governance mechanisms.  
The ultimate goal of IT governance is to achieve strategic alignment between the business and 
IT to ensure that IT investments lead to business value (Van Grembergen et al., 2004). 
Organisations that lack effective governance suffer from low performance, heightened risk 
exposure, and resource allocation that may appear inappropriate, arbitrary, or political (Van 
Grembergen & De Haes, 2008; Weill, 2004). Weill and Ross (2004) argue that effective IT 
governance is the single most important predictor of the business value that organisations can 
generate from IT. Other researchers have made similar claims about the importance of IT 
governance. For example, IT governance allows an enterprise to more effectively concentrate on 
major business issues and facilitates guaranteeing security, integrity and reliability of organisation’s 
strategic information (Lainhart IV, 2001). Clarity of accountability and responsibility help effective 
IT governance lead, in turn, to more business value returned from IT investments (Haghjoo, 2012). 
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Thus, to achieve business value of IT from sharing IT services, an organisation must assess and 
minimise the IT governance structural gap between desirable and actual behaviours (Clementi & 
Carvalho, 2009).  
At the lower level (right hand side of figure 2.1), organisations must develop a repertoire of 
mechanisms to monitor IT decision-making. The IT governance model challenges managers in a 
client organisation or business units to surrender control over certain business-specific IT domains 
for the well-being of the enterprise or shared services partners and to develop business-to-IT and 
business-to-business shared services partnerships (Van Grembergen, 2004). In particular, the 
challenge is to control IT decision-making, yet empower shared services providers to take 
responsibility for IT decisions (e.g., Hodge, 2012). Many organisations still struggle with this task, 
especially considering their ‘cultural’ IT governance legacy with business resistance to change and 
relinquishment of IT control (Alter, 2001; Scheier, 2001). To achieve business value of IT, an 
organisation must articulate and implement appropriate monitoring mechanisms to ensure shared 
services management’s action is aligned with the best interests of the client organisation in terms of 
shared IT strategy.  
2.4.1 The Construct Definitions 
The resource-based view and agency theory provide a useful conceptual framework for 
understanding the IT governance structure and the factors that affect their ability to successfully 
implement IT shared services. The construct definitions and key measures devised from the 
research model in figure 2.1 are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.4.1.1 Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
Moving to IT shared services means a fundamental change to an organisation's service 
delivery model. A precise typology of shared services delivery arrangements has been proposed by 
(Tomkinson, 2007, p. 30), and it contains four shared services models. First, the ‘intra-service’ 
model includes limited shared services options, such as centralised procurement and purchasing 
services. Second, the ‘service’ model embodies a degree of formality of sharing a complete service 
but the organisation is not changed to meet the challenge of the sharing. Third, the ‘corporate’ 
model involves two or more business units forming a joint arrangement to deliver a specific service 
or services at a mutually agreed standard in which both the costs and benefits are borne by all 
participating business units on a negotiated basis (a “user pays” model). Fourth, the ‘supra-
corporate’ model enables two or more participating organisations to set up a separate special 
purpose vehicle (e.g., joint venture) to deliver a specified service or services on behalf of 
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participating organisations. A fifth delivery vehicle called ‘iso-corporate’ can be added. It is an 
extension of the supra-corporate model. The provider organisation would control all the assets and 
the means of delivery. The introduction of a third-party involvement is useful particularly to 
leverage existing investment (Dibbern et al., 2004). 
Table 2.1: Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
Characteristic Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
Definition Collaboration on 
specific and/or 
specialist services. 
e.g., purchasing IT 
equipment; 
partnership for 
delivery a project; 
or sharing an 
integrated software 
package. 
One business unit 
allows another to 
provide the service 
with a transfer of 
control and 
responsibility, e.g., 
all the budget 
belongs to the 
‘shared’ service 
business unit. 
Two or more 
business units or 
organisations form 
a joint arrangement 
to ‘share’ a specific 
service or services 
at a mutually 
agreed standard in 
which both the 
costs and benefits 
are borne by all 
participating 
organisations on a 
negotiated basis, 
e.g., setting up a 
new management 
group. 
Two or more 
participating 
organisations set up 
a separate special 
purpose vehicle to 
deliver a specified 
service or services 
on behalf of 
participating 
organisations, e.g., 
joint venture. 
An extension of the 
‘supra-corporate’ 
model. The 
delivery 
organisation is 
allowed to provide 
services to external 
customers, e.g., 
shared services 
centre. 
Degree of 
formality of 
service 
arrangement  
Informal 
 
Informal Formal Formal Formal 
Type of 
agreement  
None None Service- level 
agreement 
Service-level 
agreement/ 
Contract 
Service-level 
agreement/ 
Contract 
Legal Basis   Intra-organisation 
business unit 
Intra-organisation 
business unit 
Intra or Inter-
organisation 
business unit – 
flexible depending 
on customer needs 
Independent 
subsidiary – 
incorporated 
independent of the 
parent firm, e.g., 
joint venture, 
companies limited 
by shares 
Independent 
subsidiary –
incorporated 
independent of the 
parent firm, e.g., 
joint venture, 
companies limited 
by shares 
Risk transference None None/Limited Limited/Moderate Substantial Substantial 
Management  –
External market 
No access 
 
No access Very limited Limited access Free access 
Source: Modified from Tomkinson (2007). Detailed characteristics are shown in Appendix B. 
2.4.1.2 IT Decision Domain 
Weill and Ross (2004) propose that organisations have five major IT decisions to make. To 
facilitate the effective and efficient management of IT shared services, the five key IT decision 
domains can be organised within the IT resources framework proposed by Wade and Hulland 
(2004). First, ‘IT principles’ decisions dictate the role of IT in the enterprise (Broadbent & Weill, 
1997; Davenport et al., 1989). Second, ‘IT investment’ decisions concern how much and where to 
invest in IT, including project approvals and justification techniques (Devaraj & Kohli, 2002; Ross 
& Beath, 2002). Third, ‘business application needs’ decisions determine the appropriate 
applications to be implemented for the organisation (Earl, 1993). Fourth, ‘IT architecture’ decisions 
focus on technical IT implementation choices and directions, including standardisation to integrate 
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technological alternatives to satisfy business needs (Keen, 1995; Ross, 2003). Fifth, ‘IT 
infrastructure’ decisions concern the platform delivery of IT services, including network, sharing 
data, and common applications (Keen, 1991; Weill et al., 2002). 
2.4.1.3 IT Governance Structure 
IT governance structure involves the existence of responsible functions for making IT 
decisions (Van Grembergen et al., 2004). Weill and Ross (2004) propose six mutually exclusive 
governance archetypes (i.e., committee structures) for making decisions. First, a ‘business 
monarchy’ includes a group of business executives (i.e. CEO, CIO, COO, et al) and excludes IT 
executives (i.e. shared services provider) who act independently. Second, ‘IT monarchy’ includes IT 
executives (i.e. shared services provider) who act as individuals or a group with equivalent officers 
participating in the decision-making process. Third, ‘feudal’ includes business unit leaders, key 
process owners or their delegates. Fourth, ‘federal’ includes business executives (i.e. CEO, CIO, 
COO, et al) and at least one other business group (i.e. business unit leaders) with the IT executives 
(i.e. shared services provider) being an additional participant. Fifth, ‘IT duopoly’ includes IT 
executives (i.e. shared services provider) and one other group (i.e. business executives or business 
unit leaders) or a joint decision by two organisations in the fields of IT and business. Sixth, 
‘anarchy’ includes individual users with no designation of decision-making authority. Most 
organisations use a variety of decision archetypes across the five decision domains. The decision 
rights (who makes business-IT related decisions) and accountability (who is accountable for in each 
decision area) structures are separately identified and assessed in this study.  
2.4.1.4 IT Governance Structural Gap 
The presence of ‘structural gap’ refers to the identified difference between decision rights 
and accountability. Decision rights are defined as the extent to which groups make or have final 
‘say so’ over decisions while accountability is defined as the extent to which groups are held 
responsible for the outcome of decisions (Grover et al., 2007). Assessing and diagnosing IT 
governance can help close the structural gap. The ‘gap assessment’ includes mapping the current 
governance structure onto the anticipated governance structure, auditing IT governance metrics and 
accountabilities, and evaluating IT governance awareness and engagement on a regular basis 
(Clementi & Carvalho, 2009). 
20 
2.4.1.5 Monitoring Mechanism 
Control by knowledgeable peers or customers is more robust than formal control mechanisms 
(Sitkin et al., 2010). Three monitoring mechanisms are considered to align the interests of agent 
(shared services provider) with principal (shared services client). First, ‘independent review’ is the 
practice of having competent, objective reviewers evaluate the IT shared services policy and 
monitor the service agreement. The existence of independent professionals, not permanently and 
directly employed by the service providers themselves, has often been vital for these efforts 
(Pawlowski & Robey, 2004; Pollitt, 1986). Opportunistic inclinations of unscrupulous agents are 
often held in check by the standards for IT professional practice (Sharma, 1997). Second, 
‘profession-wide oversight’ involves the systematic application of IT rules, standards, or principles 
developed from research and the actual practices of and incidents experienced by major 
organisations (Kouzmin et al., 1999; Kumbakara, 2008). Third, ‘joint working’ requires close 
consultation between the stakeholders (i.e., top management, business unit, shared services partner, 
and shared services provider) and co-ordinates the different but complementary interests and/or 
contributions. Joint working is therefore defined as the joint effort by which the service provider 
and client produce the service. In this joint effort, the quality of the final product largely depends on 
the active involvement of the clients in the joint production of service product. To organise a 
solution that fits the client’s situation, the provider must offer specific knowledge that fits the client 
specific needs, and combine it successfully with the client’s knowledge base (Hertog, 2002; Lee & 
Kim, 1999).  
2.4.1.6 Business Value of IT 
Numerous research has shown links between IT governance and business value (e.g., 
Haghjoo, 2012; Weill, 2004). Business value of IT has been commonly used to refer to the 
organisational-performance impacts of IT shared services. This study defines ‘business value of IT’ 
as the degree to which predefined IT shared services objectives are realised in terms of strategic, 
economic, technological, social benefits of IT shared services (Devaraj & Kohli, 2002). Typical 
examples of shared services benefits include cost savings and sustainable efficiencies, improved 
service quality, and greater service responsiveness (Bergeron, 2003). 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, considerable research has been performed recently to understand shared services. 
This research has defined IT shared services and illuminated the conceptual foundation that help 
explain how a shared services organisation devises IT governance structure and implement 
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monitoring mechanisms. Despite the fundamental importance of the research framework, the 
confirmatory approach of this study requires a theoretical foundation to derive testable propositions. 
These propositions using the research method will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter extends the theoretical basis from the resource-based view and agency theory 
approaches. These theories are integrated to provide a number of empirically testable hypotheses 
derived from the research model (Figure 2.1) presented in Chapter 2. Section 3.1 provides an 
overview of the research model. Section 3.2 develops the main theoretical predictions and the 
hypotheses for the anticipated IT governance structure. Section 3.3 develops the hypotheses for IT 
governance structural gap. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses for monitoring mechanism. Section 
3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 The Detailed Research Model 
Based on the research model discussed in the previous chapter (Figure 2.1), the following 
sections develop the hypotheses that are tested empirically in this research. The detailed research 
model and hypotheses are shown in Figure 3.1. With regard to IT governance structure (decision 
rights)1, the design structure is influenced by the combination of the shared services delivery 
arrangement2 and the IT decision domain3 (left hand side of figure 3.1). Hypotheses H1 to H5 
describe these relationships. The IT governance structural gap4, conceptualized as the difference 
between IT governance structure (decision rights) and IT governance structure (accountability), 
                                                 
1 IT Governance Structure: 
 Business monarchy – a group of business executives (i.e. CEO, CIO, COO, et al) and excludes IT executives (i.e. 
shared services provider) who act independently. 
 IT monarchy – IT executives (i.e. shared services provider) who act as individuals or a group with equivalent officers.  
 Feudal – business unit leaders, key process owners or their delegates. 
 Federal – business executives (i.e. CEO, CIO, COO, et al) and at least one other business group (i.e. business unit 
leaders) with the IT executives (i.e. shared services provider) being an additional participant. 
 IT duopoly – IT executives (i.e. shared services provider) and one other group (i.e. business executives or business 
unit leaders) or a joint decision by two organisations in the fields of IT and business. 
 Anarchy – each individual user. 
2 Shared Services Delivery Arrangement: 
 Intra-service – collaboration on specific and or specialist services where only part of a service is shared.  
 Service – where one sharer transfers responsibility to another, so that the entire service can be shared, but the 
organisation is not itself changed to adapt to the sharing.  
 Corporate – where the sharing involves a formal agreement and change to the shared services department or 
organisation. 
 Supra-corporate – where a new or separate organisation is created to deliver or support the shared service. 
 Iso-corporate – an extension of the supra-corporate model. The delivery organisation is allowed to provide services to 
external customers. 
3 IT Decision Domain: 
 IT principles – decisions dictate the role of IT in the enterprise.  
 IT investment – decisions concern how much and where to invest in IT, including project approvals and justification 
techniques. 
 Business application needs – decisions determine the appropriate applications to be implemented for the organisation. 
 IT architecture – decisions focus on technical IT implementation choices and directions, including standardisation to 
integrate technological alternatives to satisfy business needs.  
 IT infrastructure – decisions concern the platform delivery of IT services, including network, sharing data, and 
common applications. 
4 IT Governance Structural Gap – difference between decision rights and accountability  
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affects the business value of IT (middle part of figure 3.1). Hypothesis H6 discusses these 
relationships. Hypothesis H7 examines the impacts between monitoring mechanism and business 
value of IT (right hand side of figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Detailed Research Model 
 
3.2 IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
The theoretical framework highlights the need for shared services organisations to devise and 
implement effective IT governance structures. Identification and agreement of stakeholders’ rights 
to participate in different levels of decision making on IT strategy and tactics is arguably the most 
important task of IT governance (Brown & Grant, 2005; Weill & Ross, 2004). Accordingly, 
deciding on the organisational form of IT in shared services organisations is a vital element of IT 
governance that flows from, and is concomitant with, the agreement on the exercise of decision 
rights. Effective IT governance structure is discussed in terms of the role of the knowledge asset, 
the importance of the IT resource, and the degree of shared IT. Separate hypotheses relating to the 
IT governance structure (H1 to H5) are suggested for each shared service delivery arrangement (see 
figure 3.1).  
3.2.1 Main Theoretical Predictions from Resource-based View 
The resource-based view (RBV) provides an avenue for shared services organisations to 
continuously plan and execute their organisational sourcing strategy by examining the position of 
their internal resources and capabilities towards achieving competitive advantage (Kristandl & 
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Bontis, 2007; Sheenan & Foss, 2007). To identify the resource characteristics of each IT decision 
domain proposed by Weill and Ross (2004) and their importance in determining an organisation’s  
competitive advantage, RBV is used from a holistic firm perspective. Thus, this study refers to the 
definition provided by Wade and Hulland who distinguish IT resources into intangible and tangible 
IT assets and IT capabilities (Wade & Hulland, 2004). For example, hardware and software can be 
considered as IT assets serving as an input or output in a transformation process. In contrast, IT 
capabilities represent the transformation process that uses IT assets (e.g., managerial capabilities 
could be termed as IT capabilities). In line with IT research, the resource attributes and their 
peculiarities are of high importance. An IT resource enabling a firm to create a competitive 
advantage needs to have attributes that are rare and valuable. Wade and Hulland (2004) 
complement these two attributes by adding the attribute ‘appropriable’. Additionally, a sustainable 
competitive advantage requires having the two attributes not be substitutable and imperfectly 
imitable.  
Wade and Hulland (2004) present a set of eight classes of IT resources which are further 
distinguished into three types: Inside-out, outside-in, and spanning. Inside-out resources are 
deployed from inside the firm in response to market requirements and opportunities, and tend to be 
internally focused (e.g., technology development). In contrast, outside-in resources are externally 
oriented, placing an emphasis on anticipating market requirements, creating durable customer 
relationships, and understanding competitors (e.g., market responsiveness). Finally, spanning 
resources, which involve both internal and external analysis, are needed to integrate the firm's 
inside-out and outside-in capabilities (e.g., managing IS/ business partnerships, IS management and 
planning). The resource characteristics of each IT decision domain are mapped and detailed in 
Appendix A.  
In general, when compared to inside-out resources, outside-in and spanning resources tend to 
have somewhat greater value, be rarer (but less appropriable), be more difficult to imitate or acquire 
through trade, and have fewer strategic substitutes. Focusing on the first two of these attributes 
suggests that these resources will have a stronger impact than inside-out IT resources on initial 
competitive position. Furthermore, because it is harder to imitate, acquire, or find strategic 
substitutes for the former set of resources than for the latter, outside-in and spanning resources are 
more likely to maintain their rarity, and thus support a sustainable competitive position for a longer 
period of time. 
Utilising the work by Wade and Hulland (2004), this study contends that the shared services 
delivery arrangement and the IT decision domain are two dimensions that influence the design of 
the IT governance structure. Different types of shared services delivery arrangements are described 
to represent the degree of sharing IT services ranging from repeated discrete sharing arrangements 
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(i.e., intra-service) to equity joint ventures (i.e., iso-corporate). IT decision domains are analysed as 
IT resources and capabilities falling on a spectrum of competitive advantage creation to 
sustainability positions for a longer period of time. 
This study predicts that if the resources are more likely to create and sustain competitive 
position, they are relatively higher risk and less likely to be shared, e.g., IT principles skills to 
enable the business, IT investment skills to prioritise and approve projects, and business application 
skills to specify the needs. If the resources have less impact on competitive position, they are 
relatively less risky and more likely to be shared, e.g., IT architecture skills to integrate technical 
choices and IT infrastructure skills to formulate the foundation strategies. The choice of IT 
governance structure is partially determined by IT decision domain attributes as well as shared 
services delivery arrangement characteristics. The analysis, therefore, suggests that a more business 
centralised decision-making approach is adopted to maintain tighter control over critical strategic 
resources in the client organisation. If the resource ownerships are transferred to the shared services 
provider or jointly owned by the stakeholders, then a shared decision-making approach should be 
conferred. 
3.2.2 Main Theoretical Predictions from Agency View  
While the resource-based view sheds light on appropriate management of an organisation’s 
resources, agency theory deals with the proper governance of resource decisions. The resource-
based view has neglected the potential presence of the agency problem (Penrose, 1995) impeding 
sufficient consideration of an efficient deployment of resources and capabilities (Kor & Mahoney, 
2000).  
Quality decision-making requires that the individual who makes a decision has the required 
information to make an informed choice, hence improving organisational performance (Hayek, 
1945; Jensen & Meckling, 1998). The allocation of decisions rights can be done in two ways: locate 
the decision-making rights with the individual with the relevant knowledge, or alternatively, 
transfer the knowledge to the decision maker. The problem arises when knowledge is difficult to 
transfer, Jensen and Meckling (1998) refer to this as ‘specific knowledge’. Compared with the 
managers who are responsible for shared services provision, client managers with firm (or 
business)-specific experience are more likely to envision a superior ‘subjective opportunity set for 
the firm’ (Penrose, 1995, p.42). These managers have experience-based and often tacit knowledge 
of existing firm-level capabilities and organisational routines. The client managers with firm (or 
business)-specific knowledge can also assess more precisely which opportunities emerging in the 
environment fit better dynamically with internal firm strengths and weaknesses, and as such these 
managers know better which opportunities to pursue. Therefore, the agency framework results in an 
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allocation of decision rights that favours the managers who have the most specific relevant 
knowledge of all of the agents of the firm. For example, IT investment decision rights are allocated 
to client business managers to support business requirements. In addition, the costs of 
communicating relevant specific knowledge to other decision makers can be minimised.  
3.2.3 Allocation of IT Decision Rights 
Based on the above discussion of the resource-based rationale and agency theory, this study 
suggests the competitive implications are influenced by the ability to integrate knowledge across 
functional areas (i.e., business and IT) as well as the importance of maintaining an appropriate use 
of resources in the client organisation. Thus, the governance structure design is affected by the 
strategic importance of the decision-making capabilities which convert IT resources into advantages 
for an organisation. This study derives several general principles from the analysis and examines, in 
turn, their implications for IT governance structure design.  
1. The structural archetype of anarchy is not applicable in the shared IT environment 
because individual and small groups make their own decisions based only on their local 
needs. Anarchies are the bane of the existence of many IT groups and they are expensive 
to support and secure – Agency theory. 
2. Because of their specific knowledge, business professionals should make business-
oriented IT decisions (principles, investment, and business application needs) on which 
the IT decision-making capabilities (resources) might provide sustainable competitive 
advantage – Resource-based view and Agency theory. 
3. IT professionals should make technical decisions because of their specific knowledge and 
in an attempt to lower coordination costs. The existence of synergies between business 
units is assumed – Resource-based view and Agency theory. 
4. With higher degrees of IT shared services, more IT resource management ownership is 
transferred to the shared services provider. Business and IT professionals should 
collaborate on business-oriented IT decisions because of high strategic risk in managing 
these resources. Better decisions require the fusion of business and IT thinking – 
Resource-based view and Agency theory. 
In accordance with the principles above, figure 3.2 represents the overarching framework for 
allocating the decision rights (i.e., it assists in determining the “IT governance archetype”). 
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Business Centralised 
Figure 3.2: Allocation of Decision Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study refers to IT decision rights as the right to initiate a decision and the right to 
implement a decision. Looking at the figure, the first dimension examined to determine the decision 
rights is ‘Knowledge Asset’. Specific knowledge assets refer to the knowledge (e.g., local market 
knowledge) and skills (e.g., accounting system know-how) that cannot be easily codified and 
transferred to other agents, since they have an important tacit component. Therefore, the more 
important a person’s specific knowledge asset for the generation of the residual income relative to 
another person, the more decision rights should be assigned to that person (Day, 1994). When 
business specific knowledge is valuable in decision-making, there are benefits to co-locating 
decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. In such cases a more 
business centralised approach (as indicated in the shaded arrows) seems to be more appropriate 
because the costs of transferring business specific knowledge are relatively high and cannot be 
easily transferred by contract (Hennart & Zeng, 2005). Similarly, IT specific knowledge holders will 
value the decision rights highly, a more IT centralised approach seems to be more appropriate as 
shown in the shaded arrows. If IT general knowledge relevant to decisions resides at lower levels of 
the provider, then decentralisation reduces knowledge transfer costs. For example, the IT 
Technician has knowledge that the client or higher levels do not have. The cost of transferring IT 
technical knowledge from the provider to the business decision makers reduces the net benefit from 
sharing IT services and, everything else equal, results in more IT centralisation. Business general 
knowledge assets refer to the knowledge that is inexpensive to transmit from the client to the 
provider. Some business process capabilities can be classified as business general knowledge. In 
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such cases, decision rights can be allocated to the provider when the costs of transferring such 
knowledge from the client to the provider are relatively low. Thus, as indicated in the shaded 
arrows, IT centralised approach is more suitable to effectively and efficiently support different 
business units through the application of standardised and consolidated business processes. 
The second dimension to determine the anticipated archetype stems from control over critical 
IT resources that create competitive advantage, i.e., ‘Competitive Advantage of IT Resource’. 
According to the IT resource characteristics analysed in Appendix A, IT principles resource is a 
good example of a business specific knowledge asset, i.e., a high “competitive advantage of IT 
resource” which is potentially high value and rare. The decision making capabilities of IT principles 
includes management’s ability to collect information from sources internal and external to the firm, 
as well as the dissemination of a firm’s market intelligence across departments and the 
organisation’s response to that learning. This study suggests that a more business monarchy 
decision-making approach is adopted to maintain tighter control over critical strategic resources in 
the client organisation. On the contrary, the IT infrastructure resource is an example of IT specific 
knowledge asset and has generally not been found to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage for firms, i.e., a low “competitive advantage of IT resource”. Hence, a more IT monarchy 
approach assumes responsibility for the more technical IT decisions.  
The third dimension to influence the decision rights is the varying level of IT services 
collaborated with the client or offered by the provider, i.e., ‘Degree of Shared IT’ as detailed in 
Appendix B. For governing resources that require business specific knowledge, as the degree of 
shared services increases, the federal approach allows business units have their own discretion with 
respect to business requirements and IT shared services provides the technology link to the 
business. For governing resources that require IT specific knowledge, as the degree of shared 
services increases, the IT monarchy approach enables a single point of contact to provide the cost 
benefits of centralisation and facilitate the changes in shared IT infrastructure. The following 
example illustrates the application of the decision tree for determining the IT governance archetype.  
In a joint venture relationship (e.g., supra-corporate), there is a need to change IT capability in 
the organisation and sharing IT services is seen as a way of improving IT capability. To accomplish 
the objective, most IT functions are moved from the business to the shared service operation (i.e., 
higher degree of shared IT), such as financial application development. One key capability of the 
Office of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is to understand the functionality of the underlying 
financial system serviced by the provider. The CFO must also understand how the software closes 
the books, prepares statutory reports, deals with accounting and legal obligations (i.e., specific 
knowledge to determine business application need). Certainly, the provider usually has staff that 
understand the functionality of the system. However, those individuals do not always understand 
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the intricacy of a specific organisation. Decision rights have to be retained in the client when its 
know-how is very specific and consequently the knowledge transfer and control costs are very high. 
In this case, the bargaining power of the client is relatively strong due to its non-contractual know-
how. The bargaining power means that a decision made by a party will be operative. On the other 
hand, the provider must have a single set of technical policies and practices consistently applied by 
all software developments. It is, therefore, important to take advantage of integrating both client and 
provider’s intangible knowledge assets to generate better business value of IT, decision rights 
should be allocated to both parties to efficiently and effectively utilise their specific knowledge. The 
CFO (i.e., client) must make the necessary functional (business) decisions work with the Shared 
Services Infrastructure Director (i.e., provider) on the IT technical decisions. A more federal 
approach would seem to be appropriate.  
Table 3.1 summarises the prediction of the anticipated IT governance archetype for the type 
of shared service provision operating. Tomkinson (2007) argues the determining factor as to which 
is the ‘best’ structure to develop the shared services is not a function of the legal powers to effect 
the sharing as these are common to whatever the method, nor is it the formality of the agreement 
between the services partners as even the most informal arrangement can be governed by a legally 
enforceable document. The relative degree of risk or difficulty is dependent on the degree of change 
attempted. The more ambitious the change is, the greater the difficulty and risk of the shared 
services implementation would be due to more conflicting issues. Therefore, depending on the 
decision domains, IT governance structure can vary from more centralised approaches (most 
notably monarchies) to more decentralised approaches (most notably feudal designs), with federal 
and duopoly designs straddling the two approaches. The foregoing expectations lead to the 
following hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5) as shown in the research model (see figure 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and IT Decision Domain 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ IT 
Decision Domain 
Intra-service Service  Corporate  Supra-corporate  Iso-corporate  
Outside-In 
IT principles  Business Monarchy  Business Monarchy  Business Monarchy  Business Monarchy Federal1 
IT investment Business Monarchy  Business Monarchy Business Monarchy Federal1 Federal1 
Spanning  
Business 
application needs 
Business Monarchy  Business Monarchy Federal1 Federal1 Federal1 
Inside-Out 
IT architecture Feudal IT Duopoly2 IT Duopoly2 IT Monarchy3 IT Monarchy3 
IT infrastructure Feudal  IT Duopoly2 IT Monarchy3 IT Monarchy3 IT Monarchy3 
1 Federal – IT shared services management may be an additional participant 
2 IT Duopoly – IT shared services management represents IT  
3 IT Monarchy – IT shared services management acts solely 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, more business-centralised approaches are used when making 
decisions for ‘outside-in’ resources leading to sustainable competitive advantage in most shared 
services delivery arrangements. As the degree of IT shared services increases (from ‘intra-service’ 
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to ‘iso-corporate’ shared services delivery arrangements), a more federal approach might be 
adopted to utilise both business and IT-specific knowledge efficiently for governing spanning 
resources. More IT-centralised approaches are used in making decisions for ‘inside-out’ resources 
because they are more internally efficiency-focused and their effects on competitive position are 
relatively lower (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1998). 
The ‘intra-service’ shared services delivery arrangement includes limited shared services 
options, such as procurement and purchasing services to business units. Achieving cost efficiencies 
may not be the organisation’s primary objective for the ‘intra-service’ (Tomkinson, 2007). The 
emphasis on principles embracing integrated IT and business process capabilities, rapid 
organisational learning, or appropriate response to external environment may lead the ‘intra-service’ 
approach to adopt a ‘business monarchy’ governance model for the following types of decision-
making: ‘IT principles’, ‘IT investment’ and ‘business application needs’. Wade and Hulland 
(2004) suggest these outside-in and spanning resources have more impact on the long-term 
competitive position. Therefore, a more business-centralised approach seems appropriate in ‘intra-
service’ delivery arrangement which requires business leaders to be interested and well-informed 
about IT issues (Weill, 2004). With the ‘intra-service’ approach, the degree of IT shared services is 
low. There are not many IT decisions for the service provider or IT community to make. Therefore, 
‘intra-service’ organisation utilises their local knowledge and institutes a decentralised approach to 
govern IT architecture and IT infrastructure, and they enable the shared services provider to deliver 
agreed ‘minimal’ IT services, such as hardware procurement. Hence, a ‘feudal’ governance design 
should be adopted. 
 
H1a: An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a business monarchy governance design.  
H1b: An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure 
decisions will adopt a feudal governance design. 
 
The ‘service’ shared services delivery arrangement aims to improve asset utilisation and it 
embodies a degree of formality which enables the participating group of business units and 
organisations to cede control to the service provider in terms of budgetary control, service 
specification, and etc (Tomkinson, 2007). The ‘service’ arrangement attempts to use a two-party 
decision-making approach that involves IT executives (i.e., provider) and a group of business 
leaders (i.e., client) for making its ‘IT architecture’ and ‘IT infrastructure’ decisions. The typical 
role of business leaders is to clarify business objectives and incorporate IT capabilities into strategy 
formulation. A ‘duopoly’ has the advantage over the feudal governance design in that the central IT 
leaders can see the enterprise as a whole and look for opportunities for sharing and reuse among 
business units, resulting in higher asset utilisation (Weill, 2004). A ‘business monarchy’ approach is 
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used to ensure that IT aligns with corporate objectives. Therefore, the business executives are 
responsible for ratifying ‘IT principles’ and handling ‘IT investment’ as well as ‘business 
application needs’ decisions. Wade and Hulland (2004) suggest these outside-in and spanning 
resources have more impact on the long-term competitive position. Therefore, decision rights must 
be tightly held by the business leaders in the client organisation. 
 
H2a: A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a business monarchy governance design. 
H2b: A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt an IT duopoly governance design. 
 
As the degree of IT shared services increases, the ‘corporate’ shared services delivery 
arrangement attempts to balance the contrast between governance for profitability and governance 
for revenue growth and innovation (Tomkinson, 2007). To achieve a combination of business unit-
driven customer responsiveness, and economies of scale and standardisation, the organisation 
introduces mechanisms to address both enterprise-wide and local control. Asset utilisation demands 
a hybrid approach, mixing elements of centralised and decentralised governance (Weill, 2004). 
‘Business monarchies’ make all outside-in decisions (i.e., ‘IT principles’ and ‘IT investment’) 
which have more impact on the long-term competitive position (Wade & Hulland, 2004). The 
‘federal’ governance approach for ‘business application needs’ can capitalize on potential synergies 
(such as shared applications) across business units. Because the ‘IT architecture’ is slightly higher 
than IT infrastructure in the overall competitive advantage (see Appendix A), the business-IT 
involvement approach (i.e., ‘IT duopoly’) in decision-making seems more appropriate. When more 
‘IT infrastructure’ resources are shared, the provider plays an important coordinating role to interact 
with all business units and can thus see firm-wide opportunities for sharing and reuse across 
business units. Therefore, ‘IT monarchy’ governance design should be adopted.  
 
H3a: A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles and IT investment decisions will 
adopt a business monarchy governance design. 
H3b: A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making business application needs decisions will adopt a 
federal governance design. 
H3c: A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture decisions will adopt an IT 
duopoly governance design. 
H3d: A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT infrastructure decisions will adopt an IT 
monarchy governance design. 
 
The ‘supra-corporate’ shared services delivery arrangement attempts to maximise 
opportunities to leverage shared services while minimising constraints on the unique needs of 
related, but distinct, operating requirements across business units (Tomkinson, 2007). ‘IT 
investment’ and ‘business application needs’ structures are likely to be required to make sure the 
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architecture rules make sense for the business and take responsibility for enforcing common 
investment standards. A ‘federal’ governance approach is well served. Because of the high strategic 
importance of IT principles, the business should take the lead to establish realistic expectations for 
shared IT and focus on clarification of business strategies. Hence, this study predicts that the ‘IT 
principles’ resources should reside in the business unit or client organisation. A ‘business 
monarchy’ governance approach should be adopted. Wade and Hulland (2004) suggest the inside-
out resource has less impact on the long-term competitive position. Over time, organisations can 
realise cost efficiencies via economies of scale by the further sharing of IT services. The 
responsibilities for IT infrastructure strategies and IT architecture standards can then be assigned to 
IT people. Therefore, the ‘IT monarchy’ governance design is relied on for making IT oriented 
decisions, such as ‘IT infrastructure’ and ‘IT architecture’. 
 
H4a: A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles decisions will adopt a 
business monarchy governance design. 
H4b: A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT investment and business application 
needs decisions will adopt a federal monarchy governance design. 
H4c: A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure 
decisions will adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
 
The ‘iso-corporate’ shared services model attempts to realise cost-savings by capitalising on 
business-unit synergies often looking to higher degrees of IT shared services to remove duplications 
or reduce IT unit costs (Tomkinson, 2007). Their IT principles and IT investment should emphasise 
sharing and reuse of process, system, technology and data modules. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
indicate that to realise organisational performance objectives, higher differentiation requires closer 
integration for achieving unity of effort. Business application development can take place within 
operating groups, but applications should be presented to users through a shared portal, and, where 
necessary, data should be shared across business units. Outside-in and spanning resources have a 
stronger impact on long-term competitive position (Wade & Hulland, 2004). Therefore, a more 
‘federal’ governance approach should be adopted for making ‘IT principles’, ‘IT investment’, and 
‘business application needs’ decisions. The ‘iso-corporate’ governance arrangement also attempts to 
maximise opportunities to leverage shared services. Outside-out resources have a less impact on 
long-term competitive position (Wade & Hulland, 2004). Hence, ‘IT architecture’ and ‘IT 
infrastructure’ decision rights should be held by ‘IT monarchy’.  
 
H5a: An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a federal governance design. 
H5b: An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure 
decisions will adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
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3.3 IT Governance Structural Gap 
Enterprises achieving above average returns from IT investments deal with the increased 
complexity by clarifying who is able to make critical decisions and who is accountable for them 
(Broadbent, 2002). For example, getting approval of a project investment is only part of IT 
governance. Another challenge, the real business value of IT governance, is in the accountability 
systems used to produce the expected returns. This study refers to the IT governance structural gap 
as the difference between decision rights and delivery by connecting accountability with 
performance. The foregoing expectations lead to the hypothesis (H6) as shown in the research 
model (see Figure 3.1). 
3.3.1 Presence of IT Governance Structural Gap 
Any decision-making framework must also define accountability for IT decisions. Who is 
held responsible for decision failures and who gets credit for success? An IT governance system 
that creates a balance between decision rights and accountability can promote desirable decision-
making with respect to IT assets (Weill & Ross, 2004). A mismatch between the two can erode 
relationships and promote ineffective or inefficient decision-making. For example, some 
organisations may treat IT shared services as a centralised cost center with a fixed budget and 
processes that allow IT to only react to client requests. Such an environment may not promote ‘out 
of the box’ thinking for the IT group. In this environment, if the IT leadership is held accountable 
for a lack of strategic direction or the inability to respond nimbly to competitor moves due to 
restrictive legacy systems, there will be dissonance in the shared IT group. Ultimately this 
dissonance will result in poor relationships between the client and provider, hence reduce the 
business value of IT. On the other hand, an aggressive shared IT group that is allowed to retain 
decision rights for major IT decisions and it has control processes in place to measure outcomes 
promotes innovative solutions for the business. If the accountability systems become overly stifling, 
however, this can again create a misalignment. In a shared services environment, conflict may also 
arise when the client does not give up transferred decision rights around key components of service 
delivery, frustrate the provider by interfering with their ability to deliver services, and also make the 
provider accountable for service outcomes. 
 
H6a: Lower levels of IT governance structural gap between decision rights and 
accountability are associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
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3.3.2 Assessment of IT Governance Structural Gap 
In tandem with the complexity of IT governance decision rights and accountability framework 
as described above, the client organisation must include a process for revisiting and revising the 
applicability of their IT governance structure (Dahlberg & Kivijärvi, 2006; Peterson, 2004). As 
increased levels of diligence in governance decision-making and policy implementation are built on 
top of current enterprise compliance foundations, the discipline of governance gap analysis has also 
gained irreversible visibility and importance (Hoy, 2007; Raghupathi, 2007). When executed 
properly, effective governance gap analysis can ensure people take collective ownership of the 
governance agenda, ensuring that everyone is fully aware of the consequences for noncompliance. 
All shared services clients and shared services providers must have a solid sense of their roles and 
responsibilities reinforced by regular feedback mechanisms.  
Research by Weill and Ross (2004) confirms a link between the extent of management 
awareness of, and compliance with, the organisation’s system of IT governance, the organisation’s 
success with the use of IT, and bottom-line business performance. Good governance design requires 
measurement and accountabilities. Therefore, the client organisation should formally evaluate the 
performance or/and commitment to the governance policies on a regular basis. Assessing an 
organisation's current and future ability to govern IT effectively involves validating the connection 
to, and extent of IT, shared services operations on corporate governance and examining the benefits 
of IT governance for business performance. Most importantly, the client organisation should take 
action to minimise the IT governance structural gap. 
 
H6b: More formal and regular assessment to minimise IT governance structural gap are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
3.4 Monitoring Mechanisms 
Monitoring is the most commonly recommended solution to the agency problem, with the 
level of monitoring dictated by the extent of divergence of interests between the principal and the 
agents (i.e., the severity of the agency problem). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that monitoring 
includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the 
part of the principal (shared services client) to 'control' the behavior of the agent (shared services 
provider) through budget restrictions, operating rules, and the like (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 
footnote 9). The foregoing expectations lead to the hypothesis (H7) as shown in the research model 
(see Figure 3.1). 
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3.4.1 Independent Review 
Client-provider exchanges are those in which provider managers have power over clients by 
virtue of their expertise, functional indispensability, and intrinsic ambiguity associated with the 
services they provide. Such agency exchanges involve information asymmetry because clients do 
not possess the technical IT knowledge to evaluate the effort invested or the outcome accomplished 
by provider agents. It is important to note that this knowledge asymmetry arising from a difference 
in task-related knowledge is distinct from the information asymmetry with which much of the 
mainstream literature is concerned. For example, not knowing how the agent does a job (e.g., agile 
software development versus rapid application development) is distinctly different from, and 
compounds, the problem of not knowing what the agent does. IT managers also often suffer from 
‘professional syndrome’ and have incentives to acquire the newest hardware and software 
technologies without sufficient cost justification (Mendelson, 1990). Consequently, the provider 
controls relevant task-related knowledge and it has the expert authority to influence greatly (if not 
drive) the standards of exchange.  
In addition to creating difficulty in ex post monitoring, the asymmetry of know-how 
complicates the issue further by making it difficult for the clients to know ex ante how much of a 
particular service is actually needed. For example, in the IT context, knowledge of the value of a 
given IT task is almost always possessed by the business client, while information about the 
execution of the task is possessed by the IT service provider. This information asymmetry also 
extends to top management (the clients) who are neither completely aware of the value of 
information generated by IT activities to the business client departments nor of the cost and 
technological information possessed by the provider. In such circumstances, the provider agent not 
only determines what needs to be done and how to do it but it also draws upon extra-professional 
sources of credibility and legitimacy to decide whether certain minimum standards of practice have 
been met. Thus, the client is faced with the problem of constructing a control system that will 
maximize the net value of IT services to the firm while taking into account the existence of these 
information asymmetries. 
Within shared services organisations, the providers are often not willing to let clients have 
much influence on operational issues of the service delivery (Australian Institute of Management, 
2012). Even within inter-organisations, O’Donnell (2000) finds that possibilities for direct 
monitoring decrease as subsidiary autonomy increases. To reduce typical risks, such as deteriorating 
service quality, clients may engage in monitoring service providers to secure service delivery 
(Alsbridge, 2013). Therefore, independent professionals should serve in monitoring roles and they 
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should have hierarchical authority or be subject to pressures for performance and corporate 
reputation (Freidson, 1984). 
 
H7a: Higher levels of monitoring roles being played by independent professionals are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
3.4.2 Profession-wide Oversight  
Agency theory handles well those scenarios where (1) the principal (shared services client) 
can observe and decipher the agent’s (shared services provider) actions, and where (2) the principal 
can establish causality from action to measurable performance and it can determine the agent's 
relative contribution in achieving the observed outcome, i.e., where costs of monitoring or 
measuring, or both, are low. During provision of knowledge-intensive IT services, however, the 
costs of both monitoring and measuring are high because non-IT clients only understand the 
specialised services and execution of associated tasks in a limited way (Mills & Moberg, 1982). To 
the non-IT client, the provider agent's behavior is opaque and there is a great deal of ambiguity as to 
the true contribution of the provider agent's efforts on the observed outcome (e.g., the cost savings 
and business benefits of IT shared services). Consequently, the mechanism recommended by the 
theory to restrain agent opportunism (e.g., behavior-based and outcome-based controls) is to have 
limits to the IT shared services agency exchanges. 
Similarly, although agency theory relies on both internal (organisation-based) and external 
(market-based) forms of control to curb opportunistic behavior by managers of public corporations 
(Walsh & Seward, 1990), these forms of control also are applicable in the IT shared services 
context albeit in a limited way. Organisation-based and market-based controls that typically rely on 
clear measurement of performance remain only partially effective. For example, a shared services 
manager's evaluation is sometimes based on the quality of services provided rather than on its cost 
effectiveness – s/he would never get fired for buying from Telstra (Australia), AT&T (USA) or 
Vodafone (UK). This example demonstrates the risk-averse nature of the shared IT manager-agent, 
and it is termed the ‘asymmetric cost’ problem (Mendelson, 1990). In light of the inadequacy of 
direct control of shared service providers by non-IT client and of impersonal control by the market 
at large, this study posits that restraints on opportunistic inclinations of provider agents are 
accomplished by other measures, such as benchmarking, and professional accreditation. 
 
H7b: Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide well-defined standards of work are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
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3.4.3 Joint Working  
It is important to recognise that the emphasis on impersonal controls in the client-provider 
context occurs because agency theorists have been concerned with the lack of direct involvement of 
owners in their affairs managed by provider agents (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983). In a shared 
services environment, the position of ownership has changed from that of an “active agent” to that 
of a “passive agent”. Compared with the owner (supervisor)-manager relationship which the owner 
could exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the client now holds a piece of paper 
(e.g., SLAs) representing a set of expectations with respect to an enterprise. ‘Passive’ ownership, 
arising from the absence of shareholders routinely managing their company's operations, is a unique 
feature of a separate and distinct shared services organisation. 
Inevitably, there should be a great deal of consultation and interaction between provider and 
client as the former customises a well-defined set of specialised knowledge to serve the particular 
needs of the latter service encounters (Mills, 1990). Unlike owners and managers, the client and 
provider agent coproduce the service in question. Consequently, issues such as social influence and 
trust become vital in examining client-provider exchange. Moreover, as Mills and Moberg (1982) 
argue, since there are ambiguous cues and few objective reference points to evaluate the value of IT 
shared services, even the perceptions of customers about service quality and output often are subject 
to social influences exerted by service provider. This study posits that client involvement and 
frequent interaction, e.g. through boundary spanners, can be an effective ‘control strategy’. For 
example, involvement of clients in service operations may promote the sharing of tacit knowledge 
in a ‘controlled way’ which allows providers to build up client-specific expertise, and also gives the 
client the opportunity to ‘oversee’ this process to some extent. This study also assumes that if the 
client interacts frequently with the provider and the client gets involved in service operations, 
knowledge to evaluate performance can be generated. In a similar fashion, Takeishi (2001) revealed 
client involvement embraces problem-solving processes with the client, frequent face-to-face 
communication, as well as a sufficient level of knowledge transfer.  
Hence, the active involvement of the client in the development of the service product is a 
unique and distinctive feature of client-provider agency in the IT shared services environment. The 
theoretical significance of joint-production of services is that it emphasises economic, as well as 
social, aspects of exchange, and it highlights the need for provider agents and clients to work 
together to attain joint outcomes. Active coordination, in turn, generates dynamics in the exchange 
not easily captured within the framework of agency theory. 
 
H7c: Higher levels of client involvement in the joint production of service product are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter formulates seven hypotheses (H1 to H7) from the research model. Organisations 
are proposed to govern differently depending on the combination of delivery arrangements and the 
IT decision domain (H1 to H5). Alignment and assessment of the IT governance structural gap are 
proposed to influence business value of IT (H6). In addition, monitoring mechanisms are also 
antecedents of business value of IT (H7). The next chapter discusses the research methodology used 
to empirically test the developed model.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter describes the research methodology adopted in this thesis. Section 4.1 outlines 
the philosophy that underpins the approach taken in this research. Section 4.2 discusses the 
development of the survey instrument, including the sourcing of items, the design of questions, the 
content validation using a judgmental approach, and the execution of an expert study to establish 
internal consistency and reliability. Section 4.3 presents the pilot study used to refine and validate 
the survey instrument. Section 4.4 provides an overview of the data collection methods used for the 
main study. It also highlights the ethical considerations, the survey administration process, and the 
approach used to identify the organisations to contact in the course of the questionnaire distribution. 
Section 4.5 discusses the data preparation. The chapter concludes with a section on the response 
rate of the survey. Section 4.7 contains the summary. 
4.1 Research Setting and Design 
This study develops and applies the research model to guide a comprehensive analysis of IT 
governance issues in a shared services environment. All research is based on some underlying 
guiding philosophical assumptions. These assumptions determine the research philosophy 
subscribed to, the research strategy employed, and the research instruments used. Crotty (1998) 
outlined a schema to understand the research process. The schema consists of four elements: 
epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods. Table 4.1 presents how this 
research fits into Crotty’s taxonomy. 
Table 4.1: Elements of Research Setting 
Epistemology Theoretical Perspective Methodology Methods 
Objectivism Positivism Survey Research Statistical Analysis 
 
First, objectivism is the epistemological view that things exist as meaningful entities 
independently of consciousness and experience (Crotty, 1998). This research subscribes to the 
objectivist perspective because the researcher conducts the study based on the assumption that 
evidence about the research question could be obtained through logical analyses of measurable 
facts.  
Second, the positivist researcher approaches or views the world as objective and seeks 
measureable relationships among variables to test and verify their study hypotheses (Swanson & 
Holton III, 2005). This research uses the relationships between the shared services delivery 
arrangements and IT governance structures. It then examines the factors of IT governance structural 
gap and monitoring mechanisms (independent variables) to determine the business value generated 
from IT (dependent variable) among shared services organisations. Hence, this research empirically 
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tested seven hypotheses and as such falls under the positivist paradigm (Malhotra, 2002; Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991). 
Third, survey research is concerned with drawing a sample of subjects from a population and 
studying them to make inferences about the population (Saris & Gallhofer, 2007). To test the 
hypotheses in this study, a large amount of cross-sectional data is needed. Therefore, the 
quantitative approach is more appropriate for this study than the qualitative approach. A survey 
method was used to collect the required data. This method is well suited to gathering demographic 
data that describe the composition of the sample. Furthermore, survey research can be conducted in 
different settings, it requires minimal investment to develop and administer, and it is relatively easy 
for making generalizations. It can also elicit information about attitudes that are otherwise difficult 
to measure using observational techniques (Rea & Parker, 2012).  
Fourth, quantitative methods of research means that a deductive approach is used, as such an 
approach allows for the setting up of a conceptual and/or theoretical structure before that structure 
is tested through the use of scientific instruments or other forms of empirical observation (Gill & 
Johnson, 2010). There are several reasons why using the statistical analysis approach is appropriate. 
IT governance research acknowledges its complex and dynamic nature and it consists of a set of 
interdependent subsystems (e.g., structures, processes and relational mechanisms) that deliver a 
powerful whole (Peterson, 2003; Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999). However, this phenomenon can be 
broken down into smaller components and assigned numeral values for analysis. Quantitative 
research is useful for dividing the population into groups, whose members are similar to each other 
and distinct from other groups, e.g., shared services client versus provider.  
4.2 Instrument Development 
Validation of research instruments is critical in maintaining rigor in IT research. A valid 
instrument is one which measures what it is supposed to measure (DeVellis, 2003) and it enables 
researchers to interpret variables and the relationships between variables in a more theoretically 
meaningful fashion (Bagossi, 1980). This study divided the instrument validation process into three 
stages: content development, expert judgment, and preliminary review (Lewis et al., 2005; Moore & 
Benbasat, 1991). Figure 4.1 outlines the process used to develop the survey instrument.  
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Figure 4.1: Process of Survey Instrument Development 
 
Stage 1 – Content Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 2 – Expert Judgment 
 
 
 
Stage 3 - Preliminary Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Lewis et al.(2005)  
4.2.1 Content Development 
The constructs were conceptually defined based on literature in the content development 
process. The domains and conceptual definitions of the constructs were specified in Appendix B. A 
set of items was then generated from numerous sources for each construct, such as literature, 
existing questionnaires, and case studies. These items were arranged in a suitable sequence for the 
preparation of the initial survey instrument.  
4.2.2 Expert Judgment  
The primary goal of the expert judgment process was content validation. Newly-developed 
items and those adapted from existing instruments were reviewed, validated and improved through 
an expert judging exercise. The aim of this process was to retain the best items which were believed 
to adequately measure a desired construct domain. This study utilised a quantitative procedure 
Review of literature 
Specify domain and dimensionality of construct 
Generate initial survey items 
Assess content validity (add, delete, modify items) 
Develop questions 
Assess items and instrument (question and coding issues) 
Generate survey instrument 
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developed by Lawshe (1975) to assess the content validity. Expert judgment is essentially a method 
for gauging agreement among raters or judges regarding how essential is a particular item. A panel 
of subject matter experts in IT governance and shared services was formed to evaluate whether the 
test items assess defined content. 
The researcher sent the panel an initial questionnaire and asked them to evaluate the relevance 
of each item to the construct on a three-point scale: ‘1 - Not Relevant,’ ‘2 - Important (But Not 
Essential),’ ‘3 - Essential.’ Each question had two text areas to fill in additional items and other 
comments. Follow-up discussions with experts were held when clarification of returned information 
was required. Items were eliminated if the statistical results were below the minimum threshold 
value.  
4.2.2.1 Expert Panel Selection 
The selection of the right experts lends content validity to the task (Best, 1974; Jolson & 
Rossow, 1971; Tersine & Riggs, 1976). Therefore, the participation of the right kind of experts is 
critical. The experts need to understand the issues, have a vision, and represent a substantial variety 
of viewpoints. The researcher invited a panel of 16 experts to participate in the judgment exercise. 
Expertise was determined by publication, by conference activities, by position filled (past and 
present) and by general contribution to the IT governance and shared services fields. The expert 
panel consisted of the following groups: industry consultants (2); IT governance certified trainers & 
consultants (2); IT governance professional association members (2); industry practitioners from 
two large organisations (4); doctoral students (2); academic experts (2); journal article authors (2). 
By inviting people from each group, a panel was created where different views of governance and 
shared services were well represented. The panelists were sent five sets of questions and asked to 
comment on the content and clarity of the construct domains: business value, independent review, 
profession-wide oversight, joint working, and gap assessment. 
4.2.2.2 Expert Panel Judgment 
From the data provided by the expert panel, a content validity ratio (CVR) was computed for 
each item. Lawshe (1975) only utilised the ‘3 - Essential’ response category in computing the CVR. 
However, a less stringent criterion (both 2 and 3) could also be justified because responses of both 
‘Important (But Not Essential)’ and ‘Essential’ are positive indicators of an item’s relevance to the 
construct. The CVR for each item was evaluated for statistical significance, using the table 
published in Lawshe (1975). Statistical significance implies some level of content validity for the 
item, whereas statistical non-significance indicates an unacceptable level of content validity. When 
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an expert panel is composed of sixteen members, a minimum CVR of 0.49 is required to satisfy the 
five percent level. At this point, items that are not statistically significant based on their CVR 
should be dropped from the instrument.  
Statisticians point out that higher category frequencies are generally associated with higher 
inter-rater agreements as the number of rated observations is increased. As a result, agreement due 
to chance is enhanced, particularly if rater variability is low (Hartmann, 1977; Soeken & Prescott, 
1986; Wakefield, 1980). Consistent ratings by experts are therefore often due to chance, and these 
ratings incorrectly indicate higher levels of agreement (Suen & Ary, 1989). Due to concerns about 
the risk of chance agreement among the experts, a second analysis of multirater agreement was 
undertaken. The Online Kappa Calculator developed by University of Joensuu, Finland, was used to 
calculate the multi-rater kappa statistic and inter-rater agreement was reexamined (Randolph, 2005).  
Kappa is sensitive to the number of cases made, the distribution of the data, and the presence 
of bias among raters. For these reasons, a kappa may be low despite higher values of proportion 
agreement (Banerjee & Fielding, 1997; Brennan & Hays, 1992). Free-marginal versions of kappa 
are recommended when raters are not restricted in the number of cases that can be assigned to each 
category. The multi-rater Kappa is not influenced by prevalence and it is appropriate for common 
situations in most reliability or agreement studies (Randolph, 2005). Values of kappa can range 
from -1.0 to 1.0, with -1.0 indicating perfect disagreement below chance, 0.0 indicating agreement 
equal to chance, and 1.0 indicating perfect agreement above chance. In the literature, several 
authors provide information about the magnitude or the amount of proportion that is sufficient for 
indicating higher levels of inter-rater proportion agreement. For example, Landis and Koch (1977) 
provided benchmarks for various levels of kappa magnitude and strength of agreement. Kappa 
values from 0.20 to 0.39 are ‘fair’, 0.40 to 0.59 are ‘moderate’, 0.60 to 0.79 are ‘substantial’ and 
0.80 and above are ‘almost perfect’. 
The CVRs of ‘business value’ items were calculated as a means of quantifying the degree of 
consensus among the panel of 16 experts, who evaluated the scales for content validity. The CVRs 
according to the expert panelists ranged from -0.50 to 1.00 for the business value (Table 4.2). Six 
items received a CVR below the acceptable level of relevance (0.49) and they were eliminated. 
Kappa has statistical properties that reflect formal reliability theory regarding the stability of 
measures. Individual multi-rater kappa values were examined for each of the 23 items and ranged 
from k = -0.05 to 1.00. Sixteen out of twenty-three items were below the ‘substantial’ agreement of 
0.60. The experts’ multi-rater agreement about the relevance of business value items were low and 
most likely due to different views of business value generated from shared IT. One industry expert 
commented: 
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‘There are many reasons why an IT shared services model could be chosen. The essential 
objective of one organisation may not be relevant to another. The assessments provided here 
are based on an overall assessment and not specifically related to any specific organisation 
or shared service set-up.’ 
The perceived objectives of IT shared services varied widely among the panelists. A journal 
article author also suggested including other motives of business value, such as innovation, scarcity 
of expertise, consistency of service level management, and the like. An industry consultant 
elaborated further on his assessment: 
‘The objectives of shared services will change depending on whether the organisation wants 
to share services to reduce costs or increase quality (or a combination of the two). To support 
my above statement, one of the big misunderstandings about shared services is that it is done 
to save costs. A more effective way to gain business benefits is to focus on value. Sometimes, 
costs will go up, but the focus should on quality improvement which can deliver more value in 
the long term. There may be additional costs with building quality across a larger 
organisation.’ 
Therefore, maintaining a variety of reasons for deploying IT shared services as the ‘business 
value’ measures seems to be appropriate. A decision was made to retain three items with lower 
scoring k = 0.53 (‘moderate’ agreement) because they had high relevance (CVR = 0.75). Items 
receiving lower kappa coefficients were consistent with items having lower CVR ratings; therefore, 
thirteen items in total were eliminated. The ten items shaded in Table 4.2 were retained in the 
resulting instrument.  
Table 4.2: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Business Value 
Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 16) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
To refocus on core business 16 1.00 1.00 Retain 
To improve the capability of IT to support the needs of business operations 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To share IT risks within approved risk limits 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To improve the management of technology and human resources 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To support consolidation or integration 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To reduce IT expenditure 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To improve control over IT expenditure 13 0.63 0.35 Eliminate 
To enhance economies of scale in IT resources 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
To reduce overcapacity by consolidation of systems. 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
To leverage IT purchasing. 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
To increase productivity. 13 0.63 0.35 Eliminate 
To fund IT centrally. 8 0.00 -0.07 Eliminate 
To improve financial freedom and flexibility (releasing capital, flexibility in 
budgeting and investments). 
11 0.38 0.08 Eliminate 
To increase profitability. 11 0.38 0.08 Eliminate 
To standardize IT environment (hardware, software, processes). 13 0.63 0.35 Eliminate 
To ensure the availability of necessary or new IT skills. 12 0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
To ensure the availability of necessary or new technology. 11 0.38 0.08 Eliminate 
To establish a well-functioning IT environment. 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
To enhance credibility. 6 -0.25 0.00 Eliminate 
To solve internal conflicts. 4 -0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
To improve user satisfaction. 12 0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
To improve the availability of services (e.g. more services, 7d/24h). 12 0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
To improve the quality of services (a safe, reliable service corresponding to our 
needs, capable of adapting to individual requirements). 
12 0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
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Four out of five ‘independent review’ items received CVRs above the acceptance level of 
0.49. Levels of multi-rater agreement varied across individual items on the domain from 0.20 to 
0.75, reflecting the need for subjectivity in rating certain criteria (Table 4.3). The statistically 
significant item (CVR = 0.88, k = 0.75) ‘substantial agreement’ was kept. The item of marginal 
CVR and ‘poor’ agreement with kappa value = 0.2 was eliminated. One expert suggested the 
definition should be made clear and specifically linked to ‘shared IT policy and agreement 
monitoring’. Once done, the remaining two items (CVR = 0.63, kappa = 0.35) would match the 
revised domain definition and they were retained in the resulting instrument. A pilot test was 
employed later to determine if these two items adequately represented the construct.  
Table 4.3: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Independent Review 
Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 16) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
Dedicated officer responsible for monitoring compliance with the terms of the 
shared IT services agreement 
13 0.63 0.35 Retain 
Local IT/business unit takes an active and direct role in overseeing operating policy 
for the shared IT services 
13 0.63 0.35 Retain 
Local IT/business unit has control on the design and operation the shared IT services 12 0.50 0.20 Eliminate 
Local IT/Business unit has much influence on the operation of the shared IT services 11 0.38 0.08 Eliminate 
Formal workgroup or focus group to address specific shared IT services initiatives 
and assist in the development of IT services products 
15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
 
The CVRs of all ‘profession-wide oversight’ items are above the acceptance level of 0.49. 
Item by item kappa values varied from 0.35 to 0.75 (Table 4.4). Three indicators showed ‘fair’ 
agreement, four showed ‘moderate’ agreement, and one showed ‘substantial’ agreement. The 
relatively low levels of agreement for most of the items were associated with experience of 
benchmarking, practical implementation and professional knowledge of governance frameworks, 
such as COBIT & ITIL. Within the inter-rater groups, there were negative agreements as to which 
framework tools were judged to be relevant, e.g., difference views within two academic experts, 
and between consulting practitioners and organisation practitioners. In the follow-up interviews, the 
raters remarked on the difficulty of applying professional frameworks in practice and they might 
have made implicit judgments about the items in this domain. Therefore, low kappa value items (k 
= 0.35 ‘fair’ agreement and k = 0.53 ‘moderate’ agreement) were considered to be the acceptable 
levels of kappa value. All eight items were included in the resulting instrument. A pilot test was 
employed later to determine if these items adequately represented the construct. 
Table 4.4: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Profession-wide Oversight 
Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 16) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
Benchmark the ‘cost’ target against standard of best-practice 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
Benchmark the ‘quality’ target against standard of best-practice 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
Benchmark the ‘customer satisfaction’ target against standard of best-practice 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
Benchmark the ‘timeliness’ target against standard of best-practice 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
Make use of  ‘Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT)’ 
IT governance framework 
13 0.63 0.35 Retain 
Make use of  ‘Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)’ framework 14 0.75 0.53 Retain 
Make use of  ‘Information Security Management (ISO 27002)’ framework 13 0.63 0.35 Retain 
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Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 16) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
Make use of  ‘Quality Management (ISO 9000)’ framework 13 0.63 0.35 Retain 
 
The experts judged that the ‘joint working’ items had good face validity. CVRs were 0.75 and 
1.0 which indicated nearly all the items were relevant (Table 4.5). All the multi-rater kappa values 
were 0.75 or above, representing no apparent difference among the judges. Several experts 
commented that the ‘joint working’ domain was important to shared services within the definition. 
All items were included in the resulting instrument. 
Table 4.5: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Joint Working 
Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 16) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
Participate in our business with positive attitude 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
Are very interested in each other's problems 16 1.00 1.00 Retain 
Encourage each other to solve business problems 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
Share business knowledge of core business processes if necessary 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
Exchange information that help the establishment of business planning 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
Share environmental information that affects each other's business 15 0.88 0.75 Retain 
 
CVRs were significantly high in the ‘IT government structural gap assessment’ items and 
ranged from 0.86 to 1.00 (Table 4.6). The multi-rater kappa values were above 0.70 which indicated 
an excellent positive level of agreement. The resulting instrument was prepared by making minor 
modifications in the wordings and language according to the suggestions of the experts, e.g., the 
term ‘IT governance’ should be clearly specified and the tenses used in the item statements should 
be consistent. 
Table 4.6: Content Validity Ratio and Kappa Value – Gap Assessment 
Items 
Judged as 
relevant by 
experts 
(n = 14) 
CVR 
Kappa 
value 
Action 
Utilise formal IT governance tools… 13 0.86 0.71 Retain 
Map the current governance structure… 14 1.00 1.00 Retain 
Evaluate our IT governance awareness and engagement… 13 0.86 0.71 Retain 
4.2.3 Preliminary Review 
The two main purposes of the preliminary review were to address the question issues and data 
coding issues for the resulting instrument from the expert judgment exercise. The question issues 
were primarily concerned with the content, design, and usability of the instrument. For example, did 
the respondents understand the words, terms, and concepts being used? Did they understand the 
question and the answer choices from which they were to select? The preliminary review could also 
address potential coding and data analysis issues. Constructing code categories and coding 
responses were examined. For example, could meaningful categories be constructed from 
respondents’ answers? Were respondents’ answers within the framework of expected responses? 
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Based on the results from the expert judgment exercise, a total of 30 items (‘business value’ 
domain = 10 questions; ‘independent review’ domain = 3 questions; ‘profession-wide oversight’ 
domain = 8 questions; ‘joint working’ domain = 6 questions; ‘gap assessment’ domain = 3 
questions) were placed in the preliminary review instrument. To measure the IT governance 
structure, five existing questionnaire items developed by Gonzalez-Mesa Hoffmann and Weill 
(2004) and the scales developed by Grover, et al. (2007) were used (‘IT governance structure – 
decision rights’ & ‘IT governance structure – accountability’ domains = 5 questions). The personal 
profile (1 question), organisational profile (4 questions) and shared services delivery arrangement (8 
questions) were integrated in the instrument for preliminary review. 
Four industry and academic contacts were invited to participate the preliminary review of 
resulting instrument: an IT shared services executive, an IT shared services consultant, a business 
unit leader, and a doctoral student. The time required to complete a survey provides an indication of 
possible reasons for failure to complete the questionnaire because of design and format problems. 
The preliminary review respondents completed all the questions between 15 and 37 minutes. 
Follow-up feedback indicated which questions presented content problems with regard to clarity, 
specificity, appropriate language, and relevance. In particular, two respondents reported difficulties 
relating to the decision-right and accountability allocations because the information was never 
formally measured and reported within the organisations. However, the respondents understood the 
concept and intention to measure the IT governance structural gap. They believed the questions 
were relevant and essential to this study. The detected “problem questions” suggested that further 
consideration be given, however, it was deemed unnecessary to make major alterations. Due to the 
potential complexity of organisation structure in the shared services environment, further 
clarification for the roles of each decision makers was provided in the final instrument. 
A possible coding issue was identified in the question set of ‘shared services delivery 
arrangement’. The researcher believed that some questions might be excessive and that they posed 
problems for classification. Although these questions could provide additional information about 
the characteristics of different shared services delivery arrangement, they were removed to simplify 
the instrument. Even though the survey was considered to be long, it was easy to understand. The 
respondents believed that completion commitment would be maintained (Appendix C). 
4.3 Pilot Study 
In a quantitative study, a survey instrument that is researcher-designed needs a pilot study to 
validate the effectiveness of the instrument and the value of the questions to elicit the right 
information to answer the primary research questions (Saunders et al., 2009). The pilot study 
precedes the main study to correct any problems with the instrument or other elements in the data 
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collection technique. The four main purposes of the pilot test were to check that the questions are 
understandable; to assess the likely response rate; to ensure that the data analysis techniques match 
the expected responses; and to evaluate the reliability and validity of the instrument. Reliability is 
concerned with how well this study can reproduce the survey data, as well as the extent of 
measurement error. By contrast, validity is concerned with how well the instrument measures what 
it is supposed to measure.  
4.3.1 Pilot Study Participants 
The pilot study instrument, an online questionnaire, was distributed to 170 individuals. A 
purposive sampling procedure was used to select participants that are representative of the 
population. Therefore, it was important to identify organisations that actively engaged in IT shared 
services arrangements mechanisms, and identify respondents within those organisations who were 
involved with, and most knowledgeable about, the IT governance activities. A list of potential 
survey respondents was obtained from shared services conference organisers, IT professional 
communities, IT consulting firms, and references from other IT shared services organisations. 
Respondents were chosen from diverse domains of the organisational personnel, and their job 
functions. These personnel included the chief executive officer, the chief operating officer, the chief 
information officer, senior members from business units and IT shared services units.  
A cover letter that ensured respondent anonymity accompanied the research instrument. 
Approximately one to two weeks after the online questionnaires were distributed the researcher sent 
follow-up reminders for the purpose of response rate maximisation. The participants were given 
four weeks to complete the pilot study instrument. Thirty-one responses (i.e. 18.2%) were received, 
5 respondents did not use IT shared services, and 26 questionnaires were complete or semi-
complete. The data was entered into the IBM SPSS® Statistics version 19 software package and 
checked for incorrect entries and missing data. The final sample size of 21 was deemed suitable for 
analysis. The respondent and organisation profiles are shown in Table 4.7.  
Table 4.7: Respondent Profile for Completed Pilot Survey 
Role Response 
Top Management Executive  4 
Business Unit Leader 11 
Local IT Unit Leader    2 
IT Executive - Shared Services 1 
Other (IT governance, Commercial Manager - Projects, Corporate 
Planning Manager) 
3 
Total 21 
4.3.2 Pilot Study Findings 
Analysis of the pilot study data involved two distinct stages. The first stage entailed factor 
analysis whereas the second stage entailed reliability analysis. Both stages of the data analysis were 
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conducted in SPSS. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used to refine and validate the 
measurement scales. CFA was identified as an appropriate statistical test particularly as the 
researcher had knowledge of the number of factors that were required to explain the inter-
correlations among the measurement variables (Sureshchandar et al. 2002). Additionally, the 
researcher had knowledge about the observed variables that were more likely to be reliable 
indicators of a particular factor (Sureshchandar et al. 2002). Given the fact that the proposed 
research model was based on logic, previous empirical research and theoretical findings, the CFA 
approach was considered the most appropriate method to statistically confirm the proposed factors 
of the five domains. Reliability analysis is a technique that assesses the internal consistency, or 
common core, of scale items (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).  
Prior to the extraction of the factors, several tests should be used to assess the suitability of 
the respondent data for factor analysis. These tests include Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (Kaiser, 1970; 1974) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1950). The 
KMO index, in particular, is recommended when the cases-to-variable ratio is less than 5:1. The 
KMO index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.50 considered suitable for factor analysis (Child, 2006). The 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity should be significant (p < 0.05) for factor analysis to be suitable (Child, 
2006). Examining the sufficiency test of data, KMO values are greater than the recommended value 
of 0.5 for all domains, thus indicating the suitability of the data for factor analysis (Table 4.8). The 
Bartlett’s test for ‘independent review’ is significant (p < 0.05). The other four domains ‘business 
value’, ‘independent review’, ‘professional oversight’ and ‘joint working’ are also highly 
significant (p < 0.001), making the factor analysis appropriate. 
Table 4.8: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Domains 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square df Sig. 
Business Value .721 172.561 45 .000 
Independent Review .597 11.909 3 .008 
Professional Oversight .525 75.214 28 .000 
Joint Working .828 63.093 15 .000 
Gap Assessment .658 34.628 3 .000 
 
The 30 items of ‘business value’, ‘independent review’, ‘professional oversight’, ‘joint 
working’, and ‘gap assessment’ were factor analysed using the maximum likelihood method. The 
maximum likelihood method of factor extraction is posited as theoretically superior to other 
methods (Basilevsky, 2009). Generally, a factor solution which accounts for more than 30% of the 
total variance is considered adequate.(Costello & Osborne, 2005) The factor analysis results are 
shown in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Factor Loadings and Communalities Based on Maximum Likelihood Extraction 
Items 
Factor Loading 
Communality Business 
Value 
Independent 
Review 
Professional 
Oversight 
Joint 
Working 
Gap 
Assessment 
To establish a well-functioning IT environment .402     .544 
To enhance economies of scale in IT resources .643     .764 
To reduce overcapacity by consolidation of systems .584     .895 
To leverage IT purchasing .738     .726 
To refocus on core business .444     .808 
To improve the capability of IT to support the 
needs of business operations 
.944     .949 
To share IT risks within approved risk limits .964     .962 
To improve the management of technology and 
human resources 
.769     .720 
To support consolidation or integration .881     .883 
To reduce IT expenditure .838     .788 
Formal workgroup or focus group to address 
specific shared IT services initiatives and assist in 
the development of IT services products 
 .855    .431 
Dedicated officer responsible for monitoring 
compliance with the terms of the shared IT services 
agreement 
 .397    .126 
Local IT/business unit takes an active and direct 
role in overseeing operating policy for the shared IT 
services 
 .745    .413 
Benchmark the ‘cost’ target against standard of 
best-practice 
  .380   .745 
Benchmark the ‘quality’ target against standard of 
best-practice 
  .970   .845 
Benchmark the ‘customer satisfaction’ target 
against standard of best-practice 
  .615   .745 
Benchmark the ‘timeliness’ target against standard 
of best-practice 
  .921   .835 
Make use of  ‘Control Objectives for Information 
and related Technology (COBIT)’ IT governance 
framework 
  .244   .270 
Make use of  ‘Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL)’ framework 
  -.009   .516 
Make use of  ‘Information Security Management 
(ISO 27002)’ framework 
  -.188   .578 
Make use of  ‘Quality Management (ISO 9000)’ 
framework 
  .141   .420 
Participate in our business with positive attitude    .917  .740 
Are very interested in each other's problems    .812  .638 
Encourage each other to solve business problems    .761  .579 
Share business knowledge of core business 
processes if necessary 
   .659  .418 
Exchange information that help the establishment 
of business planning 
   .694  .596 
Share environmental information that affects each 
other's business 
   .702  .643 
Utilise formal IT governance tools…     .679 .461 
Map the current governance structure…     .999 .779 
Evaluate our IT governance awareness and 
engagement… 
    .851 .724 
% of variance explained 61.677 62.324 35.068 64.842 80.287  
Eigenvalues 6.168 1.870 2.805 3.891 2.409  
 
The ‘business value’ factor accounted for 61.7% of the variance. Ten questions loaded onto 
this factor. The second factor contained the three questions relating to the ‘independent review’ and 
accounted for 62.3 % of the variance. The eight questions which loaded onto the third factor related 
to ‘professional oversight’. This factor accounted for 35.1% of the total variance. The fourth factor 
‘joint working’ accounted for 64.8% of the total variance and the fifth ‘gap assessment’ accounted 
for 80.2% of the total variance. Generally, a factor solution which accounts for more than 30% of 
the total variance can be considered adequate. The analysis identified 1 item ‘make use of Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) IT governance framework’ with 
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communality less than 0.3. Generally, a variable is said to load on a factor if its loading is higher 
than 0.3. However, this item was retained due to its strong conceptual fit with the ‘independent 
review’ factor.  
All the items, except four items, had their factor loading greater than 0.4. The four items were 
‘make use of Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) IT governance 
framework’, ‘make use of Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework’, ‘make 
use of ‘Information Security Management (ISO 27002) framework’, ‘make use of Quality 
Management (ISO 9000) framework’. All four items had factor loadings below 0.3. These four 
items represent the adoption of the four different governance frameworks. Organisations may adopt 
single or multiple frameworks, in particular COBIT or/and ITIL. Managers are advised that IT 
service management and governance frameworks are not mutually exclusive, and when combined 
provide powerful IT governance, control and best practice in IT service management (Smallwood, 
2014). The scales for these four items were subsequently submitted to reliability analysis using 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951). The acceptance range of alpha coefficients is 0.5 to 
0.6 (Nunnally, 1967). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the five factors ranged from 0.693 - 
0.924 (Table 4.10). All reliability measures were in excess of what Nunnally (1967) regarded as 
minimally acceptable and demonstrated high internal consistency. All items for all factors were thus 
retained.  
Table 4.10: Cronbach’s Alpha Results 
Domains Number of items Cronbach's alpha 
Business Value 10 .924 
Independent Review 3 .693 
Professional Oversight 8 .714 
Joint Working 6 .891 
Gap Assessment 3 .875 
Overall score 30 .904 
 
Follow-up feedback for any “unsuitable responses” with regard to clarity, specificity, 
appropriate language, and relevance was obtained. Each returned questionnaire was also checked 
for any difficulties that respondents may have encountered when completing the questionnaire. No 
significant comments were made about the difficulty in answering the instrument. Thus, no major 
modification and/or correction were made to any construct. Additionally, no major comments were 
made about the timing, format, and structure. Therefore, the layout and presentation of the 
instrument was not altered. Responses from the pilot test were not included in the final sample. 
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4.4 Data Collection Procedures 
4.4.1 Ethical Considerations 
The main study was conducted with conscious attention to a number of ethical principles 
(McNamara, 1994). First, care was taken to ensure that the participants fully understood the nature 
of the study and participation was completely voluntary. This information was detailed in a preface 
to the questionnaire (Appendix C). To encourage a higher response rate, incentives and multiple 
contacts were used via a Web research panel and survey specialist (Dillman, 2009; Millar & 
Dillman, 2011). McNamara’s (1994) second ethical guideline is to avoid possible harm to 
respondents. This could include no embarrassment or feeling uncomfortable about questions and 
survey results. As discussed in the previous section, the research instrument was thoroughly 
reviewed by peers and supervisors to ensure that sensitive questions were avoided. The cover email 
for the questionnaire also explained that the results of the study would be used in a dissertation as 
partial fulfilment for a Doctoral degree. The third ethical guideline is to protect a respondent’s 
identity. This requirement can be accomplished by exercising anonymity and confidentiality. A 
survey is anonymous when a respondent cannot be identified on the basis of a response. To avoid 
confusion, the cover email for the questionnaire clearly identified the survey as being confidential 
in regards to responses and the reporting of results. The fourth ethical guideline, as described by 
McNamara (1994), is to accurately report both the methods and the results of the surveys to 
professional colleagues in the educational community. The advancements in academic fields come 
through honesty and openness, the researcher assumes the responsibility to report problems and 
weaknesses experienced as well as the positive results of the study. Finally, approval from the 
Ethical Review Committee of the University Queensland Business School to undertake the survey 
within the frame of this study was sought and granted. 
4.4.2 Survey Administration 
The data were collected in February 2012. The participants were instructed that the study was 
being conducted to explore their IT governance practices with respect to the entire IT function 
organisation-wide, not just the central/shared IT organisation or local IT department. The survey 
consisted of three major parts. The first part included ‘screening’ questions to make sure that only 
those people who used or provided IT shared services would participate in the survey. The 
respondents were asked their roles in relation to IT shared services, their annual expenditure spent 
on IT, and the portion of total IT expenditure directly managed by IT shared services. The second 
part included questions related to demographics of the respondents. The third part included question 
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items for the constructs in the research model. To assist the respondents in understanding the 
survey, the important definitions for the survey were also provided. Participation was by informed 
consent, by direct logging on to the study website and submitting responses.  
4.4.3 Sampling Frame 
Using convenience, opt-in Internet panels as sampling frames has become virtually 
commonplace in today’s survey research world (Potoglou et al., 2012). The movement towards 
Web-based convenience panels is inevitable, given the relatively low cost of these samples, the 
shorter time frames for completing surveys and the flexibility provided by the Internet for 
conducting complex surveys (Fricker, 2008; Zhang, 2000). Some survey brokers recruit panels of 
individuals by using incentives and maintain database of several million volunteer Web survey 
participants. The volunteers are recruited from a variety of sources including advertising on the 
Internet.  
In this study, a survey broker that provides opt-in online panels was used for distributing and 
collecting survey data. The researcher provided the survey broker with a target sample size. The 
researcher also specified the sampling selection criteria (i.e., executive management, middle 
management, and IT management) and obtained a written agreement from the survey broker to 
assure the representativeness of the survey samples. For example, to safeguard against multiple 
submissions, the survey broker was responsible for managing a login procedure to ensure that a 
given person’s data was only used once. In addition, to identity and revise problematic questions 
and survey formatting, a pilot survey with a small group of participants was conducted before 
activating the survey. After the required sample size was reached, the survey broker provided a final 
report of completion rate data. Reporting a completion rate lends credibility to the survey, reflecting 
the quality of the recruitment procedures for participation in the survey (Callegaro et al., 2014). 
4.5 Data Preparation 
Data preparation involved checking the data for accuracy, entering the data, developing and 
documenting a database structure that integrates the various measures using standard statistical 
programs (i.e., SPSS & SmartPLS). First, the raw data were checked for data entry errors (e.g., the 
effectiveness of screening questions to determine whether the respondent is qualified). The 
Qualtrics web-based survey tools allowed the researcher to constantly access to the data and 
constantly monitor the performance of the application and the state of the collected data. Next, each 
response from a survey participant was checked for reasonableness. In the context of this thesis, 
checking for reasonableness principally was concerned with checking if the pattern of the response 
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could be considered reasonable and fit the majority of other responses (e.g., all or almost all 
questions answered with ‘neutral’ on the Likert-type 7-point scale). The comments provided by the 
respondents were also reviewed generally for data quality and specifically for sampling error (e.g., 
‘… not particularly relevant to very small scale business that has owner plus one other casual 
employee…’). All of the responding organisations that were not involved in IT shared services were 
identified and removed from the data analysis. To ensure the integrity of the imported data a 
thorough comparison of randomly selected data in the SPSS and SmartPLS data files with the 
corresponding MS Excel® document was performed. However, no errors or inconsistencies in the 
electronic conversion of the data were found and therefore the data was suitable for the data 
analysis procedures. 
4.5.1 Missing Data 
To avoid missing data, several validation methods were used to develop the survey instrument 
in Qualtrics. For example, respondents were required to allocate 100 points to describe the 
proportion of decision made by each decision party. A validation rule was added in the survey 
design to ensure a certain number of responses are chosen, and that a total number of 100 are 
allocated across different decision parties. Requiring the respondents to answer every question was 
another way to eliminate missing data. Respondents were prompted for answers to questions they 
left blank. This survey was administered to members of an opt-in panel who might be accustomed 
to surveys that required answers, therefore, the breakoff rate of requiring answers was small 
(Couper et al., 2011). Due to these technical configurations, it was not necessary to check the 
responses for completeness as it was technically not possible to save incomplete responses; for this 
reason there was no need to handle missing data in this research work. 
4.5.2 Data Transformation 
After the raw data were checked for inaccuracies, data transformation was required to create a 
well-structured database suitable for analysis. The transformation involved categorisation, recoding, 
and computing new variables as specified in the operation definitions (Appendix B). The construct 
‘shared services delivery arrangement’ was operationalised by the typology from the study of 
Tomkinson (2007, p.30). The variables in Question 3 were categorised accordingly. Based on Weill 
and Ross’s classification (2004, p.60), the constructs ‘IT governance structure (decision rights)’ and 
‘IT governance structure (accountability)’ were recoded and built on the variables in Question 4. 
The following table describes the computation methods of creating the constructs ‘IT governance 
structural gap’, ‘monitoring mechanism’ and ‘business value’.  
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Table 4.11: Construct Operationalisation 
Construct Scale Computation Methods 
IT Governance 
Structural Gap 
Structural gap 
Question 4 
 
Summed absolute value of the difference between decision rights and accountability for 
each IT governance decision domain (Grover et al., 2007). 
 
Structural gap = Σn=1 to 5 | Decision rights – Accountability | 
 
Gap assessment 
Question 5 
 
Mean of 3 items 
Monitoring 
Mechanism 
Independent review  
Question 6.1 
 
Mean of 4 items  
Professional 
oversight  
Question 6.3  
 
Mean of 8 items 
Joint working  
Question 6.2 
Mean of 6 items 
Business Value 
Business value  
Q7.1 & Q7.2  
The business value measure was created based on 10 items in each of questions 7.1 and 
7.2. Question 7.1 assesses the importance of particular outcome and question 7.2 assesses 
second how well IT shared services contributed to meeting that outcome. Since not all 
organisations ranked the outcomes with the same importance, the answers to the first 
question were used to weight the answers to the second question (Weill & Ross, 2004). 
 
Business value = 
Σn=1 to 10 (importance of business value [Q 7.1]*influence of IT 
shared services [Q7.2]) 
 
Σn=1 to 10 (importance of business value) 
4.6 Response Rate 
Response rates, taking into account eligibility of units, are actually difficult or even 
impossible to calculate in Web surveys (Dillman, 2009). Completion rates reported in the literature 
thus vary from less than 1% to just a few percent for very general self-selected Web surveys 
(Schillewaert et al., 1998) to higher percentages, even as high as 78% in the case of telephone pre-
recruited panels (Wiebe et al., 2001). As there appears to be no standard methodology for 
calculating a response rate in web-based surveys, the researcher avoided the term ‘response rate’ 
and used response metrics such as the click-through rate, incident rate and completion rate in 
reporting. 
In this thesis, click-through rate was measured based on the visit statistics collected by the ISP 
hosting the web survey among all invited or exposed to invitations. Of the 5476 executives and 
middle managers exposed to invitations, some 927 viewed the survey and the click-through rate was 
16.93%. Of these, 100 respondents dropped out. The incidence rate was measured based on the 
number of respondents that qualify for a study based on the screening criteria. Five hundred and 
eighty-five non-shared services providers or clients were screened out and the incident rate was 
29.26%. The completion rate was measured based on the completed and valid questionnaires. 20 
responses from single-person organisations and 17 incomplete responses were unable to be used. 
Thus, 205 useable responses were included for data analysis, resulting in a completion rate of 
24.79%. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the overall research design adopted to obtain data to test the research 
model. A quantitative research methodology seems appropriate for use in this study. The research 
contains all the parameters needed for a quantitative design, including the fact that it is highly 
structured, and the results are determined numerically or statistically. Additionally, the variables are 
clearly defined; the researcher is working within objective parameters; and the phenomena to be 
captured, no matter how complex, can be deconstructed into smaller pieces, all of which are 
measurable. The survey research described will result in conclusions that will either prove or 
disprove the hypothesis accompanying it. Explanations about analysis strategy will be presented in 
next chapter.  
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DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
This chapter summarises the data analysis and results of the hypothesis testing. Building on 
the research goals of this study, section 5.1 introduces the selected statistical methodologies for data 
analysis. Section 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the collected data. Prior to formal 
hypotheses testing, section 5.3 examines the results of an Exact Test from the IT governance 
structure data set. Section 5.4 evaluates the results of Partial Least Squares test from the IT 
governance structural gap and monitoring mechanism data set in the research model. The 
measurement model is assessed to ensure validity and reliability in section 5.4.1. Only if the 
measurement model shows adequate levels of validity and reliability, can the interdependencies 
between the latent variables be used for interpretation. Subsequent to the analysis of the 
measurement model, the structural model is evaluated in section 5.4.2. Finally, section 5.5 
concludes the findings. The structure of this chapter is shown in figure 5.1 below. 
Figure 5.1: Chapter Structure 
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5.1 Data Analysis Methodology 
As this study performs confirmatory procedures to test the developed hypotheses, the 
following statistical techniques were used: 
1. Descriptive statistics were generated to describe the basic features of the data. Cross-
tabulations and chi-squared tests were used to explore the significant differences between 
organisation size and shared services relationship. 
2. The Exact Test technique was used to examine the frequency data set for each IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement pattern. The ‘exact’ p 
values revealed if there were non-random associations between these two categorical 
variables for each IT decision domain.  
3. The Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique was used to confirm the proposed relationships 
among the IT governance structural gap, monitoring mechanism and business value of IT. 
Following Hulland’s (1999) procedure, a two-phased approach was used for data analysis. 
First, the measurement model (called the outer model relating the manifest variables to 
their own latent variables) was estimated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test 
the overall fit of the model. Composite reliability, Cronbach’s alpha and average variance 
extracted (AVE) values ensured that only reliable and valid measures of the constructs 
were used before drawing conclusions about the nature of the construct relationships. 
Second, the structural model (called the inner model relating some endogenous latent 
variables to other latent variables) was tested by estimating the paths between the 
constructs in the model. T-values and their statistical significance were assessed for that 
purpose, as indicators of the model’s predictive ability.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The research sample of 205 usable responses was examined to establish a picture about the 
complex nature of the data. In particular, two groups (shared services relationship and organisation 
size) were further compared to reveal the significant differences on the constructs in the theoretical 
model. Undertaking a review of shared services relationship ascertains whether gaps exist between 
provider and client expectations about the IT governance mechanisms and business value generated 
from IT shared services as a sourcing strategy. The discovery of gaps in the provider-client 
perceptions will indicate potential opportunities and challenges that need to be addressed by shared 
services organisations. Researchers consider organisation size as a contingency factor on 
organisation structure (i.e., form, decision making, and control) which then influences performance 
(e.g., Daft, 2013). For example, small organisations cannot develop all the desired services and have 
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all kinds of expertise, however, by sharing services and expertise among these organisations (i.e., 
iso-corporate), a larger number of services desired become available. A sound analysis of these 
manifest variables will provide an insight into the governance issues influencing the success of 
shared services implementations. 
5.2.1 Demographics of Respondents  
This research takes into account the different characteristics in the sample that may have 
potential effects on the relationships between variables. Table 5.1 presents the respondent profile. 
Survey participants are evenly divided between shared services providers and shared services 
clients (labelled as ‘RELATIONSHIP’), with 46.8% (n = 96) working for the latter and 53.2% (n = 
109) working for the former. Approximately 50.7% (n = 104) of the respondents are top 
management executives. The top management executives refer to the top two tiers of management, 
e.g., ‘C’ Level Executive (CEO, COO, CFO), Business Executives, Business Director, etc. The 
column-percentages (% within RELATIONSHIP) in the 'Top Management Executive’ row indicate 
54.0% (n = 59) are executives in providers and 46.9% (n = 45) are executives in clients. Comparing 
other column-percentages for the cells in each ‘ROLE’ row, only slight distribution pattern 
differences can be observed between provider and client. The respondent profile indicates that no 
significant difference is found between the two respondent groups. 
Table 5.1: Respondent Profile 
Respondent  RELATIONSHIP  
ROLE  
IT Shared Services 
Provider 
IT Shared Services 
Client 
Total 
Top Management Executive Count 59 45 104 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 54.10% 46.90% 50.70% 
 % of Total 28.80% 22.00% 50.70% 
Business Unit Leader  Count 23 26 49 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 21.10% 27.10% 23.90% 
 % of Total 11.20% 12.70% 23.90% 
Local IT Unit Leader  Count 16 11 27 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 14.70% 11.50% 13.20% 
 % of Total 7.80% 5.40% 13.20% 
IT Executive - Shared Services  Count 5 3 8 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 4.60% 3.10% 3.90% 
 % of Total 2.40% 1.50% 3.90% 
Other Count 6 11 17 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 5.50% 11.50% 8.30% 
 % of Total 2.90% 5.40% 8.30% 
Total Count 109 96 205 
 % within RELATIONSHIP 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 % of Total 53.20% 46.80% 100.00% 
 
The unit of analysis in this study is the organisation. The profile of respondent organisations 
consists of different dimensions: the number of people employed, industry types, and location. 
Table 5.2 presents the organisation profile. There is a wide range of participant organisations in 
terms of size. Nearly half of the respondents work for organisations employing less than 150 
employees (47%), 28% of the respondents work for organisations with employees between 151 and 
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1,000, and almost one quarter respondents work for organisations employing more than 1,000 
employees.  
From the 17 industry sectors used in the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial 
Classification (ANZSIC), the respondents come from all sectors except electricity, gas and water 
supply. The survey results show that 14% of the respondents work in the personal or other services 
sector followed by 13% in the manufacturing industry. Retail is the next largest sector, with 10% of 
the respondents falling into this category. Eight per cent of those answering the survey work in the 
communication services, finance and insurance, and education field respectively. Seven per cent are 
employed by construction organisations and six per cent work in the government administration and 
defence sector. The remaining nine sectors in total have less than 5% of the respondents. Including 
those organisations who participated in the pilot test from the electricity, gas and water supply 
sector, this study confirms similar findings that IT shared services is an accepted organisational and 
strategic model across all industries (Deloitte, 2009, 2013). Four respondents manage locations in 
more than one country, for example, New Zealand and Canada. The number of responses, along 
with their industrial dispersion, personal and organisation profiles provides good variability within 
the sample.  
Table 5.2: Organisation Profile  
Organisation Characteristic Frequency Percentage 
Size Under 150 employees 97 47.3% 
 151 to 500 employees 30 14.6% 
 501 to 1000 employees 27 13.2% 
 1001 to 5000 employees 28 13.7% 
 More than 5000 employees 23 11.2% 
Type5 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  10 4.9% 
 Mining  8 3.9% 
 Manufacturing  26 12.7% 
 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  0 0.0% 
 Construction  14 6.8% 
 Wholesale Trade  6 2.9% 
 Retail Trade  20 9.8% 
 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  8 3.9% 
 Transport and Storage  3 1.5% 
 Communication Services  17 8.3% 
 Finance and Insurance  16 7.8% 
 Property and Business Services  6 2.9% 
 Government Administration and Defence  13 6.3% 
 Education  17 8.3% 
 Health and Community Services  8 3.9% 
 Cultural and Recreational Services  4 2.0% 
 Personal and Other Services 28 13.7% 
 Missing 1 0.5% 
Location Australian Capital Territory  38 8.2% 
 New South Wales  100 21.4% 
 Victoria  86 18.4% 
 Queensland  76 16.3% 
 South Australia  55 11.8% 
 Western Australia  55 11.8% 
 Tasmania  28 6.0% 
 Northern Territory 24 5.2% 
 Overseas 4 0.9% 
 
                                                 
5 The 2006 edition of the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). 
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5.2.2 Comparison of Respondents  
Every organisation approaches shared services differently (Deloitte, 2011). The assumption is 
that each group of respondents has specific business needs to deal with service provision and 
criteria to control performance. The research sample is split into two groups: large and small 
organisations. Although there are various criteria in the literature that could be used to define or 
measure the organisation size, organisations are most frequently classified by number of employees 
because this measure is more stable over time compared with other factors (Forsaith et al., 1995). 
However, there is considerable variation in the threshold figures selected as small or large 
organisations. For example, in the United States, the upper limit to define small business ranges 
from 100 to 500 employees. The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines small business as having 
fewer than 100 employees in the manufacturing sector and fewer than 20 in retail, wholesale, 
construction, and services sectors. Organisations with 100 to 199 employees are considered as 
medium, and 200 or more employees are classified as large (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999). 
To obtain an appropriate 50:50 small-large split, this study uses the number of employees as an 
index of organisation size and collapses medium organisations to both small organisations as having 
under 150 employees and large organisations as having more than 150 employees.  
Cross-tabulation analysis together with the Chi-square (χ²) test and the Fisher exact test (2-
sided) were performed. Table 5.3 illustrates the range of different shared services delivery 
arrangements adopted in different organisation sizes. Table 5.4 reveals there is a positive significant 
association between organisation size and shared services delivery arrangement. The results indicate 
that the organisation size is related to the types of shared services delivery arrangement6. Table 5.3 
shows the column-percentage of ‘intra-service’ for large organisations is 34.9% while it is 65.1% 
for small organisations. This table indicates that small organisations are more likely to adopt ‘intra-
service’ delivery arrangement. The difference between large and small organisations is not 
significant in the 'service' column, at 48.0% and 52.0% respectively. In the ‘corporate’ delivery 
arrangement, however, there is a higher column-percentage of large organisations compared with 
small organisations (65.0% vs. 35.0%). In the ‘supra-corporate’ column, the numbers of large and 
                                                 
6 Intra-service – collaboration on specific and/or specialist services. This limited shared services option could, at its most 
basic level, provide for services to gain goods and services centrally from a business unit, e.g., purchasing IT equipment; partnership 
for delivery a project; share an integrated software package. 
  Service – a degree of formality of sharing a complete service but the organisation is not changed to meet the challenge of 
the sharing. Generally, one business unit allows another to provide the service with a transfer of control and responsibility, e.g., all 
the budget belong to the ‘shared’ service business unit. 
  Corporate – two or more business units or organisations form a joint arrangement to ‘share’ a specific service or services at 
a mutually agreed standard in which both the costs and benefits are borne by all participating organisations on a negotiated basis, 
e.g., IT infrastructure services partnership as a new management group. 
  Supra-corporate – two or more participating organisations set up a separate special purpose vehicle to deliver a specified 
service or services on behalf of participating organisations.  
  Iso-corporate – an extension of the ‘supra-corporate’ model. The delivery organisation is allowed to provide services to 
external customers. 
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small organisations represent the same percentage, i.e., 50%. Small organisations account for 66.7% 
and large organisations account for 33.3% of total ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement, indicating 
that small organisations are more likely to adopt an ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement. 
Table 5.3: Cross-Tabulation of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Organisation Size 
   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
   
Intra-
service Service Corporate 
Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate Total 
Size Large Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
  Expected Count 22.7 13.2 52.7 11.6 7.9 108.0 
  % within SSDA 34.9% 48.0% 65.0% 50.0% 33.3% 52.7% 
  % of Total 7.3% 5.9% 31.7% 5.4% 2.4% 52.7% 
  Adjusted Residual -2.6 -.5 3.4 -.3 -1.6  
 Small Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
  Expected Count 20.3 11.8 47.3 10.4 7.1 97.0 
  % within SSDA 65.1% 52.0% 35.0% 50.0% 66.7% 47.3% 
  % of Total 13.7% 6.3% 17.1% 5.4% 4.9% 47.3% 
  Adjusted Residual 2.6 .5 -3.4 .3 1.6  
 Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
  Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
  % within SSDA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.4: Chi-Square Tests of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Organisation Size 
    Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
    Sig.  99% Confidence Interval 
  Value df  (2-sided) Sig. Lower Upper 
Size Pearson Chi-Square 14.087a 4 .007 .008b .005 .010 
  Likelihood Ratio 14.281 4 .006 .009b .007 .011 
  Fisher's Exact Test 14.084     .008b .006 .010 
  N of Valid Cases 205           
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.10. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341. 
 
To gain insight into the effects of shared services relationship (client vs provider) on shared 
service delivery arrangement, the cross-tabulation analysis was conducted as shown in Table 5.5. 
The Chi-square (χ²) test and the Fisher exact test (2-sided) indicate differences between provider 
and client groups do not reach statistical significance for each shared services delivery arrangement 
(Table 5.6). The results indicate shared services relationship is not significantly related to delivery 
arrangement. The sample is, therefore, likely to provide a ‘balanced’ representation of both provider 
and client.  
Table 5.5: Cross-Tabulation of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Relationship 
   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
   
Intra-
service Service Corporate 
Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate Total 
Relationship Provider Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
  Expected Count 22.9 13.3 53.2 11.7 8.0 109.0 
  % within SSDA 44.2% 52.0% 61.0% 40.9% 46.7% 53.2% 
  % of Total 9.3% 6.3% 29.8% 4.4% 3.4% 53.2% 
  Adjusted Residual -1.3 -.1 2.2 -1.2 -.5   
 Client Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
  Expected Count 20.1 11.7 46.8 10.3 7.0 96.0 
  % within SSDA 55.8% 48.0% 39.0% 59.1% 53.3% 46.8% 
  % of Total 11.7% 5.9% 19.0% 6.3% 3.9% 46.8% 
  Adjusted Residual 1.3 .1 -2.2 1.2 .5   
 Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
  Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
  % within SSDA 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  % of Total 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
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Table 5.6: Chi-Square Tests of Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) and Relationship 
    Asymp. Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
    Sig.  99% Confidence Interval 
  Value df  (2-sided) Sig. Lower Upper 
Relationship Pearson Chi-Square 5.453a 4 .244 .246b .235 .257 
  Likelihood Ratio 5.476 4 .242 .253b .242 .264 
  Fisher's Exact Test 5.485     .241b .230 .252 
  N of Valid Cases 205           
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.02. 
b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 624387341. 
 
The descriptive statistics and cross-tabulation analysis of different groups (above) do not 
assess the explanatory power of the research model, and as such, are not able to answer the research 
questions. Instead, the descriptive analysis provides background information, which is useful for the 
understanding of the differences between organisation size and shared services relationship. 
5.3 Exact Tests – Assessment of IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights)  
To assess relationships, interdependency and significant differences between shared services 
delivery arrangement, IT decision domain and IT governance structure (decision rights) variables, 
the Exact Tests were used for analysis using SPSS to test the hypotheses of the first part of the 
research model as shaded in Figure 5.2, i.e., H1 to H5 (Bryman & Cramer, 2008). This test 
determines whether the proportions of those variables falling into each category differ by group, 
i.e., whether organisations govern IT differently, depending on the selected delivery arrangement. 
The unit of measurement is at the shared services delivery arrangement/IT decision domain level to 
conduct the analysis. 
Figure 5.2: Assessment of Research Model – Part 1 
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5.3.1 Characteristics of IT Governance Structure Distribution 
The boxplots show the distributional characteristics of each comparison group as well as the 
level of the scores (Figures 5.3 to 5.7). The horizontal line within each box represents the median; 
the lower and upper borders of each box represent the 25th and the 75th percentiles, respectively. 
As can be seen in the figures, most boxplots are comparatively tall. Overall, this finding suggests 
organisations hold quite different opinions about the design of IT governance structure, particularly 
in the subgroups (e.g., small organisation or client group). Most of the median lines are not 
equidistant and gravitating towards the bottom or the top edges, which suggests that the data are 
highly skewed distribution. General observations about the boxplots for each decision domain 
group indicate:  
1. For IT principles, most of the consolidated boxplots are comparatively tall suggesting 
each shared services delivery arrangement has differences in the IT governance structure. 
The ‘corporate’ box plot has a relatively equal distribution suggesting organisations have 
a high level of similarity in their IT governance structure (Figure 5.3).  
2. For IT investment, most of the medians are in the middle or nearer the lower quartile. All 
interquartile ranges are situated to the bottom of the range and the distribution departs 
from symmetry. This result suggests that organisations generally adopt a more centralised 
structure (Figure 5.4). 
3. For business application needs, there are few outliers and extreme observations in the 
‘corporate’ distribution. Most of the ‘corporate’ organisations again have similar views on 
their IT governance structure. Other shared services delivery arrangements are more 
variable in their IT governance structure choices (Figure 5.5). 
4. For IT architecture, boxplots are uneven in size and outliers are found in ‘corporate’ 
shared services delivery arrangement. These observations show the ‘corporate’ 
organisations have very different distribution views of IT governance structure (Figure 
5.6). 
5. For IT infrastructure, the distributions are similar to IT investment and have wide ranges 
of IT governance structure choices in all the boxplots (Figure 5.7).  
The boxplot is an important tool for exploratory data analysis. The result confirms that non-
normality is evident in the data set, i.e., asymmetric with respect to the mean. This non-normality 
may exist due to the presence of outlier cases. Although in many cases outliers are seen as ‘data 
problems’ that must be ‘fixed’, outliers can also be of substantive interest and studied as unique 
phenomena that may lead to novel theoretical insights (Aguinis et al., 2013). A further investigation 
was conducted to examine if the outliers are ‘error’. More specifically, “error outliners” include 
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outlying observations that are caused by not being part of the targeted population of interest (i.e., an 
error in the sampling procedure), lying outside the possible range of values, errors in observation, 
errors in recording, errors in preparing data, errors in computation, errors in coding, or errors in data 
manipulation (Orr et al., 1991). 
The identified outliers are legitimate observations and more likely to be representative of the 
population as a whole. First, there is no evidence to show that the outliers are ‘error outliers’. 
Second, these outliner cases may contain potentially valuable or unexpected knowledge (Mohrman 
& Edward E. Lawler, 2012). The relationship between shared service delivery arrangement and IT 
governance structure choice is relatively unexplored in academic literature. The outliers may be due 
to random variation and represent different opinions on allocating decision rights; therefore, they 
may have potential influence on the results. Third, nonparametric statistical methods are used for 
analysis which are robust in the presence of outliers (Rovai et al., 2013). The identified outliers are 
retained for further analysis.  
The boxplots show that the organisations have large variability in IT governance structure. 
Apparently, ‘business monarchy’ and ‘federal’ are the most popular choices of IT governance 
structure.  
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Figure 5.3: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT principles 
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Figure 5.4: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT Investment 
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Figure 5.5: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for Business 
Application Needs 
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Figure 5.6: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT Architecture 
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Figure 5.7: Boxplots of IT Governance Structure and Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) for IT Infrastructure 
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5.3.2 Significance and Strength of Association 
This section examines the statistical associations between shared services delivery 
arrangement, IT decision domain and IT governance structure (decision rights) variables. The next 
section, 5.3.3 will summarise the results of the hypothesis tests. 
The Exact Tests provide two methods, the Exact and Monte Carlo methods, for calculating 
significance levels for the statistics available through the Cross-tabulations and Nonparametric 
Tests procedures. These methods provide powerful means for obtaining accurate results when the 
data set is small, the tables are sparse or unbalanced, the data are not normally distributed, or the 
data fail to meet any of the underlying assumptions necessary for reliable results using the standard 
asymptotic method (Mehta & Patel, 2011). The goal of using the Exact Tests is to enable this study 
to make reliable inferences because the data set, as shown in the above figures 5.3 to 5.7, is 
unbalanced.  
The SPSS Exact Tests offer three tests for analysing unordered contingency tables. They are 
the Pearson chi-square test, the likelihood-ratio test, and Fisher’s Exact Test. The Pearson chi-
square statistic is a measure of the degree of independence of IT governance structure and shared 
services delivery arrangement, i.e., to test if there is a relationship between these two variables. The 
standard chi-square test is an asymptotic test. This means that given a sufficiently large sample size, 
the data are likely to conform reasonably closely to the expected chi-square distribution. As a result, 
the chi-square test is an approximation, albeit a reasonably good one most of the time. The 
likelihood-ratio test is an alternative to the Pearson chi-square test for testing independence of row 
and column classifications in an unordered contingency table. The Exact Method is also known as 
the Fisher's Exact Test. The test is exact because it uses the exact hypergeometric distribution rather 
than the approximate chi-square distribution to compute the p value.  
When deciding to use a chi-square test, a significant assumption of ‘minimum expected cell 
frequency’ has to be taken into consideration. According to Pallant (2011), the minimum expected 
cell frequency should be 5 or greater (or at least 80% of cells have expected frequencies of 5 or 
more). If this assumption is violated, the outcomes of the chi-square test using asymptotic method 
may fail to produce reliable results (but not necessarily false). According to the SPSS output cross-
tabulations (see Appendix D1 to D5), most cells have an expected count less than five. However, to 
test a very wide set of hypotheses, it is inappropriate to group either IT governance structure or 
shared services delivery arrangement categories to perform the standard chi-square test. Therefore, 
it is preferable to calculate a significance level based on the exact distribution of the test statistic 
(Agresti, 1992). In addition, Fisher's Exact Test is preferable to the likelihood ratio test for the small 
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sample, i.e., 205, obtained in the study. Hence, the likelihood ratio statistics are provided only for 
reference.  
In this study, the differences between IT governance structure and shared services delivery 
arrangement for each IT decision domain should be examined by the Fisher’s Exact Test statistics 
Fisher’s Exact Test7 considers all the possible cell combinations that would still result in the 
marginal frequencies and deems appropriate to confirm the research findings. Fisher (1970) 
advocated 5% significance as a standard level for concluding that there is evidence against the 
hypothesis tested. When the (two-sided) p value (the probability of obtaining the observed result) is 
less than the conventional 0.05, this study suggests that there is a significant relationship of the 
Fisher’s Exact Test between the two classification factors. When a statistical significance is 
identified (p < 0.05), Cramer’s V coefficient is evaluated as the effect size to describe the relative 
strength of the relationship. The value of Cramer’s V varies from 0 to 1.  
This study uses the value of 0.10 as the threshold to indicate a substantive difference between 
the variables (Dancey & Reidy, 2011). The results of the Cramer's V tests are evaluated according 
to the following criteria: < 0.10 = no relationship; 0.10 – < 0.15 = moderate association; 0.15 – < 
0.25 = strong association; 0.25 – < 0.40 = very strong association; 0.40 – < 0.45 extremely strong 
relationship or the two variables are measuring the same concept; 0.45 – < 0.99 = two variables 
probably measuring the same concept, 1.00 = perfect relationship, independent variables will 
predict the dependent variable.   
The cross-tabulations are then used to further investigate which specific IT governance 
structure versus delivery arrangement contributes to the overall differences between the two 
variables, i.e., what IT governance structure is likely adopted for each shared services delivery 
arrangement. The cross-tabulation tables are contained in Appendix D1 to D5. In the tables, the 
adjusted residuals in a cross-tabulation provide an estimation of the differences between observed 
and expected values (by assuming the distributions under comparisons are identical to each other). 
The IT governance structure versus shared services delivery arrangement cells with higher absolute 
values of adjusted residuals indicate that IT governance structures are more likely to be adopted in 
those shared services delivery arrangements corresponding to the positive cells, than the other ones. 
The summary findings for each IT decision domain are discussed in sections 5.3.2.1 through 
5.3.2.5.  
                                                 
7 This study utilises the Monte Carlo statistic. Monte Carlo enumeration algorithms provide an estimate of the exact p value 
called the Monte Carlo p value which can be made as accurate as necessary for the problem at hand. Typically, their accuracy is 99% 
of Fisher´s Exact Test. Monte Carlo estimates involve enumerating a random subset of all of the possible outcomes in the reference 
set. The random subset is large (default = 10,000) and can be set at any size. Increasing the size of the random subset will increase 
the accuracy of the Monte Carlo estimation. Thus, the Monte Carlo method provides a reliable, robust method of estimating the 
‘exact’ p value without requiring exorbitant computer capacity (Mehta & Patel, 2011). 
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5.3.2.1 Cross-tabulation of IT principles 
The summarised cross-tabulation of IT governance structure versus shared services delivery 
arrangement for IT principles decisions is shown in Table 5.7. In relation to the IT principles 
decision the highest frequency of each type of governance structure within each type of delivery 
arrangement is presented. For IT principles decision making within the ‘intra-service’ delivery 
arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (51.2% i.e., 
n = 22/43). For IT principles decision making within the ‘service’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (48.0% i.e., n = 12/25). For IT 
principles decision making within the ‘corporate’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted 
governance structure is ‘federal’ (58.0% i.e., n = 58/100). For IT principles decision making within 
the ‘supra-corporate’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is 
‘federal’ (54.5% i.e., n = 12/22). For IT principles decision making within the ‘iso-corporate’ 
delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ 
(53.3% i.e., n = 8/15). This pattern shows that there is more focus on the use of ‘business 
monarchy’ in the ‘intra-service’, ‘service’ and ‘iso-corporate’ organisations. The ‘federal’ 
governance structure is more likely to be used in the ‘corporate’ and ‘supra-corporate’ 
organisations. The frequency distribution for each of the subgroup variables can be found in 
Appendix D1. 
Table 5.7: Cross-tabulation – IT principles 
Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis 
 
 Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Large Provider n = 83 Significant relationship, Very strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
 Client n = 25 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 108 Significant, Very strong relationship 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
Small Provider n = 26 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 71 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 97 Not significant relationship 
All Provider n = 109 Significant relationship, Very strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
 Client n = 96 Not significant relationship 
 Total n= 205 Significant relationship, Strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Result   Supported Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
*Adjusted residual values indicate deviations significant at the 0.05 level. Residual Analysis here is presented as a way of delving deeper into a Cross-
tabulation. However, with Crosstabs of larger dimension, Residual Analysis will sometimes throw up interesting results along the lines of particular 
sub-categories that ‘buck the trend’ of the overall association between the variables. Alternatively, much higher values for residuals - whether +ve or -
ve - may be taken as indicating those cells which make a particularly strong contribution to the relationship depicted in the table. 
 
Table 5.8 provides the significance tests for IT principles cross-tabulation. The Fisher’s Exact 
Test statistics of total sample (n = 205) is 34.480 with p value = 0.001. Thus, there are significant 
associations between IT governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement in these 
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table variables (i.e. statistically significant differences exist between the five IT governance 
structures and the five delivery arrangements). In other words, the pattern of responses (i.e. the 
proportion of those organisations that adopt ‘business monarchy’, ‘IT monarchy’, ‘federal’, ‘IT 
duopoly’ & ‘feudal’) in the five delivery arrangements is significantly different. 
This study also examines whether or not there is an association between IT governance 
structure and shared services delivery arrangement implemented by separate groups. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics show that there are statistically significant associations in the ‘large-provider’ 
group (n = 83, Fisher’s Exact value = 25.589, p = 0.003), ‘large-total’ group (n = 108, Fisher’s 
Exact value = 24.202, p = 0.005), and ‘total-provider’ group (n = 109, Fisher’s Exact value = 
33.535, p = 0.001). The Fisher’s Exact Test statistics for other groups are not significant at the 0.05 
level. 
Table 5.8: Chi-Square Tests – IT principles 
Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Large Provider Likelihood Ratio 24.549 12 .017 .007 .005 .010 
 n = 83 Fisher's Exact Test 25.589   .003 .002 .005 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 11.226 12 .510 .596 .584 .609 
  n = 25 Fisher's Exact Test 12.679   .467 .455 .480 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 23.769 12 .022 .023 .019 .027 
  n = 108 Fisher's Exact Test 24.202   .005 .003 .006 
Small Provider Likelihood Ratio 16.281 16 .434 .517 .504 .530 
  n = 26 Fisher's Exact Test 15.398   .470 .457 .483 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 21.861 16 .148 .244 .233 .255 
  n = 71 Fisher's Exact Test 14.709   .419 .407 .432 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 19.268 16 .255 .412 .399 .425 
  n = 97 Fisher's Exact Test 12.595   .645 .633 .657 
Total Provider Likelihood Ratio 36.186 16 .003 .001 .000 .002 
 n = 109 Fisher's Exact Test 33.535   .001 .000 .001 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 20.796 16 .187 .268 .256 .279 
  n = 96 Fisher's Exact Test 16.538   .287 .275 .298 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 39.099 16 .001 .001 .000 .001 
  n = 205 Fisher's Exact Test 34.480   .001 .000 .001 
 
The statistics in Table 5.9 provides a measure of the strength of association between the 
variables. The Cramer’s V test statistic of total sample indicates that the association between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement is a strong one (n = 205, Cramer’s V 
value = 0.203, p = 0.007). The highly significant Cramer’s V values for the ‘large-provider’ group 
(n = 83, Cramer’s V value = 0.339, p = 0.020), ‘large-total’ group (n = 108, Cramer’s V value = 
0.268, p = 0.036), and ‘total provider’ group (n = 109, Cramer’s V value = 0.279, p = 0.017) 
indicate that there are very strong relationships between the two variables.  
Table 5.9: Symmetric Measures – IT principles 
Size Relationship  Value Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider n = 83 Cramer's V .339 .004 .020 .017 .024 
  Client n = 25  Cramer's V .410 .397 .423 .410 .436 
  Total n = 108 Cramer's V .268 .025 .036 .031 .040 
Small Provider n = 26 Cramer's V .368 .592 .674 .662 .686 
  Client n = 71 Cramer's V .254 .309 .309 .297 .321 
  Total n = 97 Cramer's V .196 .534 .552 .539 .565 
Total Provider n = 109 Cramer's V .279 .006 .017 .013 .020 
  Client n = 96 Cramer's V .217 .324 .321 .309 .333 
  Total n = 205 Cramer's V .203 .006 .007 .005 .009 
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5.3.2.2 Cross-tabulation of IT Investment 
For allocating IT investment responsibility, the summarised cross-tabulation of IT governance 
structure versus shared services delivery arrangement is shown in Table 5.10. For IT investment 
decision making within the ‘intra-service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted 
governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (58.1% i.e., n = 25/43). For IT investment decision 
making within the ‘service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure 
is ‘business monarchy’ (48.0% i.e., n = 12/25). For IT investment decision making within the 
‘corporate’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ 
(50.0% i.e., n = 50/100). For IT investment decision making within the ‘supra-corporate’ delivery 
arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (45.5% i.e., 
n = 10/22). For IT investment decision making within the ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement the 
most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (60.0% i.e., n = 9/15). The 
frequency distribution for each of the subgroup variables can be found in Appendix D2. 
Table 5.10: Cross-tabulation – IT Investment  
Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis 
 
 Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal Federal 
Large Provider n = 83 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 25 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 108 Not significant relationship 
Small Provider n = 26 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 71 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 97 Not significant relationship 
All Provider n = 109 Significant relationship, strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
 Client n = 96 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 205 Significant relationship, strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal* 
Business 
Monarchy  
Business 
Monarchy 
Result   Supported Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
*Adjusted residual values indicate deviations significant at the 0.05 level. Residual Analysis here is presented as a way of delving deeper into a Cross-
tabulation. However, with Crosstabs of larger dimension, Residual Analysis will sometimes throw up interesting results along the lines of particular 
sub-categories that ‘buck the trend’ of the overall association between the variables. Alternatively, much higher values for residuals - whether +ve or -
ve - may be taken as indicating those cells which make a particularly strong contribution to the relationship depicted in the table. 
 
Table 5.11 provides the significance tests for IT investment cross-tabulation. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics of total sample (n=205) is 24.376 with p value = 0.033. Thus, there are 
significant associations between IT governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement 
in these table variables (i.e. statistically significant differences exist between the five IT governance 
structures and the five delivery arrangements). In other words, the pattern of responses (i.e. the 
proportion of those organisations that adopt ‘business monarchy’, ‘IT monarchy’, ‘federal’, ‘IT 
duopoly’ & ‘feudal’) in the five delivery arrangements is significantly different. 
This study also examines whether or not there is an association between IT governance 
structure and shared services delivery arrangement implemented by separate groups. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics show that there are statistically significant associations of the ‘small-provider’ 
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group (n = 26, Fisher’s Exact value = 23.988, p = 0.020) and the ‘provider-total’ group (n = 109, 
Fisher’s Exact value = 29.405, p = 0.004). The Fisher’s Exact Test statistics for other groups are not 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 5.11: Chi-Square Tests – IT Investment  
Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider Likelihood Ratio 17.325 12 .138 .146 .137 .155 
  n = 83 Fisher's Exact Test 16.364   .098 .090 .105 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 12.290 12 .423 .400 .388 .413 
  n = 25 Fisher's Exact Test 14.349   .334 .322 .346 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 18.631 12 .098 .118 .110 .127 
  n = 108 Fisher's Exact Test 16.166   .112 .103 .120 
Small Provider Likelihood Ratio 23.189 16 .109 .025 .021 .028 
  n = 26 Fisher's Exact Test 23.988   .020 .016 .023 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 15.039 16 .522 .717 .705 .728 
  n = 71 Fisher's Exact Test 11.627   .781 .770 .792 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 17.844 16 .333 .490 .477 .503 
  n = 97 Fisher's Exact Test 13.571   .536 .523 .548 
Total Provider Likelihood Ratio 28.774 16 .026 .011 .008 .013 
  n = 109 Fisher's Exact Test 29.405   .004 .002 .005 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 11.588 16 .772 .887 .878 .895 
  n = 96 Fisher's Exact Test 10.195   .874 .866 .883 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 26.901 16 .043 .051 .045 .056 
  n = 205 Fisher's Exact Test 24.376   .033 .029 .038 
 
The statistics in Table 5.12 provides a measure of the strength of association between the 
variables. The Cramer’s V test statistic of total sample indicates that the relationship between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement is a strong one (n = 205, Cramer’s V 
value = 0.169, p = 0.106). The high significant Cramer’s V value for the ‘provider-total’ group (n = 
108, Cramer’s V value = 0.255, p = 0.046) indicates that there is a very strong relationship between 
the two variables. Although the Fisher’s Exact Test of the ‘small-provider’ group is significant at 
the 0.05 level, its strength of association (Cramer’s V values = 0.520) is redundant. This result 
implies that two variables are likely measuring the same concept. Hence, the relationship between 
the two variables in the ‘small-provider’ group should be considered as not significant. 
Table 5.12: Symmetric Measures – IT Investment 
Size Relationship  Value Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider n = 83 Cramer's V .265 .131 .145 .136 .154 
  Client n = 25  Cramer's V .362 .633 .602 .589 .615 
  Total n = 108 Cramer's V .221 .199 .203 .193 .213 
Small Provider n = 26 Cramer's V .520 .030 .054 .048 .060 
  Client n = 71 Cramer's V .201 .777 .832 .823 .842 
  Total  n = 97 Cramer's V .183 .673 .698 .686 .710 
Total Provider n = 109 Cramer's V .255 .028 .046 .041 .052 
  Client n = 96 Cramer's V .163 .857 .888 .880 .896 
  Total n = 205 Cramer's V .169 .100 .106 .098 .114 
5.3.2.3 Cross-tabulation of Business Application Needs 
The summarised cross-tabulation of IT governance structure versus shared services delivery 
arrangement for business application needs decisions is shown in Table 5.13. For business 
application needs decision making within the ‘intra-service’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (48.8% i.e., n = 21/43). For 
business application needs decision making within the ‘service’ delivery arrangement the most 
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commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (40.0% i.e., n = 10/25). For 
business application needs decision making within the ‘corporate’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ (60.0% i.e., n = 60/100). For business 
application needs decision making within the ‘supra-corporate’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ (59.1% i.e., n = 13/22). For business 
application needs decision making within the ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (53.3% i.e., n = 8/15). The 
frequency distribution for each of the subgroup variables can be found in Appendix D3. 
Table 5.13: Cross-tabulation – Business Application Needs 
Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis 
 
 Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal Federal Federal 
Large Provider n = 83 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 25 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 108 Not significant relationship 
Small Provider n = 26 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 71 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 97 Not significant relationship 
All Provider n = 109 Significant relationship, Very strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
 Client n = 96 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 205 Significant relationship, Strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Result   Supported Supported Supported Supported Not Supported 
*Adjusted residual values indicate deviations significant at the 0.05 level. Residual Analysis here is presented as a way of delving deeper into a Cross-
tabulation. However, with Crosstabs of larger dimension, Residual Analysis will sometimes throw up interesting results along the lines of particular 
sub-categories that ‘buck the trend’ of the overall association between the variables. Alternatively, much higher values for residuals - whether +ve or -
ve - may be taken as indicating those cells which make a particularly strong contribution to the relationship depicted in the table. 
 
Table 5.14 provides the significance tests for business application needs cross-tabulation. The 
Fisher’s Exact Test statistics of total sample (n = 205) is 27.282 with p value = 0.015. Thus, there 
are significant associations between IT governance structure and shared services delivery 
arrangement in these table variables (i.e. statistically significant differences exist between the five 
delivery arrangements and the five IT governance structures). In other words, the pattern of 
responses (i.e. the proportion of those organisations that adopt ‘business monarchy’, ‘IT monarchy’, 
‘federal’, ‘IT duopoly’ & ‘feudal’ ) in the five delivery arrangements is significantly different. 
This study also examines whether or not there is an association between IT governance 
structure and shared services delivery arrangement implemented by separate groups. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics show that there are statistically significant associations in the ‘small-provider’ 
group (n = 26, Fisher’s Exact value = 24.107, p = 0.008 and the ‘total provider’ group (n = 109, 
Fisher’s Exact value = 33.813, p < 0.001). The Fisher’s Exact Test statistics for other groups are not 
significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 5.14: Chi-Square Tests – Business Application Needs 
Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider Likelihood Ratio 23.412 16 .103 .076 .069 .082 
  n = 83 Fisher's Exact Test 21.870   .051 .045 .056 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 9.740 12 .639 .758 .747 .769 
  n = 25 Fisher's Exact Test 10.606   .760 .749 .771 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 18.433 16 .299 .363 .351 .375 
  n = 108 Fisher's Exact Test 18.228   .172 .163 .182 
Small Provider Likelihood Ratio 26.763 16 .044 .015 .012 .018 
  n = 26 Fisher's Exact Test 24.107   .008 .006 .010 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 20.180 16 .212 .334 .322 .346 
  n = 71 Fisher's Exact Test 14.733   .417 .404 .429 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 17.301 16 .366 .539 .526 .552 
  n = 97 Fisher's Exact Test 14.887   .408 .395 .420 
Total Provider Likelihood Ratio 38.491 16 .001 .001 .000 .001 
  n = 109 Fisher's Exact Test 33.813   .000 .000 .001 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 19.381 16 .249 .353 .341 .366 
  n = 96 Fisher's Exact Test 15.632   .350 .338 .363 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 28.067 16 .031 .051 .046 .057 
  n = 205 Fisher's Exact Test 27.282   .015 .012 .018 
 
The statistics in Table 5.15 provide a measure of the strength of association between the 
variables. The Cramer’s V value of total sample indicates that the relationship between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement is a strong one (n = 205, Cramer’s V 
value = 0.181, p = 0.045). The high significant Cramer’s V value for the ‘total-provider’ group 
indicates that there is very strong relationship between the two variables (n = 109, Cramer’s V value 
= 0.282, p = 0.008). Although the Fisher’s Exact Test of the ‘small-provider’ group is significant at 
the 0.05 level, its strength of association (Cramer’s V values = 0.543) is redundant. The two 
variables are likely measuring the same concept. Hence, the relationship between the two variables 
in the ‘small-provider’ group should be considered as not significant. 
Table 5.15: Symmetric Measures – Business Application Needs  
Size Relationship  Value Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider n = 83 Cramer's V .274 .070 .095 .087 .102 
  Client n = 25  Cramer's V .355 .666 .701 .690 .713 
  Total n = 108 Cramer's V .210 .268 .268 .256 .279 
Small Provider n = 26 Cramer's V .543 .015 .015 .012 .018 
  Client n = 71 Cramer's V .234 .483 .496 .483 .509 
  Total  n = 97 Cramer's V .192 .571 .577 .564 .589 
Total Provider n = 109 Cramer's V .282 .004 .008 .006 .010 
  Client n = 96 Cramer's V .200 .495 .494 .481 .506 
  Total n = 205 Cramer's V .181 .044 .045 .040 .050 
5.3.2.4 Cross-tabulation of IT Architecture 
For allocating IT architecture responsibility, the summarised cross-tabulation of IT 
governance structure versus shared services delivery arrangement is shown in Table 5.16. For IT 
architecture decision making within the ‘intra-service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly 
adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (53.5% i.e., n = 23/43). For IT architecture 
decision making within the ‘service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance 
structure is ‘business monarchy’ (40.0% i.e., n = 10/25). For IT architecture decision making within 
the ‘corporate’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ 
(50.0% i.e., n = 50/100). For IT architecture decision making within the ‘supra-corporate’ delivery 
arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ (50.0% i.e., n = 11/22). 
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For IT architecture decision making within the ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement the most 
commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (46.7% i.e., n = 7/15). The 
frequency distribution for each of the subgroup variables can be found in Appendix D4. 
Table 5.16: Cross-tabulation – IT Architecture  
Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis   Feudal IT Duopoly IT Duopoly IT Monarchy IT Monarchy 
Large Provider n = 83 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 25 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 108 Not significant relationship 
Small Provider n = 26 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 71 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 97 Not significant relationship 
All Provider n = 109 Significant relationship, Very strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
 Client n = 96 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 205 Significant relationship, Strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Result   Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
*Adjusted residual values indicate deviations significant at the 0.05 level. Residual Analysis here is presented as a way of delving deeper into a Cross-
tabulation. However, with Crosstab of larger dimension, Residual Analysis will sometimes throw up interesting results along the lines of particular 
sub-categories that ‘buck the trend’ of the overall association between the variables. Alternatively, much higher values for residuals - whether +ve or -
ve - may e taken as indicating those cells which make a particularly strong contribution to the relationship depicted in the table. 
 
Table 5.17 provides the significance tests for IT architecture cross-tabulation. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics of total sample (n = 205) is 26.080 with p value = 0.023. Thus, there are 
significant associations between IT governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement 
in these table variables (i.e. statistically significant differences exist between the five IT governance 
structures and the five delivery arrangements). In other words, the pattern of responses (i.e. the 
proportion of those organisations that adopt ‘business monarchy’, ‘IT monarchy’, ‘federal’, ‘IT 
duopoly’ & ‘feudal’) in the five delivery arrangements is significantly different. 
This study also examines whether or not there is an association between IT governance 
structure and shared services delivery arrangement implemented by separate groups. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics show that there is statistically significant association of the ‘total-provider’ 
group (n = 109, Fisher’s Exact value = 29.913, p = 0.003). However, the Fisher’s Exact Test 
statistics for other groups are not significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 5.17: Chi-Square Tests – IT Architecture  
Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider Likelihood Ratio 19.522 16 .243 .275 .263 .286 
  n = 83 Fisher's Exact Test 18.724   .151 .141 .160 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 11.122 16 .802 .791 .780 .801 
  n = 25 Fisher's Exact Test 18.115   .637 .625 .650 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 18.728 16 .283 .360 .347 .372 
  n = 108 Fisher's Exact Test 18.048   .182 .172 .192 
Small Provider Likelihood Ratio 19.831 16 .228 .201 .191 .212 
  n = 26 Fisher's Exact Test 19.341   .152 .142 .161 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 17.875 16 .331 .505 .492 .518 
  n = 71 Fisher's Exact Test 13.147   .565 .552 .577 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 15.025 16 .523 .725 .714 .737 
  n = 97 Fisher's Exact Test 10.351   .841 .832 .851 
Total Provider Likelihood Ratio 34.852 16 .004 .004 .002 .006 
  n = 109 Fisher's Exact Test 29.913   .003 .002 .005 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 14.450 16 .565 .751 .740 .762 
  n = 96 Fisher's Exact Test 11.162   .773 .762 .783 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 32.254 16 .009 .016 .012 .019 
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Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
  n = 205 Fisher's Exact Test 26.080   .023 .019 .027 
 
The statistics in Table 5.18 provide a measure of the strength of association between the 
variables. The Cramer’s V value of total sample indicates that the relationship between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement is a strong one (n = 205, Cramer’s V 
value = 0.184, p = 0.033). The high significant Cramer’s V value for the ‘total-provider’ group 
indicates that there is very strong relationship between the two variables (n = 109, Cramer’s V value 
= 0.264, p = 0.020). 
Table 5.18: Symmetric Measures – IT Architecture  
Size Relationship  Value Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider n = 83 Cramer's V .241 .254 .264 .253 .275 
  Client  n = 25  Cramer's V .344 .757 .688 .676 .700 
  Total  n = 108 Cramer's V .200 .367 .359 .346 .371 
Small Provider n = 26 Cramer's V .404 .388 .428 .415 .440 
  Client  n = 71 Cramer's V .253 .315 .315 .303 .327 
  Total  n = 97 Cramer's V .181 .694 .718 .706 .729 
Total Provider n = 109 Cramer's V .264 .016 .020 .016 .024 
  Client  n = 96 Cramer's V .196 .538 .548 .536 .561 
  Total  n = 205 Cramer's V .184 .034 .033 .028 .037 
5.3.2.5 Cross-tabulation of IT Infrastructure 
The summarised cross-tabulation of IT governance structure versus shared services delivery 
arrangement for business application needs decisions is shown in Table 5.19. For IT infrastructure 
decision making within the ‘intra-service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted 
governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (48.8% i.e., n = 21/43). For IT infrastructure decision 
making within the ‘service’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure 
is ‘business monarchy’ (44.0% i.e., n = 11/25). For IT infrastructure decision making within the 
‘corporate’ delivery arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘federal’ 
(54.0% i.e., n = 54/100). For IT infrastructure decision making within the ‘supra-corporate’ delivery 
arrangement the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (45.5% i.e., 
n = 10/22). For IT infrastructure decision making within the ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement 
the most commonly adopted governance structure is ‘business monarchy’ (46.7% i.e., n = 7/15). 
The frequency distribution for each of the subgroup variables can be found in Appendix D5. 
Table 5.19: Cross-tabulation – IT Infrastructure 
Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis   Feudal IT Duopoly IT Monarchy IT Monarchy IT Monarchy 
Large Provider n = 83 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 25 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 108 Not significant relationship 
Small Provider n = 26 Not significant relationship 
 Client n = 71 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 97 Not significant relationship 
All Provider n = 109 Significant relationship, Very strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Federal Federal* Federal 
Business 
Monarchy* 
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Size Relationship Cases 
Intra-service Service Corporate 
Supra-
corporate 
Iso-corporate 
n = 43 n = 25 n = 100 n = 22 n = 15 
Hypothesis   Feudal IT Duopoly IT Monarchy IT Monarchy IT Monarchy 
 Client n = 96 Not significant relationship 
 Total n = 205 Significant relationship, Strong level of association 
 
 
 Business 
Monarchy* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal* 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Result   Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
*Adjusted residual values indicate deviations significant at the 0.05 level. Residual Analysis here is presented as a way of delving deeper into a Cross-
tabulation. However, with Crosstabs of larger dimension, Residual Analysis will sometimes throw up interesting results along the lines of particular 
sub-categories that ‘buck the trend’ of the overall association between the variables. Alternatively, much higher values for residuals - whether +ve or -
ve - may be taken as indicating those cells which make a particularly strong contribution to the relationship depicted in the Table. 
 
Table 5.20 provides the significance tests for IT infrastructure cross-tabulation. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test statistics of total sample (n = 205) is 30.691 with p value = 0.005. Thus, there are 
significant associations between IT governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement 
in these table variables (i.e. statistically significant differences exist between the five delivery 
arrangements and the five IT governance structures). In other words, the pattern of responses (i.e. 
the proportion of those organisations that adopt ‘business monarchy’, ‘IT monarchy’, ‘federal’, ‘IT 
duopoly’ & ‘feudal’) in the five delivery arrangements is significantly different.  
To examine whether or not there is an association between IT governance structure and 
shared services delivery arrangement implemented by separate groups. The Fisher’s Exact Test 
statistics show that there are statistically significant associations in the ‘large-provider’ group (n = 
83, Fisher’s Exact value = 25.110, p = 0.021), the ‘small-provider’ group (n = 26, Fisher’s Exact 
value = 18.179, p = 0.012) and the ‘total-provider’ group (n = 109, Fisher’s Exact value = 36.661, p 
< 0.001). The Fisher’s Exact Test statistics for other groups are not significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 5.20: Chi-Square Tests – IT Infrastructure 
Size Relationship Value df Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider Likelihood Ratio 23.849 16 .093 .056 .050 .062 
  n = 83 Fisher's Exact Test 25.110   .021 .017 .025 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 9.708 12 .642 .772 .761 .783 
  n = 25 Fisher's Exact Test 11.527   .579 .566 .592 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 19.497 16 .244 .293 .281 .304 
  n = 108 Fisher's Exact Test 19.689   .112 .104 .120 
Small Provider Likelihood Ratio 22.031 12 .037 .035 .030 .039 
  n = 26 Fisher's Exact Test 18.179   .012 .009 .014 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 18.639 16 .288 .416 .403 .429 
  n = 71 Fisher's Exact Test 14.071   .511 .498 .524 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 17.811 16 .335 .513 .500 .526 
  n = 97 Fisher's Exact Test 13.941   .512 .499 .525 
Total Provider Likelihood Ratio 38.053 16 .001 .001 .000 .001 
  n = 109 Fisher's Exact Test 36.661   .000 .000 .000 
  Client Likelihood Ratio 14.819 16 .538 .676 .664 .688 
  n = 96 Fisher's Exact Test 13.622   .579 .566 .592 
  Total Likelihood Ratio 33.421 16 .006 .010 .007 .012 
  n = 205 Fisher's Exact Test 30.691   .005 .003 .006 
 
The statistics in Table 5.21 provide a measure of the strength of association between the 
variables. The Cramer’s V value of total sample indicates that the relationship between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement is a strong one (n = 205, Cramer’s V 
value = 0.189, p = 0.024). The significant Cramer’s V value for the ‘total-provider’ group indicates 
that there is very strong relationship between the two variables (n = 109, Cramer’s V value = 0.283, 
p = 0.006). The relatively low significant Cramer’s V value for the ‘large-provider’ group indicates 
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that there is very strong relationship between the two variables (n = 83, Cramer’s V value = 0.290, p 
= 0.070). Although the Fisher’s Exact Test of the ‘small-provider’ group is significant at the 0.05 
level, its strength of association (Cramer’s V values = 0.483) is redundant. The two variables are 
likely measuring the same concept. Hence, the relationships between the two variables in the ‘large-
provider’ and ‘small-provider’ groups should be considered as not significant. 
Table 5.21: Symmetric Measures – IT Infrastructure 
Size Relationship  Value Asymp. Sig.  Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) 
          (2-sided)  Sig. 99% Confidence Interval 
              Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Large Provider n = 83 Cramer's V .290 .032 .070 .063 .077 
  Client n = 25  Cramer's V .400 .447 .530 .517 .543 
  Total  n = 108 Cramer's V .206 .306 .294 .282 .306 
Small Provider n = 26 Cramer's V .483 .110 .091 .084 .099 
  Client  n = 71 Cramer's V .237 .458 .467 .454 .479 
  Total  n = 97 Cramer's V .201 .480 .491 .479 .504 
Total Provider n = 109 Cramer's V .283 .004 .006 .004 .008 
  Client  n = 96 Cramer's V .190 .610 .632 .620 .645 
  Total  n = 205 Cramer's V .189 .023 .024 .020 .028 
 
Having constructed a five-by-five contingency table for each IT decision domain to identify 
the most likely IT governance structure adopted, Fisher’s Exact Tests were then used to determine if 
the observed variations in IT governance structure differed by shared services delivery arrangement. 
The results reveal that for the total sample (n = 205), there is a strong significant association 
between IT governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement for all decision domains. 
The ‘provider’ group (n = 109) is also found to be significant for all decision domains. The results 
for ‘large’ group (n = 108) are mixed. There is a significant relationship in IT principles, but no 
significant relationship is found in the other four decision domains. Finally, there is no significant 
association in both ‘small’ group and ‘client’ group for all decision domains. The above assessment 
indicates that sufficient evidence has been obtained to claim support/non-support for each of the 
five hypotheses for the whole sample (n = 205) and allows us to confirm the conclusion drawn in 
the crosstab analysis, namely, organisations with different shared services delivery arrangements 
adopt different IT governance structures for decision making. 
5.3.3 Summary Results – Assessment of IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
The summary representation of IT governance structure for each shared services delivery 
arrangement is shown in Table 5.22. IT governance structure (decision rights) refers to the extent to 
which groups make IT decisions or have final decision rights. ‘Intra-service’, ‘service’, and ‘iso-
corporate’ organisations are more likely to adopt a ‘business monarchy’ IT governance approach for 
all IT decision domains (i.e., IT principle, IT investment, business application needs, IT 
architecture, and IT infrastructure) that reflects the commitment to offer total, integrated solutions 
to business needs. ‘Corporate’ organisations are more likely to assign a ‘federal’ IT governance 
approach for all decision domains (i.e., IT principle, IT investment, business application needs, IT 
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architecture, and IT infrastructure) which enhances the business unit performance in support of 
corporate objectives. ‘Supra-corporate’ organisations are more likely to implement a combination of 
‘business monarchy’ for ‘IT investment’ and ‘IT infrastructure’; and ‘federal’ approaches for ‘IT 
principle’, ‘business application needs’ and ‘IT architecture’ decision domains that empowers 
decision-making at multiple organisation levels. Senior business management are responsible for IT 
infrastructure and business application needs to ensure IT issues are incorporated into the 
organisation’s strategic decision. 
Table 5.22: Summary Results of Total Sample 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ 
IT Decision 
Domain  
Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
All = 205 Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  
IT principles  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT investment 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
application 
needs 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT architecture Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
infrastructure 
Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
1 Federal – IT shared services management may be an additional participant 
2 IT Duopoly – IT shared services management represents IT  
3 IT Monarchy – IT shared services management acts solely  
 
Table 5.23 provides a summary of all sample and group comparison results. Hypotheses are 
statistically accepted or rejected based on levels of significance and confidence intervals. In this 
study, the test results are based the following criteria:  
1. Evaluate if there is any association between the variables by using Fisher’s Exact Test. If 
the p value is greater than 0.05, then there is a ‘not significant’ relationship and the 
hypothesis is ‘no support’.  
2. If the Fisher’s Exact Test statistics are significant at the 0.05 level, then determine the 
strength of the association by using Cramer's V statistics. 
3. If the Cramer’s statistics are greater than 1.0, interpret the pattern of the relationship by 
computing the percentages in the direction of the independent variable, across the 
dependent variable. Next, identify the highest observed frequencies in the relevant cells. 
4. Compare the predicted and observed pattern and determine if the hypotheses are ‘support’, 
‘partially support’ or ‘no support’. 
As shown in table 5.23, three hypotheses (H1a, H2a, & H3b) are supported, one hypothesis 
(H4b) is partially supported, and nine hypotheses (H1b, H2b, H3a, H3c, H3d, H4a, H4c H5a, & 
H5b) are not supported. The first research question associated with these hypotheses is reviewed in 
section 5.3.5.  
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Table 5.23: Summary Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Provider 
n = 109 
Client 
n = 96 
Large 
n = 108 
Small 
n = 97 
1a An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT 
principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a business 
monarchy governance design. 
Support Support No Support Support No Support 
1b An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT 
architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt a feudal governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
2a A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT 
principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a business 
monarchy governance design. 
Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
2b A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT 
architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt an IT duopoly governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
3a A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
principles and IT investment decisions will adopt 
a Business monarchy governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
3b A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making business 
application needs decisions will adopt a federal 
governance design. 
Support Support No Support No Support No Support 
3c A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
architecture decisions will adopt an IT duopoly 
governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
3d A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
infrastructure decisions will adopt an IT 
monarchy governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
4a A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
principles decisions will adopt a business 
monarchy governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
4b A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
investment and business application needs 
decisions will adopt a federal monarchy 
governance design. 
Partially 
Support 
Support No Support No Support No Support 
4c A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
5a An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
principles, IT investment, and Business 
application needs decisions will adopt a federal 
governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
5b An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT 
architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
5.3.4 Post Hoc Analysis – IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
A significant amount of research has brought to light factors that affect the choice of an IT 
governance structure within an organisation (Agarwal & Sambamurthy, 2002; Henderson & 
Venkatraman, 1993; Weill & Ross, 2004). The motivation for this post hoc test is to analyse the 
factors that have not been explored (e.g., shared services experience) and validate previous findings 
(e.g., organisation size) in a shared services environment.  
To compare whether the differences among the participant groups (in terms of the distribution 
of IT governance structure versus shared services delivery arrangement for each IT decision 
domain, are statistically significant), two nonparametric tests, Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal 
Wallis test, were performed. Nonparametric tests do not make assumptions about the type of data 
(e.g., that it is normally distributed). Many nonparametric procedures are based on ranked data. 
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Data are ranked by ordering them from lowest to highest and assigning them, in order, the integer 
values from 1 to the sample size. The analysis is then carried out on the ranks rather than the actual 
data. The Mann-Whitney U test for comparison of 2 groups (e.g., large versus small organisations) 
and the Kruskal-Wallis test for comparison of 3 or more groups (e.g., five management roles) are 
designed to detect whether 2 or more samples come from the same distribution or to test whether 
medians between comparison groups are different, under the assumption that the shapes of the 
underlying distributions are the same (Corder & Foreman, 2011).  
5.3.4.1 Management Role 
Table 5.24 shows the significance values (Monte Carlo Sig.) are p > 0.05 for all IT decision 
domains indicating there is no significant difference in the IT governance structure distribution in 
shared services delivery arrangement across the five categories of management role (‘ top 
management executive’ n = 104, ‘business unit leader’ n = 49, ‘local IT unit leader’ n = 27, ‘IT 
executive - shared services’ n = 8, and ‘others’ n = 17). Research suggests the position of 
responsible manager or executive is expected to influence IT governance adoption within 
organisations (Brown & Grant, 2005). For example, the business unit managers are extremely 
hesitant to have their careers and decisions managed by a centralised locus of control because they 
understand their business lines better than a centralised shared services steering committee 
(Boynton et al., 1992). From a practitioner standpoint, it is not surprising that business unit 
managers prefer a decentralised approach to IT governance. On the contrary, this study suggests 
that the five ‘management roles’ do not have significantly different perceptions of IT governance 
structure within each shared services delivery arrangement. 
Table 5.24: Results Group Comparison – Management Role 
IT Decision 
Domain 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Kruskal Wallis Test - Chi-Square 1.682 2.025 1.077 2.245 1.800 
df   4 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig.   .794 .731 .898 .691 .772 
Monte Carlo Sig. Sig.  .788 .731 .902 .692 .779 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .778 .719 .895 .680 .768 
  Upper Bound .799 .742 .910 .704 .789 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 334431365 
5.3.4.2 Industry 
Table 5.25 shows the significance values (Monte Carlo Sig.) are p > 0.05 for all IT decision 
domains indicating there are no significant differences in the IT governance structure distribution in 
shared services delivery arrangement across the sixteen categories of respondent industry (refer to 
Table 5.2). Little research has investigated whether ‘industry’ is a contingent factor to IT 
governance framework adoption. In their highly cited study of 303 organisations in Israel, Ahituv et 
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al. (1989) were unable to find any significant association between a corporation’s industry type and 
the level of decentralisation of IT governance within the organisation. This study echoes their 
conclusion. 
Table 5.25: Results Group Comparison – Industry 
IT Decision 
Domain 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Kruskal Wallis Test - Chi-Square 12.157 12.894 14.110 16.028 13.685 
df   15 15 15 15 15 
Asymp. Sig.   .667 .611 .517 .380 .550 
Monte Carlo Sig. Sig.  .679 .628 .517 .386 .564 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .667 .615 .504 .373 .551 
  Upper Bound .691 .640 .529 .398 .577 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 2000000 
5.3.4.3 Degree of Shared IT Services 
Table 5.26 shows the significance values (Monte Carlo Sig.) are p > 0.05 for all IT decision 
domains indicating there are no significant differences in the IT governance structure distribution in 
shared services delivery arrangement across various degrees of sharing IT services. The literature 
findings about organisational structure are highly dispersed and limited to certain fields. No 
consensus or best practice can be found about which arrangement is most useful for shared services 
(Friebe, 2013). In addition, the association existing between organisation structure and IT 
governance structure is not fully accepted (Brown & Grant, 2005). This study supports this 
argument.  
Table 5.26: Results Group Comparison – Degree of Shared IT Services 
IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Kruskal Wallis Test - Chi-Square 17.683 16.786 16.805 18.530 17.149 
df   18 18 18 18 18 
Asymp. Sig.   .477 .538 .537 .421 .513 
Monte Carlo Sig. Sig.  .479 .558 .557 .425 .525 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .466 .545 .544 .412 .512 
  Upper Bound .492 .571 .570 .437 .538 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 221623949 
5.3.4.4 Shared Services Relationship 
For each IT decision domain shown in Table 5.27, the significance values (Monte Carlo Sig.) 
of Mann-Whitney tests are p > 0.05 indicating the IT governance structure distribution in shared 
services delivery arrangements does not differ significantly across the ‘provider’ and ‘client’ 
groups. From a practical point, the provider will typically want to preserve decision rights around 
the mechanics of agreed in-scope service delivery and it will defend its authority regarding how 
services are delivered for all decision domains. While this situation is critical to the provider’s value 
model, it is often new to the client who is unaccustomed to releasing direct responsibility in this 
area (Accenture, 2007; Newman, 2007; Spoehr et al., 2007). However, this study is unable to find 
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significant evidence to support the observation about different perceptions of IT governance 
structure between ‘provider’ and ‘client’. 
Table 5.27: Results Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship 
IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U   4782.500 4731.000 4817.000 4668.000 4726.000 
Wilcoxon W   9438.500 9387.000 9473.000 9324.000 9382.000 
Z   -1.075 -1.194 -.993 -1.343 -1.207 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .282 .232 .321 .179 .227 
Monte Carlo Sig.  Sig.  .285 .232 .325 .187 .230 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .273 .221 .313 .177 .219 
  Upper Bound .297 .243 .337 .197 .241 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 334431365 
 
Table 5.28 integrates the group comparison of shared services relationship based on the 
highest observed frequencies for each cell of IT governance structure versus shared services 
delivery arrangement. The significance tests reveal the individual subgroup may not be a good 
guide to the IT governance structure pattern. Only the ‘provider’ group is significant in all IT 
decision domains. Comparing the governance structures between ‘provider’ and ‘client’, the 
majority of the cells are the same. The ‘intra-service’ and ‘iso-corporate’ organisations are identical 
and they are more likely to adopt a ‘business monarchy’ governance approach in both groups. 
‘Service’, ‘corporate’, and ‘supra-corporate’ organisations adopt a combination of ‘business 
monarchy’ and ‘federal’ approach in which the ‘provider’ group is more likely to adopt a ‘federal’ 
design. 
Table 5.28: Summary Results of Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ 
IT Decision 
Domain  
Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
Provider n = 109 
Small n = 96 
Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result 
IT principles 
Provider 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Client 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy
/Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT investment 
Provider 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Client 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business application needs 
Provider 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Client  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy Federal Federal 
Business 
Monarchy
/Federal 
IT architecture 
Provider 
Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Client 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT infrastructure 
Provider 
Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Client 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
1 Federal – IT shared services management may be an additional participant 
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2 IT Duopoly – IT shared services management represents IT  
3 IT Monarchy – IT shared services management acts solely  
5.3.4.5 Organisation Size 
Table 5.29 shows the significance values of Mann-Whitney tests (Monte Carlo Sig) are p < 
0.05 indicating there is a significant difference between the ‘large’ and ‘small’ groups. The lower 
and upper bound confidence interval for significance for each variable is also important. For 
example, for IT principles, the actual 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound value is 0.019 and the 
Upper Bound value is 0.027. The fact that these values do not cross the critical value 0.05 indicates 
that the significant effect is genuine. Thus, it can be noted that the two groups significantly differ in 
IT principles (U = 4305.5, p = 0.026), IT investment (U = 4111.5, p = 0.006), business application 
needs (U = 4248.0, p = 0.018), IT architecture (U = 4131.5, p = 0.008), and IT infrastructure (U = 
4254.0. p = 0.019).  
In a number of studies, the size of an organisation could not be supported as a significant 
antecedent for the adoption of a particular IT governance design (Brown & Grant, 2005; Olson & 
Chervany, 1980). Ein-Dor and Segev (1982) were only able to significantly support for an 
association when firm size was measured in terms of total revenue, but not when firm size was 
measured in terms of employee headcounts. In contrast, this study confirms the IT governance 
structure differs between ‘large’ (employee number > 150) and ‘small’ organisations (employee 
number < = 150) in different shared services delivery arrangements. 
Table 5.29: Results Group Comparison – Organisation Size 
IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U   4305.500 4111.500 4248.000 4131.500 4254.000 
Wilcoxon W   9058.500 8864.500 9001.000 8884.500 9007.000 
Z   -2.228 -2.684 -2.368 -2.634 -2.346 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .026 .007 .018 .008 .019 
Monte Carlo Sig.  Sig.  .024 .006 .018 .008 .019 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .020 .004 .014 .006 .015 
  Upper Bound .028 .008 .021 .011 .022 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1535910591 
 
Table 5.30 integrates the group comparison of organisation size based on the highest observed 
frequencies for each cell containing IT governance structure versus shared services delivery 
arrangement. The significance tests reveal the individual subgroup may not be a good guide to the 
IT governance structure pattern. Except for IT principles decision domain, the ‘large’ organisations 
are significant for all IT decision domains. The ‘small’ organisations are more likely to adopt a 
‘business monarchy’ governance approach in almost all shared services delivery arrangements. The 
‘large’ organisations are more likely to adopt a ‘business monarchy’ approach for ‘intra-service’ 
and ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangements and a ‘federal’ approach for ‘service’, ‘corporate’, and 
‘supra-corporate’ delivery arrangements. 
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Table 5.30: Summary Results of Group Comparison – Organisation Size 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ 
IT Decision 
Domain  
Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
Large n = 108 
Small n = 94 
Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result Predict Result 
IT principles 
Large 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Small  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT investment 
Large 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Small  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business application needs 
Large 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Small  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT architecture 
Large 
Feudal 
Federal/B
usiness M IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Small  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT infrastructure 
Large 
Feudal 
Federal 
IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Small  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
1 Federal – IT shared services management may be an additional participant 
2 IT Duopoly – IT shared services management represents IT  
3 IT Monarchy – IT shared services management acts solely  
 
Further Mann-Whitney tests are run to investigate the differences between ‘provider’ and 
‘client’ within the ‘large’ and ‘small’ groups. For each IT decision domain shown in Table 5.31, the 
significant values (Monte Carlo Sig.) of Mann-Whitney tests are p > 0.05 indicating the  IT 
governance structure distribution in shared services delivery arrangements does not differ 
significantly between ‘provider’ and ‘client’ within the ‘large’ group.  
Table 5.31: Results Group Comparison – Large Organisation Size x Shared Services Relationship 
IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U   985.000 1034.000 945.000 1019.500 1019.000 
Wilcoxon W   4471.000 4520.000 4431.000 1344.500 1344.000 
Z   -.402 -.026 -.702 -.135 -.140 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .688 .979 .483 .892 .889 
Monte Carlo Sig.  Sig.  .692 .981 .494 .893 .889 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .680 .978 .481 .885 .881 
  Upper Bound .704 .985 .507 .901 .897 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1310155034 
 
In Table 5.32, the significant values of Mann-Whitney tests (Monte Carlo Sig) are p > 0.05 
indicating the IT governance structure distribution in shared services delivery arrangement does not 
differ significantly between ‘provider’ and ‘client’ within the ‘small’ group. 
Table 5.32: Results Group Comparison – Small Organisation Size x Shared Services Relationship 
IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
Mann-Whitney U   900.500 871.000 909.500 886.500 886.500 
Wilcoxon W   1251.500 1222.000 1260.500 1237.500 1237.500 
Z   -.184 -.427 -.111 -.299 -.299 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .854 .669 .912 .765 .765 
Monte Carlo Sig.  Sig.  .853 .670 .914 .773 .771 
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IT Decision 
Domain 
 
  IT principles IT Investment Business 
Application 
Needs 
IT 
Architecture 
IT 
Infrastructure 
 99% Confidence Interval Lower Bound .844 .658 .907 .762 .760 
  Upper Bound .862 .682 .922 .784 .782 
Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1585587178 
 
The above group comparison analysis reveals that, between organisation sizes, there is 
significant statistical difference in the distribution of IT governance structure and shared services 
delivery arrangement for each IT decision domain. For the participant management role, industry, 
degree of IT shared services, and shared services relationship, there is no statistical difference in the 
IT governance structure pattern within these groups. However, this study suggests a single 
contingency investigation for IT governance framework should not be conclusive, multiple 
contingencies with considering possible interactions should be more appropriate for future research 
(Brown & Grant, 2005). 
5.3.5 Review of Research Question One – IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights)  
This study predicts in hypotheses H1 to H5 that organisations govern IT very differently 
depending on two factors: IT decision domain and shared services delivery arrangement. Table 5.33 
below summarises the hypothesis testing for IT governance structure (decision rights). In analysing 
the IT decision makers, this study has found that most of the organisations do not have very 
different governance archetypes for different IT decision domains. Based on the research findings 
discussed in the previous sections, the first research question, “Given a particular type of IT shared 
services delivery arrangement, what should be the IT governance structure (decision rights) 
adopted within an organisation?” posed by this study is discussed. 
Table 5.33: Consolidated Hypothesis Testing for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ 
IT Decision 
Domain  
Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
All sample  
n= 205 
Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  
IT principles  
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy H1a 
Support 
H2a 
Support 
H3a 
No 
Support 
H4a 
No 
Support 
H5a 
No 
Support 
IT investment 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy H1a 
Support 
H2a 
Support 
H3a 
No 
Support 
H4b 
Partially 
Support 
H5a 
No 
Support 
Business 
application 
needs 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Business 
Monarchy H1a 
Support 
H2a 
Support 
H3b 
Support 
H4b 
Partially 
Support 
H5a 
No 
Support 
IT architecture Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
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Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement/ 
IT Decision 
Domain  
Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
All sample  
n= 205 
Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  Hypothesis Result  
H1b 
No 
Support 
H2b 
No 
Support 
H3c 
No 
Support 
H4c 
No 
Support 
H5b 
No 
Support 
IT 
infrastructure 
Feudal 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Duopoly 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Monarchy 
Federal 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
IT 
Monarchy 
Business 
Monarchy 
H1b 
No 
Support 
H2b 
No 
Support 
H3d 
No 
Support 
H4c 
No 
Support 
H5b 
No 
Support 
1 Federal – IT shared services management may be an additional participant 
2 IT Duopoly – IT shared services management represents IT  
3 IT Monarchy – IT shared services management acts solely  
5.3.5.1 IT principles 
IT principles, which set the strategic role for IT across the enterprise, are predicted to be 
governed in two ways: ‘intra-service’, ‘service’, ‘corporate’, and ‘supra-corporate’ organisations 
will adopt a business monarchy approach, and ‘iso-corporate’ organisations will adopt a federal 
approach. Business monarchy enhances the likelihood that IT principles will be aligned with 
business strategy. Federal approach for IT principles ensures business units share the decisions in 
defining the role of IT. The findings reveal that ‘intra-service’, ‘service’, and ‘iso-corporate’ 
organisations did indeed choose business monarchy on average. ‘Corporate’ and ‘supra-corporate’ 
organisations used a federal model. 
In general, IT principles’ resources have a high value in competitive advantage. The business 
knowledge is essential to ensure that IT principles will be formulated effectively and applied 
consistently in a shared services environment. As the degree of shared IT increases, a federal 
approach can balance the interests of the corporate, service provider, and all the business units. 
Contrary to the prediction, ‘iso-corporate’ organisations do not adopt a federal approach. The 
possible explanations might be that a federal model is less efficient and effective for decision-
making. The main objective of the introduction of the ‘iso-corporate’ delivery arrangement is to 
lower costs through increased efficiency and competition in the market. However, research 
indicates the federal approach often takes longer time to make decisions as more people and stages 
are involved, but there is less agreement on the objectives for the decisions (Weill & Ross, 2004). 
The long cycle times compound the problems with poor governance. Therefore, it is likely that 
neither the business units nor the external customers get the responsive services with lower costs. 
Hence, business monarchy seems to be more efficient and effective for ‘iso-corporate’ organisations 
to allow the production of more competitive services. H1a and H2a are supported. H3a, H4a and 
H5a are not supported.  
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5.3.5.2 IT investment 
IT investment resources have, generally, a high value in competitive advantage and require 
the relevant business knowledge to facilitate an integrated view of the enterprise’s key assets. Two 
approaches dominate the allocation of IT investment decision rights, namely business monarchy 
and federal. Contrary to expectations, ‘supra-corporate’ and ‘corporate’ organisations adopted a 
business monarchy approach instead of a federal model. Business monarchy is well positioned to 
define and fund business priorities. Business monarchy should also be responsible for overall 
budgeting decisions for the shared services joint venture. Thus, vesting responsibility for IT 
investment and prioritisation in a business monarchy allows IT projects to compete for funds with 
other inter- or intra-organisational needs. The potential explanation for the difference between 
predicted and actual IT governance structure could be the need to minimise agency risk. With 
higher degrees of shared IT, the less autonomously the business unit is allowed to fund IT at 
regional offices. Using a central funding mechanism can address strategic global needs. Thereby, a 
business monarchy approach seems to be more appropriate. For example, vesting responsibility for 
overall capital budgeting decisions in a business monarchy allows IT projects to compete for funds 
with other organisational needs. ‘Corporate’ organisations prefer a federal approach instead of 
business monarchy to balance enterprise-wide priorities and business unit priorities. H1a and H2a 
are supported. H3a and H5a are not supported. H4b is partially supported. 
5.3.5.3 Business Application Needs 
People who make business application needs decisions specify the business needs for systems 
to be acquired. Therefore, the resources should have a relatively high impact on competitive 
advantage creation and a medium impact on competitive sustainability. In this study, organisations 
display both federal and business monarchy approaches to these decisions. Consistent with the 
predictions, the higher the degree of shared IT, the more the federal approach seems to be 
appropriate. The federal model considers enterprise objectives in the process of deploying client 
business applications. Implementation of client business applications may replicate or customise an 
enterprise-wide application. For example, a ‘supra-corporate’ organisation can purchase an 
enterprise resource planning application for inter-organisational sharing. For some data definitions, 
it does not standardise the application across organisations or business units. Decision rights are 
granted to local business units for the benefits of local customisation over global standardisation 
while shared expertise can also be accommodated. For ‘iso-corporate’ organisations, business 
monarchy is the most popular choice. The possible explanation might be that economies of scale 
can be achieved through centralisation and standardisation. Over a technology's life cycle, 
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standardisation can affect economic efficiency that is essential to attracting external customers in 
‘iso-corporate’ organisations. H1a and H2a are supported. H3b and H5a are not supported. H4b is 
partially supported. 
5.3.5.4 IT Architecture 
Contrary to the prediction and other research (Weill & Ross, 2004), all five shared services 
delivery arrangements do not rely on feudal, IT duopoly and IT monarchy to make IT architecture 
decisions. This study assumes that IT architecture is a technical issue rather than business strategic 
issue. Therefore, the business knowledge required to make effective decision should be minimal. 
However, the findings suggest most organisations attempt to incorporate business strategy 
considerations into architecture decisions via federal or business monarchy arrangements. 
Traditionally, efforts to manage IT architecture issues remain rooted in an organisation’s IT 
practices, culture, and leadership. The IT architecture program leader is frequently selected from 
within the technical ranks, bringing deep IT know-how but little direct experience or influence in 
leading a business-wide change program. A weak linkage to the business may create a void that 
limits the quality of the resulting IT architecture and the organisation’s ability to enforce and sustain 
the benefits of implementation over time (Khosrowpour, 2002). 
In recent years, the scope of IT architecture has expanded beyond the IT domain and is 
increasingly taking on broader roles relating to organisational strategy and change management. 
This new approach lifts the IT architecture function out of the exclusive preserve of the IT 
department and places IT more squarely within the business (Bonnet et al., 2013). Therefore, IT 
architecture is more a business decision. Organisations seem to have less confidence that IT 
professionals, such as the service provider, can translate IT principles into an architecture. In 
coordinating IT efforts, the risk of IT monarchy is that it can become isolated from organisational 
reality. Considerable waste of resources might result if no client representative is involved to 
convert technology improvements into business value. H1b, H2b, H3c, H4c and H5c are not 
supported. 
5.3.5.5 IT Infrastructure 
Like IT architecture, this study predicts that IT infrastructure strategy decisions are made 
within the IT unit. With the increased degree of shared IT, the location of IT infrastructure 
knowledge should reside in the provider. IT monarchy allows the provider independence in 
designing service offerings. IT duopoly should be well suited to relatively quick negotiation of the 
business, technology, and political issues associated with shared infrastructure services (Weill & 
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Ross, 2004). However, the findings are unexpected and do not support the allocation of decision 
rights to feudal, IT duopoly, or IT monarchy. The possible explanation might be that an ‘iso-
corporate’ organisation, for example, is required to sell its services to the client. Hence, its 
customers’ demands strongly influence its services. These demands are articulated by the client at 
the top management level to maximise the business value or minimise the agency risk. 
With a low degree of shared IT, this study predicts the use of a feudal model to specify the IT 
needs for different business units as they try to best serve their local clients. The centralised IT 
governance structure is striving to implement organisation-wide programs such as improving 
service quality or reducing cost by removing duplication. The tension between the dual pressures of 
autonomy and centralised strategic focus might result in poorer IT governance effectiveness. This 
study demonstrates a feudal approach is not adopted in a IT shared services environment. H1b, H2b, 
H3d, H4c and H5b are not supported. 
In summary, four hypotheses could be confirmed as ‘supported’ or ‘partially supported’ with 
nine hypotheses receiving ‘no support’ based on the results. The agency framework suggests an 
allocation of decision rights that favours the managers who have the most specific relevant 
knowledge of all the agents of the firm. According to the findings of this study, organisations have 
more top management and senior management involvement in their IT governance structure for 
each IT decision domain in all shared services delivery arrangements. Therefore, the location of 
business/IT knowledge might not be a contingent factor in devising the IT governance structure.  
This study views that the types of resources is another factor used to determine the way in 
which IT are to be shared and governed. The resource-based view also seems unable to fully 
provide the clarification of IT governance structure design. Overall, the structural solution to the 
principle-agent problem is to centralise IT governance structure in a shared services environment. 
The implications of the findings will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.4 Partial Least Squares Analysis – Assessment of Business Value of IT 
This study utilises the variance-based Partial Least Squares (PLS) approach to test the 
hypotheses in the second part of the research model as shaded in Figure 5.8, i.e., H6 and H7.  
Figure 5.8: Assessment of Research Model – Part 2 
 
Three criteria were considered to determine PLS as the appropriate choice of statistical 
method. First, the research model builds upon previous knowledge and applies the conceptual 
elements in a new research environment, i.e., IT shared services (Weill & Ross, 2004). Despite 
aiming at testing hypotheses, this research approach has a rather explorative character. Although 
PLS is a confirmatory testing procedure, the variance-based method can be used to maximize the 
prediction quality of the overall model (Chin, 1998). Second, the variance-based PLS algorithm 
does not require any distribution assumption (Hair et al., 2010). Small sample sizes are unlikely to 
meet homogeneity and normality requirements (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, this study involved 
nominal (e.g., making use of IT governance frameworks) and ordinal data (e.g., assessment of 
business value) that could not satisfy homogeneity and normality requirements (Hair et al., 2010). 
Consequently, this study employs the variance-based PLS approach for estimating factor weights 
and path coefficients. Third, the variance-based algorithm of PLS can be performed with a 
significantly lower number of data elements. The quality of the overall model can be assessed by 
using re-sampling methods (e.g., bootstrapping). As these methods allow multiple drawings from 
the same sample base, they are far less influenced by a smaller sample size.  
Generally, a PLS model is analysed and interpreted in two stages, that is, the assessment of 
the adequacy of measurement model followed by the assessment of structural model. This sequence 
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is to ensure reliability and validity of the measures before any attempt is made to draw conclusion 
on the structural model. Hair et al. (2010) recommend this approach to be adopted in cases where 
measures are anticipated to be less reliable or in cases where theory is only tentative. This work 
employed the SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) application (Ringle et al., 2005) to carry out the following 
assessment procedures. 
5.4.1 Assessment of Measurement Model 
To assess whether the five variables, namely structural gap, gap assessment, independent 
review, professional oversight and joint working, influence the business value, the PLS path 
modelling is used. The measures for each of these variables are described in Table 4.11. Structural 
gap refers to the identified difference between decision rights and accountability. Gap assessment 
includes mapping the current governance structure onto the anticipated governance structure, 
auditing IT governance metrics and accountabilities, and evaluating IT governance awareness and 
engagement on a regular basis. Independent review is the practice of having competent, objective 
reviewers evaluate the IT shared services policy and monitor the service agreement. Profession-
wide oversight involves the systematic application of IT rules, standards, or principles developed 
from research and the actual practices of and incidents experienced by major organisations. Joint 
working is defined as the joint effort by which the service provider and client produce the service. 
Business value refers to the degree to which predefined IT shared services objectives are realised in 
terms of strategic, economic, technological, social benefits. 
First, the measurement model is evaluated by assessing the reliability and validity of the 
measures. Reliability is the extent to which ‘a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same 
object, would yield the same result each time’ (Babbie, 1992, p. 129). Validity is defined as ‘the 
extent to which measurements indicate what they are intended to measure’ (Schutt, 1999, p.83). In 
addition, the measurement model consists of the relationship between the constructs and the 
indicators (i.e., items) used to measure them. This relationship implies the examination of internal 
consistency, convergent validity, and discriminate validity of the instrument (Barclay et al., 1995; 
Boudreau et al., 2001; Straub et al., 2004). Table 5.34 shows the required determinants of the 
measurement model. 
Table 5.34: Quality Criteria of Measurement Model 
Test Measure Cut-off Reference 
Internal Consistency Composite Reliability (CR) ≥ 0.7 Hair et al. (2010) 
 Cronbach's Alpha (α) ≥ 0.6 Nunnally (1978) 
Convergent Validity Loading - Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) ≥ 0.6 Hulland (1999) 
 Average Variance Extracted (AVE) ≥ 0.5 Hair et al. (2010) 
Discriminant Validity Compare Cross Loadings Cross loadings < Construct Correlations Gefen and Straub (2005) 
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5.4.1.1 Internal Consistency Measures 
According to Vogt (2005, p.195) ‘internal consistency and reliability of a measure is the 
extent to which the measure provides consistent results from one application to the next, or the 
degree to which the measure is free of random error’. The first type of diagnostic measure is 
reliability coefficient, which assesses the consistency of the entire scale, with Cronbach’s alpha 
(Nunnally, 1978). The generally agreed upon lower limit for the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70, although 
it may decrease to 0.60 in exploratory research (Hair et al., 2010). The composite reliability for each 
construct should be greater than 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010).  
All constructs were analysed using PLS for adequate internal consistency reliabilities. As 
shown in Table 5.35 all constructs have composite reliability values of greater than the 
recommended threshold value of 0.70 (Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000; Barclay et al., 1995). 
Reliability was also tested using Cronbach’s Alpha values. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for 
the five factors range from 0.87 - 0.96. All reliability measures are in excess of what Nunnally 
(1967) regarded as minimally acceptable value of 0.60 and demonstrate high internal consistency. 
In this study, most values are in a range above or close to 0.90 and thus are considered acceptable 
and strong. Thus, the results suggest the measurement model has adequate internal consistency 
reliabilities. 
Table 5.35: Reliability Measures 
Construct Composite Reliability Cronbach’s Alpha 
Business Value 0.964 0.959 
Gap Assessment 0.955 0.929 
Independent Review 0.911 0.869 
Joint Working 0.940 0.923 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.916 0.895 
Structural Gap 1.000 1.000 
5.4.1.2 Convergent Validity of Measures 
Convergent validity refers to whether the items comprising a scale behave as if they are 
measuring a common underlying construct (Hulland, 1999). In this sense, all items measuring the 
same construct should correlate with the items in the same scale (Bagozzi et al., 1991). Convergent 
validity of the scale items was assessed using two criteria: the item factor loadings should be 
significant and exceed 0.60; and average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct should exceed 
the variance attribute to measurement error (i.e., AVE ≥ 0.50) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). AVE 
measures the amount of variance that a latent variable component captures from its indicators 
relative to the amount due to measurement error (Chin, 1998; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The AVE 
values in Table 5.36 show all constructs exceed the recommended threshold value of 0.50 (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). Convergent validity is also assessed using the standardised confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
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As shown in Table 5.37, loadings for all reflective items in the model exceed the minimum 
required loading criterion of 0.60. The confirmatory factor analysis results also indicate all items are 
loaded more highly on their own construct than on other constructs, except POB2 ‘make use of 
‘Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework’. The relatively low levels of 
agreement for this item might be associated with experience of benchmarking, practical 
implementation and professional knowledge of the ITIL framework. However, the item POB2 
‘make use of ‘Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework’ fits conceptually 
with the other best practice framework items on ‘profession-wide oversight’, and as such this item 
should be retained. Thus, the results suggest the measurement model demonstrates adequate 
convergent validity. 
Table 5.36: Inter-Construct Correlations 
  Correlations of among Constructs 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted Construct 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
0.731 Business Value 0.855      
0.876 Gap Assessment 0.438 0.936     
0.720 Independent Review 0.604 0.576 0.848    
0.722 Joint Working 0.643 0.312 0.554 0.850   
0.578 Profession-wide Oversight 0.721 0.648 0.740 0.667 0.760  
1.000 Structural Gap -0.082 0.067 0.071 -0.023 0.062 1.000 
 
Table 5.37: Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings 
Cross 
Loadings 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
BVP1 0.841  0.350  0.507  0.525  0.596  -0.043  
BVP2 0.876  0.381  0.520  0.593  0.630  -0.016  
BVP3 0.859  0.430  0.541  0.566  0.658  -0.075  
BVP4 0.884  0.344  0.511  0.557  0.638  -0.100  
BVP5 0.878  0.400  0.555  0.585  0.650  -0.083  
BVP6 0.782  0.288  0.417  0.389  0.500  -0.085  
BVP7 0.871  0.438  0.583  0.510  0.669  -0.058  
BVP8 0.868  0.395  0.518  0.545  0.601  -0.081  
BVP9 0.810  0.350  0.492  0.536  0.581  -0.110  
BVP10 0.875  0.350  0.497  0.658  0.619  -0.057  
GA1 0.376  0.936  0.538  0.263  0.589  0.107  
GA2 0.443  0.942  0.570  0.312  0.649  0.007  
GA3 0.404  0.930  0.506  0.296  0.577  0.083  
IR1 0.465  0.543  0.796  0.414  0.639  0.058  
IR2 0.573  0.380  0.785  0.591  0.566  0.076  
IR3 0.504  0.525  0.911  0.438  0.658  0.044  
IR4 0.485  0.517  0.895  0.404  0.648  0.060  
JW1 0.509  0.166  0.382  0.830  0.498  0.005  
JW2 0.533  0.222  0.424  0.870  0.547  -0.066  
JW3 0.523  0.273  0.471  0.891  0.600  0.006  
JW4 0.492  0.231  0.467  0.840  0.513  -0.037  
JW5 0.659  0.339  0.519  0.886  0.629  -0.002  
JW6 0.533  0.335  0.546  0.777  0.596  -0.029  
POA1 0.613  0.522  0.645  0.625  0.846  0.026  
POA2 0.652  0.429  0.554  0.653  0.831  0.061  
POA3 0.625  0.420  0.540  0.679  0.808  0.013  
POA4 0.626  0.453  0.617  0.679  0.833  0.030  
POB1 0.478  0.630  0.555  0.289  0.705  0.012  
POB2 0.417  0.499  0.563  0.296  0.626  0.165  
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Cross 
Loadings 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
POB3 0.446  0.563  0.538  0.308  0.705  0.033  
POB4 0.454  0.535  0.513  0.339  0.696  0.073  
SG1 -0.082  0.067  0.071  -0.023  0.062  1.000  
5.4.1.3 Discriminant Validity of Measures 
Discriminant validity complements convergent validity, and represents the extent to which 
measures of a given construct differ from measures of other constructs in the same model (Hulland, 
1999). Following suggestions by Hulland (1999) and Chin (1998), discriminant validity is assessed 
by examining the cross loadings of each item in the constructs, and the square root of average 
variance extracted (AVE) for each construct. The first criterion of discriminant validity is assessed 
by examining that all items load more strongly on their corresponding construct than on other 
constructs in the models (i.e., loadings should be higher than cross-loadings). The second criterion 
of discriminant validity is assessed by examining the square root of AVE for each construct which 
needs to be higher than the correlations of that construct with all others (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
Thus, discriminant validity is satisfied when the diagonal elements (square root AVE – shaded 
numbers) are greater than the off-diagonal elements in the same row and column. As Table 5.36 
shows, all constructs satisfied this criterion. 
If the correlation between different variables is closer or lower than the square root of the 
AVE, it is justified to consider them as distinct theoretical entities. Note that the square root of the 
AVE for ‘profession-wide oversight’ (0.760) is not much higher than the high correlation between 
‘profession-wide oversight’ and ‘joint working’ (0.667). Even though this is not enough for 
discriminant validity to be questioned, it may be indicative of collinearity8. Thus, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) can be used as a criterion for multicollinearity assessment. 
The VIF determines the variance impact on the regression coefficients caused by 
multicollinearity. A proven maximum level of VIF is 10 (Cohen, 2003; Kutner et al., 2004). The 
more conservative threshold VIF is 3.3 (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006). Higher levels of VIF 
suggest a potential issue of multicollinearity. However, low levels of VIF do not prove its absence. 
To complement the VIF-value analysis, this study uses the condition index (CI). CI represents the 
collinearity of combinations of variables (Hair et al., 2010). The higher the CI value, the higher the 
degree of collinearity presents amongst the indicators. CI values below 30 remain acceptable 
(Belsley et al., 2005; Hair et al., 2010). Table 5.38 contains VIFs and the condition indices for all 
formative constructs. All indicators of the construct show VIF-values between 1.023 and 2.948 that 
                                                 
8 Collinearity between a pair of latent variables may be associated with a few offending indicators that are highly correlated 
with both latent variable scores. This situation would be indicated by high cross-loadings for those indicators from a confirmation 
factor analysis. 
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are well below the threshold of 10. In addition, the CI remains below the acceptable level of 30. 
Hence, no collinearity exists in all constructs. 
Table 5.38: Vertical Collinearity Estimates 
Construct 
Condition Index (CI) 
= 20.382 
Gap Assessment Independent Review Joint Working 
Profession-wide 
Oversight 
Structural Gap 
Business Value 1.149 2.294 1.957 2.948 1.023 
5.4.1.4 Quality of Measurement Model 
Table 5.39 provides an overview on the descriptive statistics for each construct, e.g., mean 
and standard deviation, and the scale ranges. All scales show satisfactory levels of differentiation 
and the ranges of the indicators have been used to their full extent by the respondents. The 
‘profession-wide oversight’ scale, however, is characterized by a relatively low arithmetic mean and 
slightly smaller standard deviation in comparison to the other constructs. 
Table 5.39: Descriptive Statistics for Each Construct 
Construct 
Number of 
Items 
Maximum Minimum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Question 
Business Value 10   5.206 1.063 Q7.1 – Q7.2 
Gap Assessment 3 5 1 3.085 1.537 Q5.1 – Q5.3 
Independent Review 4 7 1 4.654 1.557 Q6.1 
Joint Working 6 7 1 5.443 1.091 Q6.2 
Profession-wide Oversight 8 5 1 3.468 0.938 Q6.3 – Q6.4 
Structural Gap9 1 100 0 11.423 16.422 Q4.1 – 4.5 
 
In the preceding sections, several statistics were used to assess the internal consistency, 
convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement model. First, all items loaded positively 
and significantly on their respective constructs. Second, all constructs exhibited composite 
reliabilities of 0.90 or higher. Third, the average variance extracted (AVE) for all constructs 
exceeded the threshold value of 0.60. The square root of the AVE for each construct was greater 
than all other cross-correlations, thus providing evidence for the distinctiveness of the constructs. 
The confirmatory factor analysis loadings further established this discriminant validity. All items 
had high loadings in their respective constructs with low cross-loadings in the others, except POB2 
‘make use of ‘Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework’. In summary, 
sufficient evidence has been demonstrated, on balance, to show that the measurement model 
displays satisfactory levels of reliability and validity. The next step is to assess the structural model.  
                                                 
9 Structural Gap is the total absolute value of the difference between decision rights and accountability for each IT 
governance decision domain. 
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5.4.2 Assessment of Structural Model 
After testing the measurement model, the PLS structural model and hypotheses can be 
assessed. A structural model is used to capture the linear regression effects of the exogenous 
constructs on the endogenous constructs and the regression effects of the endogenous constructs 
upon one another (Hair et al., 2010). The structural model is of interest to researchers because it 
offers a direct test of the theory of interest (Cheng, 2001). As PLS makes no distributional 
assumptions, bootstrapping (i.e., 500 samples with replacement) is used to test the statistical 
significance of each path coefficient (Chin, 1998).  
First, PLS provides the squared multiple correlation (R2) for each endogenous construct in the 
model, a measure of the percentage of a construct’s variation that the model explains. R2 is similar 
to regression and it is used to measure the percentage of a construct’s variation that the model 
explains (Chin, 1998). The R2 value represents the amount of variance explained by the independent 
variables, thereby providing insight into the model’s predictive power (Chin, 1998; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). The examination of the structural model leads to either rejection or confirmation of 
hypotheses. Chin (1998) categorises R² values, 0.67, 0.33 and 0.19, as ‘substantial’, ‘moderate’ and 
‘weak’ respectively. 
The second measure of the structural model provided by PLS is the path coefficient (β), 
indicating the strength of relationship between two constructs (dependent and independent 
variables). Dependent and independent variables need to be significant and directionally consistent 
with expectations. This procedure provides an estimate of the standard error for each salience10 in 
(singular vector weight) all latent variables, and serves to assess the contribution of each data point 
to the latent variable structure. In theory, the p value is a continuous measure of evidence. However, 
in practice it is typically trichotomized as approximately highly significant, marginally significant, 
and not statistically significant at conventional levels, with cutoffs roughly at p = 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10. According to Gujarati (1995) and Fishers (1958), the p value should not be interpreted as a 
hypothetical frequency of ‘error’ but rather as a measure of evidence meant to be combined with 
alternative sources of information about the phenomenon under study. Thus, the threshold of p 
value of less than 0.05 for significance used in this thesis to interpret the relationship of each path is 
reasonable because the interpretation of the results is also dependent on background knowledge 
about the phenomenon being investigated (Gujarati, 1995).  
Third, instead of looking solely at significant structural paths and loadings, closer attention 
should perhaps be given to the predictiveness of the model. Structural paths and loadings with 
                                                 
10 The coefficients of a PLS analysis represent the angular relations of the variables within one data block with respect to 
those in the other data block. They represent the variables that are most useful or salient for predicting patterns in the other data 
block. For this reason, they are referred to as saliences. 
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substantial strength should be the focus of investigation. As described by Chin (1998), the effect 
size (f²) indicates how substantial the influence of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable is. SmartPLS does not provide the effect size value directly, but it can be calculated using 
the following formula (Cohen, 1988):  
f² =  
R² (included) - R² (excluded) 
1 - R² (included) 
In PLS path modelling, the effect sizes of different constructs can be investigated by 
considering the explained variance of dependent variables. When a construct is removed from the 
research model, the explained variance of the dependent variable (R²) changes. A change in R² is 
used to estimate whether the impact of a specific exogenous construct has a substantive impact 
(effect size f²). An effect size f² value of 0.02 indicates that a construct has a small impact on 
explained variance (R²), an effect size of 0.15 a medium impact, and an effect size of 0.35 a large 
impact, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Finally, the quality of the structural model can be measured using a redundancy index (i.e. 
Stone-Geisser Q²) that gives an estimate of the predictive relevance of structural regression 
equations. Redundancy is the average variance of the manifest variable set, related to the 
endogenous construct, and explained by the exogenous constructs. Redundancy is a cross-validated 
R-square between the manifest variables of an endogenous construct and all the manifest variables 
associated with the constructs explaining the endogenous construct, using the estimated structural 
model. If the redundancy index is higher than zero, the index indicates predictive relevance. 
Negative values, on the other hand, imply the rejection of related structural equations (Fornell & 
Cha, 1994). The Q² values are obtained using the bindfolding procedure available in SmartPLS 
(Tenenhaus et al., 2005). According to Ringle et al. (2005), the value of the Stone-Geisser criterion 
Q² is displayed under the heading ‘Construct/Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy’ in SmartPLS.  
Table 5.40 lists the quality criteria for the evaluation of the structural model as implemented in the 
SmartPLS application (Chin, 1998; Cohen, 1988). 
Table 5.40: Quality Criteria of Structural Model 
Test  Measure  Cut-off 
Goodness-of-fit measures Share of Variance Explained (R²) Threshold ≥ 0.1 
0.10 - 0.32 (weak) 
0.33 – 0.66 (moderate) 
≥ 0.67 (substantial) 
 Path coefficients (β) < 0.1 (no relationship) 
0.1 – 0.2 (weak) 
0.2 – 0.5 (moderate) 
> 0.5 (substantial) 
 Statistical significance level (p value) <  0.05 (significant) 
Validation measures Effect size (f²) 0.02 –  0.15 (small) 
0.15 –  0.35 (moderate) 
≥ 0.35 (large) 
 Prediction Accuracy - Stone-Geisser criterion (Q²) Threshold > 0 
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5.4.2.1 Quality of Structural Model 
Figure 5.9 summarises the various structural regressions of ‘business value’ in the research 
model. Table 5.41 presents the same PLS estimation of the research model in table format. In the 
figure, the path coefficients are the standardized regression coefficients (β). The explained variance 
(R²) is also presented. In addition, the significance levels (p) of the regression coefficients were 
computed using a cross-validation method available online. The path loadings were taken to be 
statistically significant with a p value lower than 0.05 (the highest probability generally 
considered)(Burns, 2000). By adopting the threshold of 0.05, this study accepts that there is a 5 per 
cent possibility that the result occurred by chance.  
Since the case values of constructs are determined by weight relations, structural prediction 
may be assessed by looking at usual R². A high R² demonstrates a good prediction power. As shown 
in the figure, the explained variance (R²) of ‘business value’ is 0.586. That means the research 
model explains 58.6% of the variance in the dependent variable and is deemed satisfactory (Chin, 
1998). The investigation of R² indicates that the research model has substantial explanatory power.  
Figure 5.9: Path Analysis Model – Total Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.41: Path Coefficient – Total Sample 
                                            
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
(Two-
tailed) 
P Value 
(One-tailed) 
           Gap Assessment -> Business Value -0.012 -0.009 0.044 0.044 0.274 0.784 0.392 
       Independent Review -> Business Value 0.129 0.128 0.051 0.051 2.513 0.013 0.006 
            Joint Working -> Business Value 0.263 0.265 0.048 0.048 5.492 0.000 0.000 
Profession-wide Oversight -> Business Value 0.466 0.463 0.056 0.056 8.248 0.000 0.000 
           Structural Gap -> Business Value -0.113 -0.114 0.026 0.026 4.284 0.000 0.000 
 
Four constructs have statistically significant relationships to ‘business value’: ‘independent 
review’ has a statistically significant (β = 0.129, p = 0.006) positive moderate correlation with 
‘business value’; ‘joint working’ has a statistically significant (β = 0.263, p < 0.001) positive 
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moderate correlation with ‘business value’; ‘profession-wide oversight’ has a statistically 
significant (β = 0.466, p < 0.001) positive moderate correlation with ‘business value’; and 
‘structural gap’ has a negative weak relationship with ‘business value’ (β = -0.113, p < 0.001). Only 
the construct ‘gap assessment’ does not have statistically significant effect on ‘business value’ (β = 
-0.012, p = 0.392). The ‘gap assessment’ construct is problematic mostly because the correlation 
and weight between ‘business value’ have different signs (positive loading and negative 
correlation). The removal of the construct of ‘gap assessment’ does not weaken the explanatory 
power of the model (Table 5.42). In fact, the explained variance of ‘business value’ stays the same 
when the construct is removed from the model.  
Table 5.42: Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs 
                                            R² included R² excluded f² 
Gap Assessment 0.586 0.586 0.00 
Independent Review 0.586 0.579 0.02 
Joint Working 0.586 0.551 0.08 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.586 0.526 0.14 
Structural Gap 0.586 0.574 0.03 
 
Table 5.42 presents the exogenous constructs and the effect sizes (f²) computed for them in 
the research model. All the effect sizes are higher than 0.02, except ‘gap assessment’. On the other 
hand, only the construct ‘profession-wide oversight’ (f² = 0.14) has an almost medium impact on R² 
= 0.586. The research model seems to equalize the impact of the different constructs on R² values of 
‘business value’ because none of the constructs has a considerably higher effect size compared to 
other ones. The most notable result of this analysis is that ‘profession-wide oversight’ would appear 
to be the most important determinant of ‘business value’. 
Table 5.43: Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² 
BVP1 0.370 BVP9 0.391 IR4 0.645 POA2 0.559 
BVP2 0.445 BVP10 0.477 JW1 0.566 POA3 0.511 
BVP3 0.443 GA1 0.719 JW2 0.648 POA4 0.565 
BVP4 0.439 GA2 0.694 JW3 0.697 POB1 0.390 
BVP5 0.468 GA3 0.685 JW4 0.595 POB2 0.287 
BVP6 0.261 IR1 0.426 JW5 0.660 POB3 0.389 
BVP7 0.430 IR2 0.338 JW6 0.452 POB4 0.387 
BVP8 0.422 IR3 0.679 POA1 0.619 SG1 0.000 
 
Table 5.44: Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² 
Business Value 0.414 
 
As shown in Table 5.43 all indicators have a cross-validated redundancy (i.e. Q²) exceeding 
the minimum level of zero, except structural gap (SG1). The remaining variables have moderate to 
significant predictive relevance. The ‘business value’ construct has a Q² value of 0.414 which 
indicates a substantial level of predictive relevance (Table 5.44).  
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Although the sample size is deemed adequate using the ‘10 times’ rule of thumb, a statistical 
power analysis is needed to formally determine if the sample size is adequate (Peng & Lai, 2012). A 
post hoc power analysis was conducted using the post hoc statistical power calculator for multiple 
regression11. The sample size of 205 was used for the statistical power analyses and a 5 predictor 
variable equation was used as a baseline. The alpha level used for this analysis was p < 0.05. The 
post hoc analyses revealed the statistical power for this study exceeded 0.99. Thus, there was more 
than adequate power (i.e., power > 0.80). In general, the model shows satisfying levels of 
evaluation criteria across both its measurement and structural model. Hence, the model and its 
relationships are considered valid.  
5.4.3 Summary Results – Assessment of Business Value of IT 
Table 5.45 presents the result of hypotheses testing, as outlined in the previous section. The 
criteria for ‘support’ is strictly path coefficients >= ± 0.10 and P(t) <= 0.05. Four hypotheses (H6a, 
H7a, H7b, & H7c) are supported and one hypothesis (H6b) is not supported. The second research 
question associated with these hypotheses is reviewed in section 5.4.5. 
Table 5.45: Summary Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structural Gap and Monitoring Mechanism 
IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap between decision rights and accountability are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise IT governance structural gap are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support 
Monitoring Mechanism 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
7a Higher levels of monitoring roles being played by independent professionals are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
7b Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide well-defined standards of work are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
7c Higher levels of client involvement in the joint production of service product are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
5.4.4 Post Hoc Analysis – Business Value of IT  
From the PLS model, the following post hoc tests seek to empirically answer three questions: 
First, while the IT shared services business model is evolving, the actual responsibilities and 
accountabilities vary in magnitude and complexity, accordingly. Shared services provider and client 
may develop different approaches to expectation or risk appetite. Is there any experience or 
perception difference between provider and client in how IT structural gap and monitoring 
mechanisms influence the business value of IT? Second, with recent increases in demand for cost 
                                                 
11 The calculator is available on http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=9. 
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reduction, the need for small businesses to actively manage their IT resources has never been 
greater (Leyer & Quigley, 2009). Small organisations differ from large organisations in the number 
of staff, annual budget, number of customers, and amount of hardware and software. Is there any 
difference in the business value of IT impacted by IT governance structural gap and monitoring 
mechanisms between small organisations and large organisations? Third, different shared services 
delivery arrangements have different targeted levels of business process integration and 
standardisation for delivering IT services to customers. Do IT governance structural gap and 
monitoring mechanisms affect the business value of IT differently among shared services delivery 
arrangements? 
To estimate the influence of the above factors on the path coefficients, this study uses the 
method of group comparison. Carte & Russell (2003) point out that a valid comparison requires a 
comparability of constructs. As the structural equation models are estimated for the different groups 
separately, different construct values for the same constructs could result. The resulting path 
coefficient differences either can result from a different indicator weight structure or are related to 
other objective reasons in the two groups. Therefore, the group comparison method requires a 
similar construct structure. The two subgroups incorporated in the group comparison can also be 
understood as two separate samples from different relationship or organisation size. 
This study takes a three-step approach to group comparisons. First, the reliability and validity 
of the individual measurement models is determined. In addition, the structural models are 
evaluated separately. Second, the comparability of the separate models is evaluated. Finally, the 
path coefficients are assessed for significant differences.  
5.4.4.1 Shared Services Relationship 
The initial step ensures that both the measurement and the structural model allow valid 
interpretations (in line with the assessment for stand-alone models). The provider and client 
reflective constructs meet all the criteria during their assessment with regard to measurement 
reliability. All other indicators show loadings above the threshold of 0.6, except ‘POB2’ in the 
provider and ‘POB1’ in the client models. Consistency measures such as Cronbach’s alpha, internal 
consistency and AVE confirm measurement reliability in both sub-models. In addition, both 
reflective measurement models show discriminant validity on both the indicator and construct 
levels, except ‘profession-wide oversight’. Together with the findings in Chapter 5.4.1.4 that assess 
the content of the constructs, the reflective measurement models are assumed both valid and reliable 
(Appendix E). Hence, the constructs in both subgroups can be evaluated further during the group 
comparisons. 
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Both structural sub-models meet all the criteria during their quality assessment. In comparison 
to the overall model, the coefficient of determination (R²) for the provider group increases to 69.5% 
and R² for the client group decreases to 45.4%. Both models have a sufficient level of prognostic 
relevance (Q²) well above 0. 
The second step in a group comparison determines if the constructs between the subgroups 
are actually comparable. Both reflective measurement models show a satisfying coefficient 
comparability (CoC) of 0.99. Hence, the indicator loading structure between the constructs of both 
models can be assumed as being nearly identical. 
This study attempts to enrich the conceptual discussion by combining the causal (‘business 
value’ consequences) with a descriptive analysis. The combination of both is expected to deliver 
valuable insights into the application of assessment and monitoring mechanisms. During the third 
step, the path coefficients of both models are evaluated for significant differences. The comparison 
of the path coefficients is conducted by using the t-test as documented by Keil et al. (2000). The 
path coefficients show significant differences between provider and client. To determine the 
difference in construct between the two groups, the average indicator values are aggregated into one 
construct value per latent variable. The construct’s mean values are then compared for significant 
differences using a t-test. The constructs of ‘independent review’, ‘joint working’ and ‘profession-
wide oversight’ show significant differences between provider and client groups. The construct 
values of client are found to be significantly lower than the construct values of provider. Figure 5.10 
presents the various structural regressions of ‘business value’ in the provider and client groups 
respectively. The results are also summarised in Table 5.46. 
Figure 5.10: Path Analysis Model – Shared Services Relationship 
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Table 5.46: Results Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship 
Provider n = 109 
Client n = 96                              
 Construct 
Values 
 
 Path 
Coefficients  
 Provider Client Difference Provider Client Difference 
Gap Assessment 2.440 2.253 -0.187 -0.035(ns) 0.033(ns) na 
Independent Review 5.174 4.103 -1.071*** -0.021(ns) 0.190** na 
Joint Working 5.628 5.240 -0.388* 0.414*** 0.142* -0.272*** 
Profession-wide Oversight 3.671 3.255 -0.415*** 0.506*** 0.425*** -0.081*** 
Structural Gap 0.106 0.123 0.018 -0.163*** -0.083* 0.080** 
Significance - *** = < .001; ** = < .01; * = < .05; ns = not significant; na = not comparable 
 
Table 5.47 presents the result of hypotheses testing, as outlined in the previous section. The 
criteria for ‘support’ is strictly path coefficients >= ± 0.10 and P(t) <= 0.05.  
Table 5.47: Summary Hypotheses Testing for Group Comparison – Shared Services Relationship 
IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Provider 
n = 109 
Client 
n = 96 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap between decision rights 
and accountability are associated with higher levels of IT-business 
value 
Support Support Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise IT governance 
structural gap are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support No Support No Support 
Monitoring Mechanism 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Provider 
n = 109 
Client 
n = 96 
7a Higher levels of monitoring roles being played by independent 
professionals are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support No Support Support 
7b Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide well-defined standards of 
work are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support 
7c Higher levels of client involvement in the joint production of service 
product are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support 
5.4.4.2 Organisation Size 
The comparison of organisation size begins with the assessment of the individual 
measurement models. Within the large group measurement model, all indicators (GA1, GA2 & 
GA3) from the construct of ‘gap assessment’ are below the threshold of 0.6. Both ‘gap assessment’ 
and ‘profession-wide oversight’ indicators show insufficient loadings. The requirements for 
discriminant validity on both construct and indicator levels also do not meet the criteria. In addition, 
the composite reliability and AVE measures from the construct of ‘gap assessment’ are inadequate. 
However, the internal consistency indices show levels well above 0.7. Within the small group 
measurement model, four indicators from the construct of ‘profession-wide oversight’ (POB1, 
POB2, POB3, & POB4) are below the threshold of 0.6. Such results might be due to small 
organisations are less likely to use certified IT governance frameworks or evaluate industrial 
standard benchmarks. The requirement for discriminant validity on both groups’ constructs is met. 
Except ‘profession-wide oversight’, the indicator levels of both groups are also met. In essence, the 
measurement models do not show sufficient levels in some evaluation criteria, therefore, the 
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predictions from the structure models may not be accurate. The evaluation criteria for company size 
are summarised in Appendix E. 
Both structural models meet all the criteria in relation to their explanatory value (R²) and 
prognostic relevance (Q²): they are able to explain between 76.8% (large organisations) and 33.8% 
(small organisations) of the overall variance of business value performance (Figure 5.11). Q² of 
both models is well above 0 which suggests that the models actually have a prognostic effect. The 
comparability of both measurement models is ensured as well. Both reflective constructs are highly 
consistent in terms of their indicator loadings structure (CoCs 0.99). The comparison of path 
coefficients shows that the performance effect of ‘joint working’ increases significantly with 
decreasing organisation size (Table 5.48). As the organisation size decreases, diversity decreases 
and less resources for problem solving are required. Hence, impeding communication, cooperation 
and making consensus less difficult to reach (Chenhall, 2003). In particular, both ‘independent 
review’ and ‘structural gap’ have no ‘business value’ effect in small organisations. The possible 
explanation could be that bureaucracy decreases when organisational size decreases, thereby 
decreases the difficulties in monitoring shared services performance. The use of ‘independent 
review’ becomes unnecessary. In addition to the reduction of complexity, small organisations tend 
to have a less IT governance structural gap between decision rights and accountability. In contrast, 
‘profession-wide oversight’ decreases significantly with smaller organisation size.  
In line with shared services relationship, a descriptive analysis was conducted to determine 
construct value patterns in organisation size. The descriptive analysis shows that the means of all 
constructs decrease with reducing organisation size. In other words, larger organisations in the 
sample use more monitoring controls. However, structural gap is less likely to be affected by 
organisation size. 
Figure 5.11: Path Analysis Model – Organisation Size 
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Table 5.48: Results Group Comparison – Organisation Size 
Large n = 108 
Small n = 97                              
 Construct 
Values 
 
 Path 
Coefficients  
 Large Small Difference Large Small Difference 
Gap Assessment 2.600 2.077 -0.523*** -0.009(ns) -0.027(ns) na 
Independent Review 5.432 3.827 -1.606*** 0.308*** 0.058(ns) na 
Joint Working 5.569 5.308 -0.261* 0.173* 0.212** 0.039*** 
Profession-wide Oversight 3.786 3.131 -0.655*** 0.434*** 0.418*** -0.016*** 
Structural Gap 0.131 0.094 -0.038 -0.137** -0.025(ns) na 
Significance - *** = < .001; ** = < .01; * = < .05; ns = not significant; na = not comparable 
 
Table 5.49 presents the result of hypotheses testing, as outlined in the previous section. The 
criteria for ‘support’ is strictly path coefficients >= ± 0.10 and P(t) <= 0.05.  
Table 5.49: Summary Hypotheses Testing for Group Comparison – Organisation Size 
IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Large 
n = 108 
Small 
n = 97 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap between decision rights and 
accountability are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support No Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise IT governance structural 
gap are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support No Support No Support 
Monitoring Mechanism 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Large 
n = 108 
Small 
n = 97 
7a Higher levels of monitoring roles being played by independent 
professionals are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support No Support 
7b Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide well-defined standards of 
work are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support 
7c Higher levels of client involvement in the joint production of service 
product are associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support 
5.4.4.3 Profession-wide Oversight - Shared Services Relationship  
According to the path analysis model, ‘profession-wide oversight’ appears to be the most 
important determinant of ‘business value’ (Figure 5.9). The comparison of path coefficients also 
shows that the performance effect of ‘profession-wide oversight’ differs significantly between 
provider and client groups within shared services relationship (Figure 5.10) and large and small 
groups within organisation size (Figure 5.11). To evaluate how this monitoring mechanism is 
utilised to control the shared services performance, the ‘profession-oversight’ construct was divided 
into two subgroups: benchmarking (POA1, POA2, POA3, POA4)12 and best practice framework 
(POB1, POB2, POB3, POB4)13. Profession-wide oversight involves the systematic application of IT 
                                                 
12 Benchmarking: 
POA1 - ‘cost’ targets against standards of best-practice. 
POA2 - ‘quality’ targets against standards of best-practice. 
POA3 - ‘customer satisfaction’ targets against standards of best-practice. 
POA4 - ‘timeliness’ targets against standards of best-practice. 
13 Best-practice framework: 
POB1 - Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 
POB2 - Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
POB3 - Information Security Management (ISO 27002) 
POB4 - Quality Management (ISO 9000) 
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rules, standards, or principles developed from research and the actual practices of and incidents 
experienced by major organisations. Benchmarking control refers to comparing performance to 
industry standards and competitors, including cost, quality, customer satisfaction, and timelines. 
Best practice framework refers to the most efficient (least amount of effort) and effective (best 
results) way of accomplishing a task, based on repeatable procedures that have proven themselves 
over time for large numbers of people or organisations, including ITIL, ISO, COBIT. Results from 
these post-hoc analyses are provided in Table 5.50 and Table 5.51.  
In particular, the performance of ‘best practice framework’ decreases from a medium effect 
level in client group (β = 0.294, p < .05) to no effect in provider group. The ‘business value’ is also 
directly related to ‘benchmarking’ in both client group (β = 0.287, p < .005) and provider group (β 
= 0.466, p < .005). The relationship between client and provider, however, differs significantly by 
0.180. The descriptive analysis shows that the means of the ‘benchmarking’ group are well above 
‘best practice framework’ means. In other words, the provider group in the sample uses less best 
practice frameworks and relies more on benchmarking in monitoring the shared IT performance.  
Table 5.50: Results Profession-wide Oversight Comparison – Shared Services Relationship 
Provider n = 109 
Client n = 96                              
 Construct 
Values 
 
 Path 
Coefficients  
Profession-wide Oversight Provider Client Difference Provider Client Difference 
- Benchmarking 5.257 4.805 0.452*  0.466***  0.287*** -0.180*** 
- Best Practice Framework 2.062 1.695 0.367***  0.093(ns)   0.235*** 0.142(na) 
Significance - *** = < .005; ** = < .01; * = < .05; ns = not significant; na = not comparable 
 
Benchmarking is a proven tool for improving efficiency and reducing operating costs in 
shared services (Accenture, 2011b). Using common or industry key indicators for the IT service, 
such as cost, quality, time, and customer satisfaction, an organisation can compare its indicators 
against the indicators for leading organisations providing the same IT service. This study indicates 
benchmarking is a popular and effective monitoring mechanism. The service providers might 
support benchmarking as a way to ‘prove’ to their clients that they are competitive (Pattacini, 
2013).  
From a provider perspective, the adoption of best practice framework has no impact on 
business value of IT. Based on a recent analysis of client engagements, a consulting firm found that 
frameworks such as ITIL and COBIT are often implemented by the service provider in isolation 
from the business, simply to achieve a certain level of compliance (Compass, 2011). In such cases, 
the business may not be sufficiently engaged and clients may not feel enough of a sense of 
ownership and accountability in the initiative for it to be successful. 
From a client perspective, both benchmarking and best practice frameworks have positive 
impacts on the shared IT performance. IT best practices have become significant to the client 
because of the constant preoccupation over the generally increasing level of IT expenditure and 
over the increasingly complex IT-related risks, such as network security (Selig, 2008). The effective 
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use of best practices can also avoid reinventing their own policies and procedures, optimize the use 
of IT resources and reduce the occurrence of major IT risks. Potential shared IT risks include 
project failures, wasted investments, security breaches, system crashes and failures by service 
providers to understand and meet customer requirements. 
5.4.4.4 Profession-wide Oversight – Organisation Size 
Comparing standardized beta coefficients from the two organisation size subgroups –  
large and small, it appears that the influence of ‘benchmarking’ is significant in both large (β = 
0.451, p < .005) and small (β = 0.282, p < .005) organisations. Furthermore, the shared IT 
performance also directly relates to ‘best practice framework’ (β = 0.241, p < 0.005) in small 
organisations. However, ‘best practice framework’ does not predict the business value of IT in large 
organisations. A descriptive analysis of the data reveals that the extents of ‘benchmarking’ and ‘best 
practice framework’ usage differ significantly between two groups. The usage of ‘benchmarking’ is 
higher than ‘best practice framework’ in both groups. 
Table 5.51: Results Profession-wide Oversight Comparison – Organisation Size 
Large n = 108 
Small n = 97                              
 Construct 
Values 
 
 Path 
Coefficients  
Profession-wide Oversight Large Small Difference Large Small Difference 
- Benchmarking 5.368 4.686 0.682***  0.451***   0.282***  0.169*** 
- Best Practice Framework 2.183 1.564 0.619***  0.076(ns)   0.241***  na 
Significance - *** = < .005; ** = < .01; * = < .05; ns = not significant; na = not comparable 
 
There is a very clear tendency for larger organisations to be more likely to be benchmarking 
than smaller organisations. Furthermore, the influence of benchmarking on large organisations 
seems to be higher than small organisations. This difference might reflect a familiar combination of 
lack of organisational slack (in terms of time and/or resources) coupled with a healthy suspicion of 
management ‘theory’ resulting in a reduced likelihood of smaller organisations being involved with 
benchmarking. The propensity for conglomerates/federations to want to know how different parts 
compare may be one reason why benchmarking has the highest impact on shared IT performance.  
The findings regarding the adoption of best practice framework in large organisation are 
unexpected. The possible explanation could be that technology is ever changing at an accelerating 
pace. It is also frequent that process simplification and new security threats result in the requirement 
of continuously updating the best practice frameworks. The change management could be more 
complex in large organisations. The IT governance challenge might also be an obstacle to the 
implementation of best practice frameworks because of the complex alignment requirement among 
multiple stakeholders in a shared services environment. 
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5.4.4.5 Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
Not all the five PLS measurement models of shared services delivery arrangements allow 
valid interpretations for group comparison due to varied sample sizes, e.g., only 15 in the ‘iso-
corporate’ subgroup. Therefore, correlational analysis using Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) was 
used to examine the relationships between business value with IT governance structural gap and 
monitoring mechanisms respectively (Table 5.53). Evans (1996) suggests for the absolute value of r 
to describe the strength of the correlation according to the following criteria: 0.00 - 0.19 = very 
weak; 0.20 - 0.39 = weak; 0.40 - 0.59 = moderate; 0.60 - 0.79 = strong; and 0.80 - 1.0 = very strong.  
For ‘intra-services’ organisations (n = 43), results indicate no correlation between ‘business 
value’ and ‘structural gap’, and “business value” and ‘gap assessment’. A weak positive correlation 
between ‘independent review’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.398, p = 0.008) indicates that as the level 
of active monitoring roles being played by independent professionals increases, the business value 
generated from IT increases. A significant moderate positive correlation between ‘profession-wide 
oversight’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.577, p < 0.001) indicates that as the adoption of profession-
wide well-defined standards of work increases, the business value generated from IT increases. A 
significant moderate positive correlation between ‘joint working’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.409, p 
= 0.007) indicates that as the level of active involvement of the clients in the joint production of 
service product increases, the business value generated from IT increases. The results indicate that 
the IT governance structural gap is unlikely to affect the business value generated from IT. 
However, the implementation of monitoring mechanisms is more likely to contribute effectively to 
the shared services performance. 
For ‘service’ organisations (n = 25), results indicate no correlation between ‘structural gap’, 
‘gap assessment’ and ‘business value’ respectively. There is a moderate, positive significant 
correlation between ‘Independent review’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.461, p = 0.020). There is 
strong, positive significant correlation between ‘profession-wide oversight’ and ‘business value’ (r 
= 0.805, p < 0.001). The correlation between ‘joint working’ and ‘business value’ is found to be 
moderate significant (r = 0.580, p = 0.002). The results reveal that the IT governance structural gap 
is unlikely to affect the business value generated from IT. However, the implementation of 
monitoring mechanisms is likely to contribute effectively to the shared services performance, 
particularly the adoption of benchmarking. 
For ‘corporate’ organisations (n = 100), no significant correlation is found between ‘structural 
gap’, ‘gap assessment’ and ‘business value’. There are moderate significant correlations between 
‘independent review’ (r = 0.565, p < 0.001), ‘profession-wide oversight’ (r = 0.669, p < 0.001), 
‘joint working’ (r = 0.617, p < 0.001) and ‘business value’ respectively. The results imply that the 
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IT governance structural gap is unlikely to affect the business value generated from IT. However, 
the implementation of monitoring mechanisms is likely to contribute effectively to the shared 
services performance. 
For ‘supra-corporate’ organisations (n = 22), no significant correlation is found between 
‘structural gap’, ‘gap assessment’ and ‘business value’. The correlations between ‘independent 
review’ and ‘business value’ is moderate and significant (r = 0.746, p < 0.001), ‘profession-wide 
oversight’ and ‘business value’ is strong and significant (r = 0.804, p < 0.001), ‘joint working’ and 
‘business value’ is moderate and significant (r = 0.715, p < 0.001). The results reveal that the IT 
governance structural gap is unlikely to affect the business value generated from IT. Comparing 
with other shared services delivery arrangements, the implementation of monitoring mechanisms is 
more likely to contribute effectively to the shared services performance. 
For ‘iso-corporate’ organisations (n = 15), no significant correlation is found between 
‘structural gap’, ‘gap assessment’ and ‘business value’. Moderate significant correlations are found 
between ‘independent review’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.778, p = 0.001), and ‘profession-wide 
oversight’ and ‘business value’ (r = 0.704, p < 0.001) respectively. Within ‘profession-wide 
oversight’, there is no correlation between ‘best practice framework’ and ‘business value’. 
However, ‘joint working’ and ‘business value’ correlate strongly and significantly (r = 0.823, p < 
0.001). The results indicate that the IT governance structural gap is unlikely to affect the business 
value generated from IT. However, the implementation of monitoring mechanisms is likely to 
contribute effectively to the shared services performance, except the adoption of best practice 
framework. The possible explanation could be that the ‘iso-corporate’ organisations focus more on 
competitiveness; thereby the adoption of benchmarking seems to be more effective than best 
practice framework in demonstrating the business value generated from IT shared services.  
Table 5.52: Pearson Correlations (Level Of Significance) of Business Value  
Shared 
Services 
Delivery 
Arrange’t 
Business 
Value 
H6a 
Structural 
Gap 
H6b 
Gap 
Assessment 
H7a 
Independent 
Review 
H7b 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
H7b-1 
Bench-
marking 
H7b-2 
Best Practice 
Framework 
H7c 
Joint 
Working 
Intra-service 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.133 .129 .398** .577** .494** .394** .409** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .395 .410 .008 .000 .001 .009 .007 
 N 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Service 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.312 .133 .461* .805** .768** .580** .757** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .129 .528 .020 .000 .000 .002 .000 
 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Corporate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.157 -.026 .565** .669** .674** .444** .617** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .119 .800 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 N 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Supra-
Corporate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.013 .368 .746** .804** .754** .666** .715** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .953 .092 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 
 N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Iso-Corporate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.313 -.101 .778** .704** .752** .270 .823** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .256 .721 .001 .003 .001 .330 .000 
 N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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To sum up, the comparison of the Pearson's correlation coefficient among five shared services 
delivery arrangements exhibits no differences in the relationships between the dependent variables 
and independent variable, except ‘best practice framework’ in ‘iso-corporate’. In relation to the 
performance effects of monitoring mechanism, increased levels of ‘independent review’, 
‘profession-wide oversight’ and ‘joint working’ have positive impacts on ‘business value’. The 
performance effects of IT governance structural gap are not impacted by increased levels of 
‘structural gap’ and ‘gap assessment’. The summary hypotheses testing are shown in Table 5.53. 
Table 5.53: Summary Hypothesis Testing for Group Comparison – Shared Services Delivery Arrangement 
IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
Group Comparison 
Intra-
service 
n = 43 
Service 
n = 25 
Corporate 
n = 100 
Supra-
Corporate 
n = 22 
Iso-
Corporate 
n = 15 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap 
between decision rights and accountability are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business 
value 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise 
IT governance structural gap are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
Hypothesis Description 
Group Comparison 
Intra-
service 
n = 43 
Service 
n = 25 
Corporate 
n = 100 
Supra-
Corporate 
n = 22 
Iso-
Corporate 
n = 15 
7a 
Higher levels of monitoring roles being played 
by independent professionals are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support Support Support 
7b 
Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide 
well-defined standards of work are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support Support Support 
 Higher levels of benchmarking adoption are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business 
value. 
Support Support Support Support Support 
 Higher levels of best practice framework 
adoption are associated with higher levels of 
IT-business value. 
Support Support Support Support No Support 
7c 
Higher levels of client involvement in the joint 
production of service product are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support Support Support 
 
Hypothesis 6a is not supported by both Pearson’s correlation analysis and PLS model, 
Hypothesis 6b is not supported by the Pearson’s correlation analysis, but is confirmed by the PLS 
model. Pragmatically, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is sensitive to skewed distributions. It seems 
that PLS is a better interpretable model than the correlational analysis for this study. In line with the 
PLS model, hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c are confirmed in all subgroups. However, no relationship is 
found between ‘best practice framework’ and ‘business value’ in the ‘iso-corporate’ organisations 
which are characterised by profit centre and external customer. To achieve competitive advantage, 
the ‘iso-corporate’ organisations are likely to focus more on benchmarking than on best practice 
frameworks, such as COBIT.  
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5.4.5 Review of Research Question Two – Business Value of IT 
This study predicts in hypotheses H6 that lower levels of IT governance structural gap 
between decision rights and accountability are associated with higher levels of IT-business value. 
Organisations with effective IT governance actively recognise and assess their IT governance 
structural gap. In addition, hypothesis H7 predicts that monitoring mechanisms should be defined to 
ensure the business value generated from IT. Table 5.54 presents the consolidated results of 
hypotheses testing as outlined in the previous sections. The criteria for ‘support’ are strictly path 
coefficients >= ± 0.10 and P(t) <= 0.05. The second research question is explicitly consolidated and 
reviewed as follows: 
Table 5.54: Consolidated Hypotheses Testing for IT Governance Structural Gap and Monitoring Mechanism 
IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Provider 
n = 109 
Client 
n = 96 
Large 
n = 108 
Small 
n = 97 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap 
between decision rights and accountability are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business 
value 
Support Support Support Support No Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise 
IT governance structural gap are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support No Support No Support No Support No Support 
Monitoring Mechanism 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
Group Comparison 
Provider 
n = 109 
Client 
n = 96 
Large 
n = 108 
Small 
n = 97 
7a Higher levels of monitoring roles being played 
by independent professionals are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support No Support Support Support No Support 
7b Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide 
well-defined standards of work are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support Support Support 
7c Higher levels of client involvement in the joint 
production of service product are associated with 
higher levels of IT-business value 
Support Support Support Support Support 
5.4.5.1 Presence of IT Governance Structural Gap – Decision Rights vs Accountability  
As discussed above, the PLS result indicates the presence of IT governance structural gap has 
a significant negative relationship with business value of IT. H6a is supported. This study defines 
accountability as the extent to which groups are held responsible for the outcome of decisions. 
According to Gray et al. (1996), the accountability concept entails ‘the duty to provide an account 
(by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible”. Gray et al. (1996) further assert that accountability renders two types of responsibility, 
namely responsibility for actions (e.g., implementation of enterprise resource planning ERP 
application) and responsibility to report (e.g., realisation of business benefits from enterprise 
resource planning ERP investment).  
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Various management roles, such as top management, are used to understand the decision 
rights vs accountability gaps and several observations are made from the analysis. In this study, 
responses were captured for each group’s management role in each decision area (in percentage 
terms). For example, decision rights for decisions of IT principle could be distributed across the five 
groups, with the total equalling 100. A respondent could indicate that top management has 50% of 
the rights, and business unit leader has 50% (that is, decision rights are shared). A similar 
percentage response was solicited for accountability of outcomes. Table 5.55 illustrates the IT 
governance structural gaps between decision rights and accountability (average differences), with 
the negative numbers indicating where accountability exceeds decision rights. 
Table 5.55: Decision Rights vs Accountability Gap by Management Role and IT Decision Domain 
IT Decision Domain 
Top 
Management 
Business Unit 
Leaders 
Business Process 
Owners 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders 
IT Executives – 
Shared Services 
IT Principles 1.61 0.20 0.08 -1.18 -0.71 
IT Investment 3.48 -2.00 0.83 -1.43 -0.88 
Business Application Needs -0.02 -1.08 0.74 0.30 0.06 
IT Architecture 0.55 -0.69 0.63 -0.94 0.45 
IT Infrastructure 1.66 -1.05 0.41 -1.28 0.26 
 
As can be seen in the column under business unit leaders and local IT unit leaders, most 
numbers are negative indicating that these management leaders perceive an IT governance 
structural gap, where accountability for major IT decisions exceeds their decision rights. The 
business process owners column shows all numbers are positive. The business process owners are 
involved in making decisions in all decision areas but not accountable for all outcomes. A possible 
explanation could be the senior management level is typically responsible for leading lower level 
managers. 
The last column indicates IT executives – shared services make major decisions in business 
application needs, IT architecture, and IT infrastructure but the accountability systems in these 
decision areas are weak. Such environments may often result in overspending on IT that may not 
yield commensurate business benefits (Grover et al., 2007). In some cases, this could result in 
frustration for business and local IT groups. Another observation relevant to a shared services 
environment is the negative gaps found in IT principles and IT investment. In the current economic 
climate, cost considerations often appear to be the dominant consideration in decisions, and the 
resulting IT assets may not be aligned with existing competencies (Frost & Sullivan, 2005). For 
example, the top business executive committee may deny an IT investment request for a new in-
house scalable platform without full information about a situation (i.e., lack of specific IT 
knowledge). Instead, the top management may proceed to an outsourcing solution based upon an 
external vendor’s aggressive proposal. In such situations, the provider may feel frustrated because 
they believe their skills are underutilised and opportunities are being lost. Frustration could also 
result from the lack of control over their asset base, and in some cases their future viability. In 
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addition, the blame often falls on IT when projects run into difficulties (Grover et al., 2007; 
Queensland Audit Office, 2010). These conflicts could be a possible explanation of why the 
perceived decision rights-accountability gap has more impact on the provider group than the client 
group as discussed in previous section and shown in Table 5.46. 
This study reveals that the most common IT governance structure adopted is business 
monarchy. An interesting observation is made from Table 5.55 showing that most numbers in the 
top management column are positive. These gaps occur when major IT decisions are made by top 
management, but they are not held accountable for the outcomes of their executive decisions. As a 
result, the IT governance structural gap is detrimental to the business value. For example, top 
management might not acknowledge the full potential risks of (ERP) projects and approve the 
investment, or suddenly cancel them when they run into difficulties. Hence, the realisation of 
business value from investments in IT cannot be optimised. 
5.4.5.2 Assessment of IT Governance Structural Gap 
Planning an effective governance structure that recognises the decision rights and 
accountability differences is essential for an organisation to better deploy and manage the 
technology. In addition, this study predicts more formal and regular assessment of IT governance 
structural gap is associated with higher levels of IT-business value. Interestingly, the findings do not 
support the hypothesis H6b. A test for mediation was conducted to examine the association between 
‘structural gap’ and ‘gap assessment’. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this study cannot 
infer a causal relationship between these two variables through a correlation analysis. A potential 
explanation for this result could be that the IT governance assessment is not a mandatory practice. 
There is no single source of public disclosure where information on IT governance activities can be 
acquired (Joshi et al., 2013). The extent of formal and regular assessment of IT governance might 
depend on the unique corporate governance environment and reporting framework. Although the 
result appears to be not significant, it does not imply that the IT governance assessment is irrelevant 
from the perspective of good governance practice.  
5.4.5.3 Monitoring Roles Being Played By Independent Professionals 
Within an agency relationship, monitoring of the agent’s actions is an option for the principal 
to reduce information asymmetry. This study recommends the practice of having competent, 
objective reviewers to evaluate the IT shared services operation. The findings support the 
association between the existence of monitoring roles being played by independent professionals 
and business value of IT. H7a is supported.  
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Because principals often lack the knowledge of the agents' operation needed to determine how 
much service is required and how much actually is performed, therefore, the principals may not be 
able to design mechanisms to limit post-opportunism. Also, they may be unable to design 
agreements in which agents' compensation is based on the outcome of efforts. This condition is less 
problematic, however, when the principals have sufficient knowledge about the service so as to be 
able to determine clearly their own objectives and to be able to judge the outcome of agents' efforts. 
The principals can lessen or even neutralize their vulnerability to agent opportunism by 
internalising specialised knowledge via the influencing role of IT performance and the peer review 
role of assessing shared IT performance. The ultimate goal of helping the reviewed provider is to 
improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards and 
principles. It is important to note that the internalisation of relevant knowledge in practice is an 
acknowledgment of the problem arising from asymmetry of expertise.  
Interestingly, the group comparison results do not show significant relationships in both 
provider and small organisations. A potential explanation could be that the provider might perceive 
independent review as a bureaucracy of duplicated effort and small organisations might not able to 
justify the cost effectiveness of having extra resource to oversee the shared IT operation.  
5.4.5.4 Profession-Wide Well-Defined Standards of Work 
The profession-wide bodies provide their members with best practice frameworks and/or 
benchmarking information, e.g., Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA). 
This study confirms a positive significant relationship between the adoption of profession-wide 
well-defined standards of work and business value of IT. This association is also supported by 
different shared services relationship and organisation sizes. H7b is supported.  
As agency theory suggests, the threat of harm to the provider’s general reputation is likely to 
influence professional agents' behaviour (Sharma, 1997). The principals can make their claims more 
credible than agents when any opportunistic behaviour can be advertised easily (inexpensively) and 
when principals themselves have a strong reputation. For example, the client can make a valid 
complaint to the top management or the Board if they are able to demonstrate the difference 
between a shared services charge and a benchmarked market price, i.e., it is cheaper to get the same 
service from external supplier. Moreover, there is a growing pressure on organisations to utilise 
benchmarking information and formalise controls to hold their providers accountable more 
effectively for shared IT activities and outcomes (Accenture, 2011b; Kouzmin et al., 1999). Social 
pressure from the business units might also result in preventing the provider from engaging in self-
interested efforts to avoid competition, thereby the business value of IT can be ensured.  
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Scrutiny by professional peers neutralises the agent's advantage of unique access to an 
esoteric body of knowledge and exposes the behaviour of agents for comparison against the work 
and best practices or standards of their respective community of professionals. Such a condition is 
most likely to arise when there is a great deal of interaction and information sharing via intra-
industry organisations, trade associations or professional bodies. In other words, social interaction 
and solidarity among principals is likely to make their claims more credible to one another. This 
engenders a healthy market for agents' reputations within the organisation or the principal's industry 
via best practices or standards accreditation. Even if agent reputations are built on perceptions and 
judgments of principals, as opposed to hard-to-measure behaviours and outcomes, the agents are 
likely to restrain their opportunistic inclinations when principals can easily share best practice 
information about their experiences with particular professionals or within the organisation. The 
information availability could contribute to a possible explanation why the adoption of best practice 
framework has a significant effect in the small organisations and the client group because social 
controls might be more cost effectiveness for them. 
5.4.5.5 Joint Production of Service Product 
This study examined the effect of active involvement of the clients in the joint production of 
the service product on the business value of IT. The findings show a significant relationship 
between the two variables. A further investigation also indicates the relationships are significant 
within all group comparisons of shared services relationship and organisation size. H7c is 
supported. 
According to Chang and Taylor (1999), cultural control involves the indoctrination of agents 
into principles’ values and interests. In this process of indoctrination goal congruence between the 
two parties is achieved which also means a reduced need for monitoring outcome and behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As the reduction of agency costs is the underlying goal of all agency 
relationships, it needs to be taken into consideration that this reduction can be achieved by aligning 
the interests of the two parties. Ouchi (1980) affirms that common values and beliefs provide the 
harmony of interests that erase the possibility of opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the more the values 
and beliefs of provider and client are aligned through joint production of service product, the more 
likely the agency problem reduces, thereby making control mechanisms less necessary and business 
value increases. 
Another issue to examine with regard to the need and cost of control mechanisms is trust.  
The use of personal integrating mechanisms, such as joint working, can establish a collaborative 
relationship between provider and client, leading both management to view their relationship as 
effective (Roth & Nigh, 1992). Thereby, the agency costs can be reduced. This finding indicates 
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that the trust and personal relationships between the individuals of the divergent business units and 
shared services unit become increasingly important to deliver the business value of IT (Accenture, 
2007).  
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter evaluated and reported the results of data analysis. After assessing the cross-
tabulations, measurement and structural models, the previously developed hypotheses were tested 
with the data set. The Exact Test technique was used to confirm the relationships between IT 
governance structure and shared services delivery arrangement. The Partial Least Squares technique 
was used to determine direct effects of IT governance gap and monitoring mechanisms on business 
value of IT. Next chapter will discuss the implications and limitations of this research work as well 
as present selected ideas as to the future research work.  
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In the final chapter, the empirical results are presented and discussed in the light of previous 
research. Section 6.1 re-states the motivations, objectives, and research questions. Section 6.2 
summarises the hypotheses together with the key findings of this study. Section 6.3 examines the 
potential limitations of the thesis and the techniques used to mitigate such limitations. Section 6.4 
discusses the implications of the thesis for theory and practice before outlining suggestions for 
further research. Finally, section 6.5 concludes this chapter. 
6.1 Summary of Research Objectives 
While the adoption of IT governance by organisations has been an area of substantive 
research interest, research efforts to date have led to mixed and inconclusive outcomes. Moving to 
IT shared services means a fundamental change to an organisation's service delivery model. Not 
fully recognising the need for IT governance and understanding which type of IT governance 
mechanism is needed might result in the failure of the shared services operation (Janssen & Joha, 
2007a). The diversity of key stakeholders makes IT shared services environment very complex and 
IT governance is still an unexplored domain. This thesis is motivated by the need to develop a 
conceptual framework and guide a comprehensive analysis to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. Given a particular type of IT shared services delivery arrangement, what should be the IT 
governance structure (decision rights) adopted within an organisation? 
2. Are the decision rights and accountability allocated effectively? How does an 
organisation leverage IT governance practices to ensure desired business outcomes in a 
shared services environment? 
By incorporating aspects of the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) and agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the research model examines three components, specifically IT 
governance structure (decision rights), IT governance structural gap, and monitoring mechanisms. 
The model was tested using data collected from an online survey. 
6.2 Summary of Research Findings 
6.2.1 IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
A precise typology of shared services delivery arrangements has been proposed by 
Tomkinson (2007, p.30). This research recognises each shared services delivery arrangement (e.g., 
intra-service, service, corporate, etc.) represents a different sourcing strategy and has a collection of 
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unique resources and capabilities. The IT decision-making structure is devised to accomplish IT 
activities and to support a client organisation’s environmental and strategic imperatives (Maizlish & 
Handler, 2005; Standards Australia, 2005; Weill & Ross, 2004). This study proposed the selection 
of different governance structures for different IT decision domains (i.e., ranging from IT principles 
to IT infrastructure strategy) is dependent on the characteristics of IT resource and knowledge 
locations of participating in the shared services client and provider network (Janssen & Joha, 
2007b). 
A matrix that juxtaposes the five IT decision domains against five IT governance structural 
approaches is presented in Table 5.22. This study’s results suggest that the most common structure 
is ‘business monarchy’ in all decision domains among ‘intra-service’, ‘service’ and ‘iso-corporate’ 
organisations. ‘Corporate’ organisations adopt ‘federal’ approaches in five IT decision areas. 
‘Supra-corporate’ organisations use ‘business monarchy’ for defining business application needs 
and IT infrastructure and ‘federal’ for defining IT principles, IT investment and IT infrastructure. 
Contrary to the expectations, the IT decision framework has a more centralised structure as opposed 
to that discussed in Chapter 3. H1 to H5 are partially supported as shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Summary Research Findings for IT Governance Structure (Decision Rights) 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
1a 
An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a business monarchy governance design. 
Support 
1b 
An ‘intra-service’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt a feudal governance design. 
No Support 
2a 
A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business application 
needs decisions will adopt a business monarchy governance design. 
Support 
2b 
A ‘service’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will adopt 
an IT duopoly governance design. 
No Support 
3a 
A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles and IT investment decisions will adopt a 
business monarchy governance design. 
No Support 
3b 
A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making business application needs decisions will adopt a 
federal governance design. 
Support 
3c 
A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture decisions will adopt an IT duopoly 
governance design. 
No Support 
3d 
A ‘corporate’ arrangement for making IT infrastructure decisions will adopt an IT monarchy 
governance design. 
No Support 
4a 
A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles decisions will adopt a business 
monarchy governance design. 
No Support 
4b 
A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT investment and business application needs 
decisions will adopt a federal monarchy governance design. 
Partially Support 
4c 
A ‘supra-corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure decisions 
will adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
No Support 
5a 
An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT principles, IT investment, and business 
application needs decisions will adopt a federal governance design. 
No Support 
5b 
An ‘iso-corporate’ arrangement for making IT architecture and IT infrastructure decisions will 
adopt an IT monarchy governance design. 
No Support 
 
Extant literature discussed the predominant IT governance structure for shared services as a 
federal model that included shared responsibility and authority between corporate units and 
business/IT units, e.g., Weill & Ross (2004), p.64, figure 3-4. However, a growing collection of 
evidence indicates that IT decisions are made more centrally in the organisation than in the past 
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(Adams et al., 2007). For example, the prevailing thought is that technology and platform decisions 
(i.e., IT infrastructure and IT architecture) could be centralised because each business unit is 
unlikely to demand its own customised approach to hardware. Centralisation is beneficial as it 
creates efficiencies and standardisation in shared services. Meanwhile, with the degree of shared 
services increases, the federal approach still allows business units have their own discretion with 
respect to business requirements and the flexibility they need while providing the cost benefits of 
centralisation, e.g., ‘corporate’ organisations. In addition, there are several possible explanations for 
this result. 
This study started with a set of IT resource classes derived from the knowledge base, e.g., 
Liang et al. (2010). These IT resources are further distinguished into three types to meet Wade and 
Hulland (2004)’s proposal: outside-in, spanning, and inside-out. This research assumes that outside-
in and spanning IT resources will have a stronger impact than inside-out IT resources on 
competitive position. The IT resources were then mapped with the IT decision domains according 
to Weill and Ross (2004). However, a recent study reveals IT technological capabilities have 
significant effect on the competitive advantage. Surprisingly, these capabilities comprise ‘hard’ 
technological skills, which are often understood as a commodity and not as a possible source for 
creating a competitive advantage (Patas et al., 2012). Therefore, the findings may not support how 
different classes of IT resources affect competitive advantages and the associated IT governance 
structure. Thus, the assumption of IT resource characteristics (Appendix A) may not be valid. 
Second, this study predicted when knowledge is valuable in decision-making; there are 
benefits to locate decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. 
However, the evidence does not support IT monarchies in making technical decisions, e.g., with 
regard to IT infrastructure. The possible explanation could be that the agency costs influence the 
allocation of decision rights. This study considers IT governance as an organisational problem of 
efficiently exchanging costly information (knowledge) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Organisational 
structures and processes, such as decision-making and monitoring, may be the mechanisms by 
which knowledge can be transferred between client and provider. Such knowledge transfer or 
exchange needs to be optimal not in the mathematical equilibrium sense but in the sense that excess 
transfer may be costly in terms of both cognitive overload and cost of exchange and result in a net 
negative benefits to the firm. Empirical findings confirm that a greater decentralisation of decision 
rights implies a greater need for monitoring (Brickley et al., 2003). Therefore, shared services 
organisations tend to choose ‘business monarchy’ to reduce the monitoring costs. The findings may 
also indicate the agency relationships have a more business (or principal) ‘control’ focus. For 
example, ‘iso-corporate’ is a separate special purpose vehicle (e.g., joint venture) set up by two or 
more participating organisations and allows external customer access. These organisations are thus 
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a profit-maximising (or cost-minimising) entity with relatively higher agency risk, the key IT 
governance mechanisms and principles point to more centralised approaches. 
Third, new technology is driving a higher demand for standardisation and integration 
(Pankowska, 2008). For example, the internet has profoundly changed the connectedness of the 
world as a whole. The increased capacity to link organisations enables significantly more 
interdependence than previously possible. Business units share information about products, 
customers, and marketing information. Organisations are leveraging cloud computing to provide 
increased standardisation of IT infrastructure (Chandrasekaran & Kapoor, 2011). Meanwhile, new 
regulatory requirements and financial reporting also place demands on the organisation for 
integration. While standardisation may be a necessary condition that facilitates integration. 
Standardisation of technology, applications, data and business processes drives down costs by 
sharing support services, creating leverage over suppliers, and reducing per unit costs through 
economies of scale. Therefore, the IT function may be best suited to support such business units via 
a more centralised IT governance approach to drive integration and standardisation.   
Fundamentally, organisational structure and governance mechanisms are complementary 
means to the same end, i.e., aligning shared services strategy and operations with business needs 
(Accenture, 2007; Grant et al., 2007). The literature shows no unified best practice governance 
model. There is always a trade-off between efficiency and service levels. This study suggests 
organisations should deliberately design the shared services delivery arrangement and IT 
governance structure to complement each other in driving cross-stakeholder communication and 
collaboration. 
6.2.2 IT Governance Structural Gap 
6.2.2.1 Presence of IT Governance Structural Gap 
IT governance structural gap refers to the difference between decision rights and 
accountability. The results validate the significant importance of aligning the decision rights and 
accountability in shared services organisations. The findings demonstrate a small effect size of f² = 
0.03 (path coefficients -0.113, p < 0.001). H6a is confirmed. 
This result is consistent with the importance that any decision-making framework must also 
define accountability for IT decisions. An IT governance structure that creates a balance between 
decision rights and accountability can promote desirable decision-making with respect to IT assets 
(Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991; Weill & Ross, 2004). Hence, this study demonstrates that decision 
rights are only part of the definition of IT governance. Accountability is the second part of the 
definition of IT governance required to ensure that the decision makers deliver the expected 
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business value of IT. For example, when a project sponsor (client) advocates for committing limited 
resources for initiative A over initiative B because it represents a greater value, they should be 
accountable for delivering that value. The challenge of shared IT governance is in the accountability 
systems used to produce the expected returns in the business case.  
According to traditional concepts, an accountability relationship exists when a principal 
delegates authority to an agent to act in their interest. Central to this view is that only those with 
formal authority over an agent – those that have delegated authority to it – have the right to claim 
accountability (De Lombaerde, 2006). Accountability is largely seen as an end stage activity where 
judgement is passed on results and actions already taken. This understanding may be too narrow. 
This study reveals that decision-right-accountability needs to be more encompassing if it is to 
ensure IT shared services truly generates the expected business value.  
6.2.2.2 Assessment of IT Governance Structural Gap 
The assessment of IT governance structural gap includes mapping the current governance 
structure onto the governance structure, auditing IT governance metrics and accountabilities, and 
evaluating IT governance awareness and engagement on a regular basis. The empirical results do 
not exhibit a positive business value impact of IT governance assessment in shared services 
organisations. The main model yielded effect size f² = 0.00 (path coefficient -0.012, p > 0.05). 
Hypothesis H6b is not supported. 
The results suggest that formal assessment of IT governance structure is not associated with 
any direct performance effect. Organisations apparently do not seek to invest into a cyclic, 
comprehensive, systematic, and regular review of IT governance activities. Recent literature reveals 
many organisations delay assessing their IT governance because there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach. The scale of an enterprise assessment of IT governance can be taxing for an internal audit 
team (Haseley & Brucker, 2012). Additionally, many corporate boards do not explicitly practice a 
formalised style of IT governance (Jewer & McKay, 2012). Therefore, formal assessment of IT 
governance may face significant challenges to be included in the corporate governance audit 
program. Another possible reason for the lack of statistically significant results could be agency 
relationships do not always characterise IT governance. For example, role conflict, ambiguity and 
lack of empowering structures might make agency relationships difficult to maintain. Organisations 
may be institutionalising a variety of mechanisms to increase their accountability and assess their IT 
governance effectiveness, such as stewardship relationships.  
This study alerts organisations to the importance of establishing a decision rights-
accountability framework for shared IT services. However, developing effective strategies for IT 
governance assessment is still a challenging task for business leaders to ensure the expected 
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business outcomes generated from IT. Table 6.2 summarises the findings for IT governance 
structural gap. 
Table 6.2: Summary Research Findings for IT Governance Structural Gap 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
6a 
Lower levels of IT governance structural gap between decision rights and accountability are 
associated with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
6b 
More formal and regular assessment to minimise IT governance structural gap are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
No Support 
6.2.3 Monitoring Mechanisms 
This study proposes that monitoring mechanisms have a positive effect on business value 
generated from IT. The monitoring mechanisms for IT shared services are influenced by the fears of 
opportunism (e.g., difficult and expensive to measure performance, different attitudes toward risk, 
conflicting goals and priorities) through the lens of client-provider agency relationships. To address 
the agency challenges, this study considers the professional and customer levels of monitoring 
mechanisms, i.e., independent review, profession-wide oversight and joint working. 
6.2.3.1 Independent Review 
Independent review refers to the involvement of shared services client to influence IT service 
performance. The application of independent review control has a positive impact on the business 
value of IT and has a moderate overall effect size of f² = 0.02 (path coefficient strength of 0.129, p 
< 0.05). Hypothesis 7a is confirmed. 
In addition to the IT governance structure within shared services organisations, the relative 
knowledge attributes of the client also influences the provider’s performance. One way in which 
principals can avert problems from knowledge asymmetry is by utilising a dedicated officer to 
monitor compliance of shared services agreement, a formal working group to review service 
products, and a business client to oversee operating policy. Although the professionals who serve in 
these oversight roles have no hierarchical authority, they are subject to pressures for business 
performance and qualified to issue directives governing the shared IT work. They also serve to 
restrain the opportunistic inclinations of an unscrupulous provider. Hence, the client can ensure the 
organisation’s goals are aligned and resources are assigned in an optimal way, so that the business 
value of IT increases. 
This study suggests connecting with shared services client continues to be essential after the 
implementation of shared services delivery arrangement, when the focus shifts from gaining initial 
acceptance to managing ongoing performance. For example, reaching agreement on key 
performance indicators (KPIs) for both service cost and service quality can set the stage for 
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productive future conversations with client and help gain client’s confidence. Support from client 
leader can be a key factor in encouraging appropriate behaviour among shared services users. 
6.2.3.2 Profession-wide Oversight 
Profession-wide oversight refers to adoption of well-defined standards of work, such as 
benchmarking and best practice frameworks. The results demonstrate the significant importance of 
professional oversight for shared services organisations and shows a moderate effect size of f² = 
0.14 (path coefficients 0.466, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 7b is confirmed. 
In the absence of any asymmetry of knowledge, profession-wide oversight of agents is 
accomplished by such means as implementation of IT governance frameworks (e.g., COBIT) and 
determination of benchmarking. The positive performance effect is in line with other findings that 
suggest that IT governance adoption improved organisational performance. The effect is more 
significant one year after the adoption of the framework, and as long as the control mechanisms get 
more mature, more expressive are their benefits (Lunardi et al., 2014). Organisations make use of 
formal models more effectively to hold both business and IT accountable for IT decisions and 
business outcomes. IT benchmarking is utilised to identify optimisation potentials and extrapolate 
recommendations how shared IT performance could be improved. This study provides strong 
indication for the effectiveness of profession-wide oversight that influences the business value 
generated from sharing IT services. 
6.2.3.3 Joint Working 
Joint working refers to when the client is engaged actively in the joint creation or 
coproduction of the IT service products. The empirical results show the significant importance of 
joint working for shared services organisation and shows a moderate effect size of f² = 0.08 (path 
coefficients 0.263, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 7c is confirmed. 
The agency perspective assumes there is a need for a guarantee against ‘the intrusion of 
unscreened and unpenalized opportunists’ (Williamson, 1985). However, this study demonstrates 
the significant importance of joint working on business value of IT. The interaction and routine 
consultation between client and provider serve to share information, exercise social influences and 
reduce misunderstandings. Interaction between principals and agents increases trust and generates 
the expectation that one will not undermine the other’s interest even in the face of countervailing 
short-term opportunities. In agency exchanges involving professions, a high degree of trust is likely 
to strengthen the presumed altruistic orientation of professionals and further constrain their 
opportunistic inclinations (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).  
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This study demonstrates joint working carries an influencing function of control to achieve 
desired outcomes from IT shared services. Shared services can affect people outside the functions 
being moved to shared services as well as those within it. Proactive reaching out to client can give 
stakeholders a sense of ownership in shared services; equally important, it can allow the provider to 
consider customer input when developing shared services policies and processes. Table 6.3 
summarises the findings for monitoring mechanism. 
 Table 6.3: Summary Research Findings for Monitoring Mechanism 
Hypothesis Description 
All Sample 
n = 205 
7a Higher levels of monitoring roles being played by independent professionals are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
7b Higher levels of adoption of profession-wide well-defined standards of work are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
7c Higher levels of client involvement in the joint production of service product are associated 
with higher levels of IT-business value 
Support 
6.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations to take into account when assessing the overall contribution of 
this study. Cook and Campbell (1979) identify four potential threats to validity: threats to internal 
validity, threats to external validity, threats to construct validity, and threats to statistical conclusion 
validity. The potential threats to validity and preventive actions throughout this survey research 
design are discussed as follows:  
6.3.1 Threats to Internal Validity 
Internal validity refers to the validity with which statements can be made about whether there 
is a casual relationship from one variable to another in the form in which the variables are 
manipulated or measured (Cook & Campbell, 1979). The following table outlines the actions taken 
to minimise threats to internal validity.  
Table 6.4: Threats to Internal Validity 
Threats to Internal 
Validity 
Explanation Action Taken 
History The participating organisations might face a 
series of extraordinary events during the 
implementation of IT sourcing strategies, e.g., 
operation restructure. Depending on the nature 
of the reorganisation and organisational 
constraints, not all of the proposed dependent 
variables could be measured and tested in time, 
e.g., form of shared services. In addition, the 
restructure experience might have some 
influence on the ways the participants would 
respond to some of the questionnaires, e.g., 
roles and responsibilities changes.  
A survey company was utilised to recruit 
participants. The survey company maintained 
database of significant amount of research 
volunteers. Hence, it was more likely to have a 
sample including the five shared services 
delivery forms and representatives from both 
shared services client and provider. 
 
Selection of Subjects 
 
Biases might result in the selection of 
comparison organisations or participants.  
This research specified the sampling selection 
criteria (i.e., executive management, middle 
management, and IT management) and 
obtained a written agreement from the survey 
company to assure the representativeness of the 
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Threats to Internal 
Validity 
Explanation Action Taken 
survey sample. 
Testing, statistical 
regression and 
instrumentation 
Effects of pre-tests and pilot tests might alter 
responses on post-tests.  
 
All respondents for the main survey were 
selected via the survey company. All 
respondents from the pre-test and pilot-test 
were excluded from the main survey. 
Common method bias The measurement method might cause 
systematic measurement error and further bias 
the estimates of the true relationship among 
theoretical constructs. 
Procedural remedies were taken: ensuring 
respondents answered anonymously, using 
concise and simple terms in questionnaire, and 
measuring an item with mixed-scale of Likert 
and semantic differential. 
6.3.2 Threats to External Validity 
External validity refers to the generalizability of the findings beyond those who participated in 
the research project. It is a particularly important goal of survey research. The ability to query a 
certain proportion of the population and make generalizations to the whole of a particular 
population is an attractive feature of survey research (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Table 6.5 presents 
the major threats to external validity. 
Table 6.5: Threats to External Validity 
Threats to External 
Validity 
Explanation Action Taken 
Non-representative 
Sample 
The selection procedure might not provide rules 
or methods for inferring sample results to the 
population.  
 
This study might represent only a few forms of 
IT governance or shared services delivery 
arrangements. Thus, these findings might only 
be generalizable to organisations undergoing 
similar transitions. In a similar vein, employees 
from the client organisations might have unique 
perspectives on and attitudes toward shared 
services environment, which can further restrict 
the external validity. 
Selection rules and procedures were carefully 
designed as shown in Chapter 4. For example, 
‘screening’ questions were included to make 
sure that only those people who used or 
provided IT shared services would participate 
in the survey. 
 
This study ensured as much as possible that it is 
representative of the population through 
random sampling technique selected from the 
sampling frame. 
6.3.3 Threats to Construct Validity 
Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the 
operationalisations in the study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalisations were 
based (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Like external validity, construct validity is related to 
generalizability. External validity involves generalizing from the study context to other people, 
places, or times. Construct validity concerns the logical confidence one can have in whether the 
variables in a study are valid measures of the corresponding constructs in the theory being tested. 
Table 6.6 shows the major threats to construct validity. 
Table 6.6: Threats to Construct Validity 
Threats to 
Construct Validity 
Explanation  Action Taken 
Inadequate 
Preoperational 
Explication of 
Introduction of bias due to lack of standardised 
measures. 
Where possible, existing instruments were 
adapted. The survey instrument was also 
carefully designed and reviewed by the 
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Threats to 
Construct Validity 
Explanation  Action Taken 
Constructs researcher’s supervisors and the IT professions. 
Mono-Method Bias The mono-method bias limitation arises when 
one data collection method is used for 
measuring a complex construct.  
The threat was minimised by carefully 
constructed all survey items, and used 
preliminary review and pilot study to eliminate 
item ambiguity (e.g., avoid double-barrelled 
questions, avoid complicated syntax, keep 
questions simple, specific, and concise).  
Non-response bias Failed responses could affect the statistical 
results using surveys as a method of data 
collection.  
The completion rate was maximized by 
utilising a professional survey broker and 
paying special attention to questionnaire design 
(e.g., simple survey formats, length of 
questionnaire). 
Evaluation 
apprehension 
In questionnaires, respondents often answer 
according to what they would like to do, or 
what they think the researcher would like to 
hear from them, rather than what they in fact 
do. 
To alleviate this problem, non-threatening 
questions designed to elicit facts were used in 
the construction of the instruments. 
Interaction of testing 
and 
treatment 
The observed effects might be due to the 
sensitisation effects of the pretesting. 
This threat was addressed by using different 
people for pre-testing and pilot testing the 
instruments from those who participated in the 
actual study. 
6.3.4 Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Data obtained through survey and case research methods are subject to measurement and 
other errors that cannot be controlled (Galliers, 1994). If the errors are random, their presence will 
not threaten statistical conclusions. The presence of unknown, systematic errors within data 
obtained by field-research methods, however, cannot be fully discounted. Table 6.7 discusses the 
major threats to statistical conclusion validity. 
Table 6.7: Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Threats to 
Statistical 
Conclusion Validity 
Explanation  Action Taken 
Low statistical power The likelihood of making a Type-II error (fail 
to reject the null hypothesis when the 
alternative hypothesis is true) increases when 
sample sizes are small and alpha is set low. 
 
The sample size in the study is 205 participants  
The threshold for statistical significance was 
raised to 0.05. 
 
The Exact Test technique and Partial Least 
Squares (PLS) technique are robust in terms of 
small sample size. It is unlikely that the major 
conclusions are threatened by low statistical 
power. 
Violated assumptions of 
statistical tests 
Violations of assumptions underlying statistical 
tests such as normality and homogeneity of 
variance. 
The Exact and Monte Carlo methods, provide a 
powerful means for obtaining accurate results 
when the data set is small, the tables are sparse 
or unbalanced, the data are not normally 
distributed, or the data fail to meet any of the 
underlying assumptions necessary for reliable 
results using the standard asymptotic method. 
 
Some data may not be normally distributed. 
The bootstrap technique used to test the 
statistical significance of the coefficients 
derived for the research model and examine the 
stability of estimates does not require the data 
to be normally distributed. Additionally, PLS 
makes no distributional assumption other than 
predictive specification in its procedure for 
estimating parameters. 
Fishing and the error- The probability of making a Type-I error on a Given the number of individual test planned, 
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Threats to 
Statistical 
Conclusion Validity 
Explanation  Action Taken 
rate problem particular comparison in a given experiment 
increases with the number of comparisons to be 
made. 
concerns about inflated Type-I error (rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is true) had to be 
addressed. Each step of the PLS minimises a 
residual variance with respect to subset of the 
parameters being estimated by given proxies or 
fixed estimates for the other parameters. The 
probability of erroneous conclusion drawn from 
the findings is minimal. 
The reliability of the 
implementation of the 
treatment 
When treatments are not administered in a 
standard fashion (e.g., different administrators 
and/or the same administrator behaving 
differently on different occasions), error 
variance will increase, and the chance of 
obtaining true differences will decrease. 
Care was taken to ensure that the procedures for 
the timing, distribution, and collection of both 
the research questionnaire were standardised. 
The same survey broker distributed, collated, 
and administered the data. Accordingly, any 
threat to reliability of treatment implementation 
is minimal. 
Random irrelevancies in 
the setting 
The inflation of error variance due to 
irrelevancies other than the treatment that 
affects the dependent variable. 
In such diversified environments, there may 
well have been a number of irrelevancies that 
affect the scores of the variables. This thesis 
attempted to control for this problem by 
allowing participants to complete and return the 
questionnaire as quickly as possible. Feedback 
from the panel of practitioners and participants 
in the pre-test and pilot test suggested that the 
questionnaire was simple and able to be 
completed within the appropriate time limit (20 
minutes). Hence, erroneous sources of 
variations should be minimised.  
Random heterogeneity 
of respondents 
The respondents in any of the treatment groups 
can differ on factors that are correlated with the 
major dependent variables. 
Occasionally, certain kinds of respondents will 
be more affected by a treatment than others. At 
other times, respondents do not focus on the 
treatments but on the outcomes. When this 
happens, the error variance will be inflated. 
This threat was reduced by randomly selecting 
the participants from the sampling frame. 
 
The reliability of 
measures 
Increased error from irrelevant, unreliable, or 
invalid measures. 
 
 
Although measurement error is almost 
inevitable, the likelihood of this error was 
reduced by careful adherence to the validation 
techniques available. Multi-items measures 
were generated from existing literature. The 
measures were pre-tested and pilot tested. The 
results of reliability test indicate the scales were 
reliable.  
 
Despite the outlined limitations, this survey format provided the researcher with a number of 
significant advantages such as low cost, possibility to monitor the data quality throughout the 
survey process, and obtaining electronic data directly usable in the SPSS and SmartPLS 
applications. 
6.4 Implications 
This research will enrich and expand the conceptualization of IT governance by identifying 
the complexity of IT governance arrangements and examining the impacts on business value of IT 
in the shared services environment.  
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6.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
IT governance is experiencing yet another transformation, and persists as a complex and 
evolving phenomenon (Van Grembergen et al., 2004). This study offers several scholarly 
contributions extending the research done by other researchers as well as introducing some unique 
aspects in this domain. While there have been very limited studies to analyse IT governance in IT 
shared services environment, this study explored and explained the issues involved when migrating 
to different shared services delivery arrangements. This research takes a more integrated approach 
to shared IT governance issues and develops an inter-disciplinary perspective by building on agency 
theory while considering the rich new insights offered by complementary theories, such as the 
resource-based view.  
First, this study investigates how the resource-based view would utilise IT resources and their 
integration with the concept of organisational capabilities (e.g., business knowledge) to enable IT 
governance capability for the organisation, and then the impact on IT governance structure. 
Although the empirical evidence does not fully support the proposed decision rights matrix, it has to 
be questioned whether or not some IT resources, such as IT infrastructure, have the potential to 
deliver significant competitive advantages. Moreover, research into the role of IT resources as 
knowledge assets, business assets, or shared assets seems to be ignored up to now. In particular, this 
study provides several starting points for further research in the field of inter-organisational IT 
governance by designing and implementing mechanisms for their IT shared services. 
Second, the study views IT governance as a capability that, if ineffectively developed and 
implemented, may affect the business value generated from the shared IT sourcing. Given that the 
impacts of an organisation’s actions are often diffuse, accountability should be so too. However, 
accountability is especially confused in IT shared services and has been little explored. 
Accountability should not be determined by delegation of authority alone. Although an individual 
may not have delegated authority to an organisation to act in their interest, the activities of the latter 
may substantially affect them enough to warrant the establishment of an accountability relationship. 
For example, the business unit executive (client) would be responsible for developing technology-
enabled new business model/capability ideas and formulating business/IT strategies around them, 
then making decisions and realizing those ideas with assistance from IT (provider). This view of 
accountability emphasises that organisations have to respond to the needs of many stakeholders. 
This view also emphasises under outcome accountability, the results of individuals’ decisions are 
the criteria by which decisions are assessed. This study contributes to further research by 
challenging the appropriateness of outcome accountability as the dominant form of accountability 
for IT governance. 
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The third and perhaps most significant contribution comes from the critical examination of the 
key assumptions of agency theory. This study takes issue with the sole reliance of the theory on 
self-interest, for instance, and it suggests that agent disposition toward doing good (altruism) should 
be given greater attention in the specific framework addressing IT shared services (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1999). Furthermore, given the collaborative 
nature of IT shared services and power asymmetry favouring agents because of their expert 
knowledge, this study suggests restraints on opportunism come not only from bureaucratic control 
(e.g., independent review) but also client control (e.g., joint working). Given the special attributes 
of client-provider exchange, this study validated the significant importance of profession-wide 
oversight that reduces knowledge asymmetry. This research, therefore, complements existing 
research.  
This study contributes to the body of empirical research on developing a holistic guideline of 
IT governance. The findings validated the assertions that IT governance is not solely concerned 
with the formal allocation of IT decision-making authority. Irrespective of the locus of control, 
developing collaborative management styles and professional best practice competencies should be 
included for the governance of IT (Peterson et al., 2000; Weill & Ross, 2004). 
6.4.2 Practical Implications 
The research model will benefit organisations in several ways. First, managers today need to 
be aware of the varieties of shared services delivery arrangements, how they differ from each other 
in terms of strategic consequences, risks such as technology leakage and other opportunism, and 
breadth and intensity of intra or inter-organisation interactions. This study suggests various IT 
governance structures for different shared services delivery arrangements to manage IT resources. 
This study alerts organisations to the importance of establishing a decision rights-
accountability framework for shared services. This study indicates that shared services 
organisations perceive a gap between their decision rights and accountability for major IT decisions. 
These IT governance structural gaps will directly affect the organisational outcomes. There are a 
number of solutions to bridge the business gap, but a precursor is to recognise that gaps exist. After 
that there are structural, process, and relationship capabilities that can be implemented (Peterson, 
2004). A shared services organisation that is accountable to multiple stakeholders not only ensures 
that decisions are effective in meeting the needs of those it affects, but also that decision-making 
processes are more equitable. As shown in the research model (figure 2.1), accountability that is 
pursued on an ongoing basis opens up space for those affected by an organisation’s policies to input 
into the decision-making process. This link in turn creates feedback loops that enable organisations 
to learn from what is effective and what is not. Accountability is no longer simply a mechanism for 
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disciplining power, but also a force for organisational change and for strengthening organisational 
performance. Clearly, accountability’s effects are not only beneficial to stakeholders, but also to 
organisations themselves. 
As mentioned above, shared services may be accompanied by agency problems and 
potentially bears the risk of knowledge leaking. This risk is increased if the measurability of the 
service output is limited (Jensen & Meckling, 1999). This study has identified three mechanisms to 
align interests between shared services clients and providers: independent review, professional-wide 
oversight, and joint working. Control is among the most frequently used methods to reduce agency 
costs (Eisenhardt, 1989), however, it normally involves substantial costs. Furthermore, it may have 
negative effects on the motivation of employees. Control can take the form of direct supervision of 
the shared services provider, formal reporting on achieved service-level agreements and key 
performance indicators. For client-provider relationships, the possibilities for direct control are 
limited. However, the findings show that the involvement of the client in operational matters 
increases the business value of IT. Further, the effective collaboration of client-provider teams and 
the sharing of information lie at the heart of a successful shared services strategy. 
To provide effective oversight that will help keep shared services organisations on track with 
their business strategy, the findings highlight a strong need for IT benchmarking and governance 
frameworks. International IT governance control frameworks, such as COBIT, help enterprises take 
full advantage of their information, thereby maximizing benefits, mitigating risks and capitalizing 
on business IT-related opportunities. Shared services organisations can look at effective governance 
and control over IT as a way to achieve the basic principles of IT value – on-time and within budget 
delivery of quality IT that achieves its promised benefits. Management can then use COBIT to 
translate this into increased competitive advantage, customer satisfaction, employee productivity 
and profitability, and reduced time for order/service fulfilment and customer wait time (Hardy, 
2006; Ridley et al., 2008). 
6.4.3 Avenues for Future Research 
The results of this study suggest several areas for future research. They include replications of 
the current study and refinements of measurement scales. This thesis argues that integrating 
strategic perspectives on sustained competitive advantage with literature on business models allows 
for an evaluation of IT governance structure, which is inclusive of important elements from 
otherwise differing approaches to the subject. Furthermore, the analysis allows us to reveal a greater 
complexity than when applying insights that look solely at e.g., agency factors or firm specific 
attributes (RBV). At the same time, however, this ‘greater complexity’ can also be a source of 
increased confusion as to whether it is possible to state a generalization of what leads to the design 
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of IT governance structure. When so many different factors are taken into account, it can be 
difficult to pinpoint which of these are the actual determining causes. Furthermore, shared services 
is highly dynamic and IT sourcing strategies may change when regulation is altered or when new 
technology are introduced. Further research could support that assumption but should also address 
the impact of specific contingencies such as industry, size of the organisation, business strategy, etc. 
Hence, one possible extension is to replicate the current study with organisations that face different 
levels of competitiveness and business environments so as to further develop the framework.  
The research findings demonstrate that there are various delivery models possible for shared 
services. The investigation of various types of shared services delivery arrangements and the factors 
determining the type and performance of these business models is an interesting area for future 
research. In addition, this research is based on a ‘snapshot in time’, and future research could be 
dedicated to verify how IT governance implementations evolve over time in different stages of 
maturity. Some results of the study were unexpected. For example, the non-significance of the IT 
governance assessment construct is certainly a finding that needs further investigation in future 
research. 
This study reveals the IT governance structural gap between decision rights and 
accountability is a concern of IT governance. Future research is needed to better conceptualise how 
accountability, along with decision rights, figures within IT governance structures. In shared IT 
environment, a trilateral relation is created between executive boards, business unit managers and 
shared services managers. It may not only be that the business unit managers are accountable to the 
executive board for performance, but the executive board also has a responsibility towards business 
unit managers to perform agreed services. The utilisation various board-level IT governance 
frameworks seems particularly fruitful for future research.  
From this thesis, profession-wide oversight is an important monitoring mechanism in 
generating business value. It might be useful to carry out further research to identify the direct and 
indirect benefits provided by the IT governance frameworks (e.g., COBIT, ITIL) most commonly 
adopted by shared services organisations. Hence, future research should analyse the impact of 
adopting IT governance mechanisms over time (including more than one-year post-adoption data). 
The findings of this thesis provide preliminary evidence that informal monitoring mechanisms 
are important to influence business value of IT. Future research should investigate the usefulness of 
other theoretical lenses, such as stewardship. Finally, another possible extended study is to examine 
if there would be a mixture of agency and stewardship relationship characterising IT governance in 
shared services. 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It summarises the findings of the research and identifies its 
limitations. The chapter outlined the contributions of this research to theory and identified practical 
implications for organisations that want to apply IT governance strategy. It also offered some 
suggestions for future research. 
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APPENDIX A: IT RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Adapted from Wade and Hulland (2004), the relationships between IT resources (categorised 
by IT decision domain) and their attributes are identified in Table A.1 below and they are briefly 
discussed in the following paragraphs. As Wade and Hulland emphasise, the table is based on 
limited empirical evidence and it describes hypothesised rather than proved relationships. The 
entries in this table should be interpreted in relative (i.e., versus other entries in the same table) 
rather than absolute terms. 
Table A.1: Resource Attribute and IT Decision Domain14 
IT Resource 
Characteristic (IT 
Decision Domain) 
Advantage Creation Advantage Sustainability 
Value Rarity Appropriability Inimitability 
Non-
substitutability 
Immobility 
Outside-In:       
IT principles  H H – M M – L H H – M H 
IT investment H H – M M – L H H – M H 
Spanning:       
Business application 
needs 
H H – M M – L M – L M – L M 
Inside-Out:       
IT architecture H – M M – L M M M – L M 
IT infrastructure H – M M – L H L H – M L 
Note: L = low; M = moderate; H = high 
 
Outside-In: IT principles and IT Investment 
IT principles resources are responsible for the formulation of high level statements about how 
IT will be used to create business value. IT principles should be informed by the enterprise business 
principles. For example, a business principle of ‘Develop partnerships with national electricity 
distributors on a shared services basis’ leads to several IT principles, including ‘Data must be 
accessible through common systems to facilitate aggregation’. IT investment focuses on the how 
much and where to invest in IT, including the procedures for progressing initiatives, their 
justification, approval and accountability.  
In general terms, all IT resources are valuable (Bharadwaj, 2000; Mata et al., 1995; Ross et 
al., 1996). Outside-in resources seem to have potentially higher value than inside-out resources to 
firms. For example, IT principles and IT investment skills include management’s ability to collect 
information from sources internal and external to the firm, as well as the dissemination of a firm’s 
                                                 
14 The table shows how five key IT decision domains can be organised to facilitate the effective and efficient management of 
IT resources. While a variety of different terms for IT resources have been used in past research, these five IT resources (decision 
domains) can be mapped directly onto Wade and Hulland’s framework (originated from Day, G. S. 1994. The Capabilities of 
Market-driven Organizations. Journal of Marketing, 58(4): 37-52.) to identify their relative contributions to competitive advantage. 
High, medium, low ratings for individual resource attribute represent the relative ‘degree of strength’ to advantage creation or 
sustainability. The IT resources were ranked by the researcher according to the conceptual sources in the theoretical development 
research of Wade and Hulland (2004). For example, IT infrastructure is ranked as ‘high’ in ‘appropriability’, a rent-generating 
resource in the short term, particularly when the firm possessing the IT resource has a first-mover advantage in its use, and 
competitors find such uses difficult to wrest away from the advantaged firm. Firms that are first to possess next-generation hardware 
and software are typically able to use this new infrastructure to improve firm efficiency and/or effectiveness, thereby enhancing 
short-term competitive advantage and rent-earning potential. However, IT infrastructure has the least overall potential contribution. 
Many components of the IT infrastructure (such as off-the-shelf computer hardware and software) convey no particular strategic 
benefit due to lack of rarity, ease of imitation, and ready mobility. Thus, the IT infrastructure resource has generally not been found 
to be a source of sustained competitive advantage for firms. 
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market intelligence across departments and the organisation’s response to that learning. They 
include the abilities to invest in the ‘right’ projects and to react quickly to changes in market 
conditions. Therefore, these managerial decision-making capabilities, if valuable, must be based on 
a continued understanding of the changing business environment. Without them, the full potential 
of IT for a firm will almost certainly not be realised. Moreover, these resources are likely to be 
socially complex and have a higher degree of rarity. The appropriability of the outside-in resources 
tends to be lower than that of the inside-out resources. This stems from the fact that they tend to be 
organisationally complex, and thereby more difficult to deploy successfully (Wade & Hulland, 
2004). 
Over time, some IT resources become easier to imitate than others. The outside-in resources 
are likely to be more difficult to imitate because these resources will develop and evolve uniquely 
for each firm. For example, making sound IT-business investment decisions require significant 
knowledge in the market trend, the financial direction of the organisation, and historical data 
pertaining to the relationship between IT spending and revenue generation. Strategic substitutes for 
the outside-in resources are also likely to be rare, although it may be possible for firms with a subset 
of these capabilities to compete on an equal basis with firms possessing a different subset. A 
resource is mobile if firms without a resource (or capability) face no cost disadvantage in 
developing, acquiring, and using that resource compared to firms that already possess and use it. In 
this case, that resource (i.e., mobile resource) can only be a source of temporary competitive 
advantage at best. On the other hand, if a firm without a resource or capability does face a cost 
disadvantage in obtaining, developing, and using it compared to a firm that already possesses that 
resource (i.e., resource immobility), then the firm that already possesses that resource can have a 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). The IT principles and IT investment capabilities 
are generally not readily available in factor markets. Therefore, the mobility of these resources is 
expected to be low. 
Spanning: Business Application Needs 
Spanning resources include management's ability to conceive of, develop, and exploit 
business applications to support and enhance other business functions. These skills seem to have 
potentially higher value than inside-out resources to firms and can enable firms to manage the 
market risks associated with investing in IT. Thus, the development of spanning skills is often a 
socially complex process, and one not subject to low cost imitation compared with inside-out 
resources. Similar to the outside-in resources, the spanning resources are likely to be associated 
with a higher degree of rarity and lower appropriability. The spanning resources cannot be easily 
acquired in factor markets, and they must instead be developed through on-going, firm-specific 
investments, or through mergers and/or acquisitions of other companies. For example, these 
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capabilities represent the processes of integration and alignment between the IT function and other 
functional areas or departments of the firm. This resource has also been referred to as IT and 
business synergy, assimilation, and partnerships. The importance of building relationships internally 
within the firm among the IT function and other areas or departments has been recognised and well 
documented (Gottschalk, 2006). An element of this resource is the support for collaboration within 
the firm, resulting in superior competitive position and firm performance. Strategic substitutes for 
the spanning resources are also likely to be rare. Therefore, the mobility of these resources is also 
expected to be low.  
Inside-Out: IT Architecture and IT Infrastructure 
IT architecture is about the set of technical choices that guide the enterprise in satisfying 
business needs. For example, the development of some agreed components of data architecture so 
that customer information can be meaningfully shared, together with selected standards to support 
the agreed architectural approach. IT infrastructure strategy describes the approach to building 
shared and standard IT services across the enterprise. For example, implementing the customer 
profiling approach requires the development and management of some shared and standard 
applications across the enterprise.  
While inside-out resources can lead to greater efficiency and/or effectiveness at any particular 
point in time, it is essential for the firm to track and respond to the changing business environment 
over time if it is to attain a sustainable competitive advantage. Therefore, these resources have 
relatively lower value than outside-in and spanning resources. 
The inside-out resources, as opposed to outside-in and spanning resources, are likely to be 
associated with a lower degree of rarity. The underlying reason for this claim is that available 
labour markets allow firms lacking key IT architecture and IT infrastructure resources to acquire 
them by offering superior wages or through business arrangements with external consultants.  
IT architecture and IT infrastructure may be appropriable, rent-generating resources in the 
short term, particularly when the firm possessing the IT resource has a first-mover advantage in its 
use, and competitors find such uses difficult to wrest away from the advantaged firm. For example, 
firms that are first to possess next-generation hardware and software are typically able to use this 
new infrastructure to improve firm efficiency and/or effectiveness, thereby enhancing short-term 
competitive advantage and rent-earning potential. 
In contrast, firms are likely to be able to develop IT architecture capability through the hiring 
of relevant expertise via existing labour markets or by interacting with external consulting firms. 
Thus, the resources will be more imitable than the outside-in and spanning resources, but less 
imitable than the IT infrastructure capability. Existing empirical evidence suggests that IT 
infrastructure is particularly easy to imitate over moderate to longer time periods. For example, 
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many components of the IT infrastructure (such as off-the-shelf computer hardware and software) 
convey no particular strategic benefit due to lack of rarity, ease of imitation, and ready mobility. 
Despite research attempts to focus on the inimitable aspects of IT infrastructure, the IT 
infrastructure resource has generally not been found to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage for firms (Wade & Hulland, 2004). 
The key question that one needs to answer in considering substitutability is whether or not a 
strategically equivalent resource exists and is potentially available to the firm while leading to the 
same outcome. This situation may involve the use of very different resource sets, but it could also 
reflect a decision to acquire and deploy resources in-house versus obtaining them from third parties. 
In the case of IT infrastructure, it seems unlikely that strategic alternatives exist that lead to the 
same ultimate competitive position. Thus, the substitutability of this resource will be relatively low. 
At the other extreme, firms may be able to outsource their business application development (e.g., 
part of the IT architecture resource) to third parties, and thereby compete effectively. For instance, 
firms without the required analysis, design, and programming skills required to make an IT 
investment can hire technical consultants and contractors. 
Immobility captures the extent to which the underlying resource can be acquired through 
factor markets. IT infrastructure, once established, is easily disseminated to other firms, and is thus 
highly mobile. IT architecture can be acquired via the marketplace; thus, they are also relatively 
mobile.  
Overall Advantage Creation & Advantage Sustainability 
The resource-based view argues that firms possess resources, a subset of which enables them 
to achieve competitive advantage, and a subset of those that lead to superior long-term performance. 
Resources that are valuable and rare can lead to the creation of competitive advantage (i.e., ‘high’ in 
Overall Advantage Creation). That advantage can be sustained over longer time periods to the 
extent that the firm is able to protect against resource imitation, transfer, or substitution (i.e., ‘high’ 
in Overall Advantage Sustainability) (Willcocks et al., 1997).  
In general, when compared to inside-out resources, outside-in and spanning resources tend to 
have somewhat greater value, be rarer (but less appropriable), be more difficult to imitate or acquire 
through trade, and have fewer strategic substitutes. Focusing on the first two of these attributes 
suggests that these resources will have a stronger impact than inside-out IT resources on initial 
competitive position. Furthermore, because it is harder to imitate, acquire, or find strategic 
substitutes for the former set of resources than for the latter, outside-in and spanning resources are 
more likely to maintain their rarity, and thus support a sustainable competitive position for a longer 
period of time. 
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APPENDIX B: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
Shared Services 
Delivery 
Arrangement 
Intra-service 
 
Collaboration on specific and/or specialist services. This limited shared 
services option could, at its most basic level, provide for services to gain 
goods and services centrally from a business unit, e.g., purchasing IT 
equipment; partnership for delivery a project; or sharing an integrated 
software package. 
(Tomkinson, 2007) 
  
Service 
 
A degree of formality of sharing a complete service but the organisation 
is not changed to meet the challenge of the sharing. Generally, one 
business unit allows another to provide the service with a transfer of 
control and responsibility, e.g., all the budget belongs to the ‘shared’ 
service business unit. 
Corporate 
 
Two or more business units or organisations form a joint arrangement to 
‘share’ a specific service or services at a mutually agreed standard in 
which both the costs and benefits are borne by all participating 
organisations on a negotiated basis, e.g., IT infrastructure services 
partnership. 
Supra-corporate 
 
Two or more participating organisations set up a separate special purpose 
vehicle to deliver a specified service or services on behalf of participating 
organisations. 
Iso-corporate An extension of the Supra-corporate model. The delivery organisation is 
allowed to provide services to external customers. 
Characteristic Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
Organisation 
(Newman, 2007) 
Customer-led; 
supplier provides 
support services 
 
Customer-led; 
supplier provides 
support services 
 
Customer-led; 
supplier provides 
support services 
 
Joint and team 
working; supplier 
leads management 
and has to 
comply with their 
own corporate 
governance rules 
Joint and team 
governance structure; 
supplier leads 
the management team 
Staff 
(Newman, 2007) 
Staff reside in 
current organisation 
Staff reside in 
current organisation 
Staff reside in 
current organisation 
Staff typically 
seconded or transfer 
to service provider 
organisation 
Staff transferred 
and/or seconded, 
plus directly recruited 
by service provider 
organisation 
Risk transference 
(Tomkinson, 2007) 
None 
 
None/Limited 
e.g., potential loss of 
autonomy for 
business units within 
organisation. 
Central shared 
services unit may be 
less responsive to 
needs of business 
units. 
Limited/Moderate 
e.g., cultural change 
towards cooperation 
and collaboration is 
often not an easy 
process. 
Cultural seepage – 
values of larger 
organisation may 
dominate. 
Competition for 
funding could affect 
viability of small 
business units. 
Substantial 
e.g., additional time 
and cost spent on new 
organisation may 
diminish benefits. 
Privacy, control, 
confidentiality may 
be harder to maintain. 
Substantial 
e.g., significant time, 
costs involved in 
planning and 
establishment of 
provider organisation. 
Company vulnerable 
if one service loses 
funding. 
Organisational values 
and culture clashes 
Service may be less 
responsive and 
accessible for clients. 
Performance risk 
(Newman, 2007) 
Performance risk rests 
with the customer 
Performance risk rests 
with the customer 
 
Performance risk rests 
with the customer 
 
Performance risk 
borne by parent 
organisations 
 
Performance risk 
borne by joint 
venture. 
Profit sharing for 
business growth – 
i.e. reinvestment 
rather than being 
passed back 
to parents. 
Maximise profit for 
the joint venture. 
Operationalisation15 Intra-service Service Corporate Supra-corporate Iso-corporate 
Degree of shared IT 
services (Hyötyläinen 
& Möller, 2007) 
Question 3.1 
Single or limited 
services, e.g., IT 
purchasing. The 
processes and service 
provision, IT 
applications and 
infrastructure are run 
by business unit. 
The processes and 
service provision are 
still run by the 
business unit, but the 
IT applications and 
infrastructure are the 
responsibility of the 
shared services 
The processes and 
service provision, the 
IT applications and 
infrastructure are the 
responsibility of the 
shared services 
provider, e.g., billing 
applications and IT 
Majority of IT 
services are the 
responsibility of the 
shared services 
provider. 
Majority of IT 
services are the 
responsibility of the 
shared services 
provider. 
                                                 
15 The construct ‘shared services delivery arrangement’ was operationalised by the typology from the study of Tomkinson 
(2007, p.30). The variables in Question 3 were categorised accordingly. 
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provider. support Services. 
Type of agreement 
(Bucklin & Sengupta, 
1993; Sturm et al., 
2000) 
Question 3.2 
None16 None 
 
Service- level 
agreement17 
Service-level 
agreement/ 
Contract18 
Service-level 
agreement/ 
Contract 
Degree of formality 
of service 
arrangement  
(Atkin & Rinehart, 
2006; Barney & 
Ouchi, 1986; Bucklin 
& Sengupta, 1993; 
Larson, 1992; 
MacNeil, 1980) 
Question 3.3 
Informal19 
 
Informal Formal20 
 
Formal Formal 
Legal Basis  
(Schulman et al., 
1999) 
Question 3.4 
Intra-organisation 
business unit 
Intra-organisation 
business unit 
 
Intra or Inter-
organisation business 
unit – flexible 
depending 
on customer needs 
Independent 
subsidiary – 
incorporated 
independent of the 
parent firm, e.g., joint 
venture, companies 
limited by shares 
Independent 
subsidiary - 
incorporated 
independent of the 
parent firm, e.g.,  
joint venture, 
companies limited by 
shares 
Management 
arrangement – Centre 
concept 
(Venkatraman, 1997) 
Question 3.5 
Cost centre21 
 
Cost centre 
 
Service centre22 Investment centre23 
 
Profit centre24 
 
 
Management 
arrangement –Service 
charges (Bergeron, 
2003; Schulman et al., 
1999) 
Question 3.6 
Shared costs Annual budget – 
The ‘lead’ business 
unit controls the 
entire budget 
belonging to the 
‘shared’ service, the 
service specification 
and possibly the 
responsibility for 
fulfilling statutory 
responsibilities. 
Cost allocation –
Costs incurred are 
charged to the 
different business 
units, where 
calculations are based 
on number of users, 
transactions, or 
agreed cost drivers. 
Transfer price – 
Services are sold to 
the various business 
units. Prices are 
commensurate to the 
sum of costs-per-
service, or plus profit. 
Different cost 
structures depending 
on the agreement. 
Market prices – 
Services are sold to 
business units at 
previously fixed 
prices equal to those 
paid in the 
marketplace. 
Management 
arrangement –
External market 
(Janssen & Joha, 
2006) 
Question 3.7 
No access 
 
No access Very limited –  
The business units of 
the parent company 
receive greater 
service attention. 
Limited access –
Through limited 
access to the external 
market, different 
objectives are 
pursued. The 
Free access – Access 
can apply to the entire 
portfolio or particular 
services only, and 
confers the benefit of 
additional sales and 
                                                 
16 Obligation - intra-organisation clients may obtain IT services only from the internal shared services provider. The service 
obligation can either be all-inclusive or relate only to particular services. 
17 Service-level agreement (SLA) is defined as the disciplined and proactive methodology and procedures that ensure service 
levels satisfying clients’ reasonable expectations are delivered to all classes of users in accordance with business priorities at 
reasonable cost. The difference between a contract and a SLA is in the intention and tightness of the document. A contract aims to 
formalise a relationship and is binding in law; a SLA seeks to improve a relationship and is not legally binding. However, failure to 
deliver on the terms of a SLA will damage or break a relationship as effectively as any breach of contract. While not officially a 
contract, the SLA can be used as part of a formal deal. 
18 A written contract is designed/developed to create an opportunity to design desired patterns of partner behaviour and to 
extract penalties from failures to perform. The client decides on whether the internal provider wins the contract according to 
conventional bidding criteria such as reputation, price and quality. 
19 Informal mechanisms consider the historical and social context of a relationship as well as specifically acknowledging that 
the performance and enforcement of obligations are an outcome of mutual interest between parties. The use of informal mechanisms, 
such as implicit contracts, are defined as unwritten agreements between shared services partners which are enforced not by formal 
authority and power but rather by the desire to create and maintain a positive reputation for integrity and fairness and build trust.  
20 Formal mechanisms clearly specify the required degree of co-operation, conformance and intra or inter-organisational 
integration through the use of a written document or agreement. 
21 A cost centre aims at supplying IT services at the lowest cost level, focusing on operational efficiency. No profit incentive 
- savings/quality. 
22 A service centre supports the company’s business strategy with IT services by delivering client satisfaction and adherence 
to agreed service levels.  
23 An investment centre has a much stronger strategic focus by pro-actively creating capabilities for business and using new 
IT services which shape alternative business strategies. The profits are largely returned to parents in agreed ratios. 
24 A profit centre seeks to obtain knowledge of the external market as well as gain credibility for its internal clients and attain 
additional revenue for the corporation. It also maximises cost savings and benefits to customer, but retained profits may remain in 
supplier. Joint venture may adopt ‘go to market’ strategy. 
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expected benefits to 
the parent company 
include exclusiveness 
and flexibility. 
the opportunity to use 
spare capacities. 
 
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
IT Decision Domain 
Question 4 
IT principles IT principles – High level statements about how IT is used in the 
business.  
(Weill & Ross, 2004, 
2005) 
IT investment IT investment – Decisions about how much and where to invest in IT – 
project approvals and justification techniques are included. 
Business application 
needs 
Business application needs – Business needs are specified for purchasing 
or internally developing IT applications. 
IT architecture  IT architecture – An integrated set of technical choices to guide the 
organisation in satisfying business needs. In particular, the architecture is 
a set of policies and rules for the use of IT.  
IT infrastructure IT infrastructure – The base foundation of budgeted-for IT capability 
(technical and human), shared throughout the firm as reliable services, 
and generally centrally coordinated. 
 
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
IT Governance 
Structure 
Question 4 
Business monarchy Business monarchy – It represents a group of, or individual, business 
executives (i.e. CIO or CEO). It excludes IT executives acting 
independently. 
(Weill & Ross, 2004, 
p. 12; 2005) 
IT monarchy IT monarchy – Only individuals or groups of IT executives are included. 
Feudal Feudal – Business unit leaders, key process owners or their delegates. 
Federal Federal – C level executives (i.e. CIO or CEO) and at least one other 
business group (i.e. business unit leaders). In this archetype the IT 
executives may be an additional participant. 
IT duopoly IT duopoly – IT executives and one other group (i.e. CEO or business 
unit leaders). 
 
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
IT Governance 
Structural Gap  
Question 5 
Structural gap 
(decision rights vs 
accountability) 
Decision rights – the extent to which groups make or have final ‘say so’ 
over decisions. 
Accountability for outcomes – the extent to which groups are held 
responsible for the outcome of decisions. 
(Grover et al., 2007) 
Gap assessment 
 
Formal – structured assessment conducted, including the following 
activities: 
Map the current governance structure onto the anticipated governance 
structure 
Audit IT governance metrics and accountabilities  
Evaluate IT governance awareness and engagement. 
Regular – an assessment issued during the regular assessment period, 
such as quarterly, biannually, or annually. 
(Clementi & 
Carvalho, 2009) 
  
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
Monitoring 
Mechanism 
Question 6 
Independent review 
 
Independent review is the practice of having competent, objective 
reviewers to evaluate the IT shared services operation. The existence of 
independent professionals, not permanently and directly employed by the 
service providers themselves, has often been vital for these efforts. 
Independent review includes: 
The influencing role of IT performance. 
The peer review role refers to the systematic examination and assessment 
of the performance of shared services provider by experts in IT, and 
outside stakeholders. The ultimate goal of helping the reviewed provider 
is to improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with 
established standards and principles. 
(Pawlowski & Robey, 
2004; Pollitt, 1986) 
Professional oversight 
 
Professional oversight involves the systematic application of IT rules, 
standards, or principles developed from research and the actual practices 
of and incidents experienced by major organisations.  
Benchmarking control refers to comparing performance to industry 
standards and competitors. 
Best practice framework refers to the industry standards in the field of IT 
service management to provide proactive monitoring include ITIL, ISO, 
COBIT.  
(Kouzmin et al., 
1999; Kumbakara, 
2008) 
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Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
Joint working 
 
Joint working is defined as the joint effort by which the service provider 
and client produce the service. In this joint effort, the quality of the final 
product largely depends on the active involvement of the clients in the 
joint production of service product. To organize a solution that fits the 
client’s situation, the provider must offer specific knowledge that fits the 
client specific needs, and combine it successfully with the client’s 
knowledge base. Joint working implies active participation and sharing 
information between the parties who bring different sets of capabilities 
and competencies. 
Participation refers to the degree of willingness to enter into and 
participate in activities between service providers and clients. 
Information sharing refers to the degree to which critical information is 
communicated. 
(Hertog, 2002; Lee & 
Kim, 1999) 
 
Construct Domain Definition 
Supporting 
Reference 
Business Value of IT 
Question 7 
Business value –  
The organisational 
performance impact 
of IT shared services 
The degree to which predefined IT shared services objectives are realised 
in terms of strategic, economic, technological, and social benefits of IT 
shared services.  
Strategic benefits – an organisation’s ability to continuously leverage and 
manage IT resources, and to fit resources to activities so as to underpin a 
strategy position leading to the achievement of business goals. 
Economic benefits – an organisation’s ability to increase its value by 
increased profits, decreased costs, and/or accelerated capital flow. 
Technological benefits – an organisation’s ability to access required key 
information technology components and skills. 
Social benefits – an organisation’s ability to create a working 
environment which leads to improved motivation and user satisfaction. 
(Devaraj & Kohli, 
2002) 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Preface 
Thank you for your participation in this study on key issues related to information technology (IT) 
governance in shared IT services environments. In particular, we are interested in how your organisation 
makes high-level decisions about the use of IT, who makes those decisions, what monitoring mechanisms 
are employed, and how effective you think IT governance is in helping your organisation achieve key 
objectives of sharing IT services.         
The term ‘IT shared services’ is used throughout this survey to mean the concentration of organisational IT 
resources performing like activities to service multiple internal business units or partner organisations 
(shared services client), which comes along with the standardisation and consolidation of redundant IT 
functions. The key is the idea of ‘sharing’ IT funding and resources within an organisation, group, or inter-
organisational collaboration. Thus, the providing department or organisation effectively becomes an 
internal ‘shared service provider’. Please be aware that this study excludes IT outsourcing arrangement, 
i.e., third party vendor contractually charged with the provision of your organisation’s IT functions.         
Except where we specify otherwise, if your organisation has multiple IT units, please answer questions with 
respect to the entire IT function organisation-wide, not just the central/shared IT organisation or local IT 
department. This survey should be completed by the senior business or IT leader at your organisation and 
will take approximately 20 minutes.         
Please complete this survey by 31st January 2012. Please also be assured all data collected will be kept 
anonymous and confidential. If you have any questions or concerns, please e-mail 
decca.cheung@uqconnect.edu.au.         
If you agree to participate, please click on the 'NEXT' button below to begin the survey.         
This project has been approved by the UQ Business School Ethical Review Committee. The University 
requires that should you have concerns about your rights as a participant in this research, or you have a 
complaint about the manner in which the research is conducted, it may be given to the researcher, or, if an 
independent person is preferred, to the Ethics Officer, telephone on (07) 3365 3924.  
161 
Q1 Your role and IT shared services experience 
Q1.1 In relation to IT shared services, what role does your business unit or organisation play? 
 IT shared services provider, e.g., Corporate IT Department or IT Organisation (1) 
 IT shared services client, e.g., Business Unit (2) 
 Neither - Do not use or provide IT shared services (3) 
 
Q1.2 Which description best fits your role? 
 Top Management Executive - Top two tiers of management e.g., ‘C’ Level Executive (CEO, COO, CFO), 
Business Executives, Business Director, etc (1) 
 Business Unit Leader - Middle management with overall responsibility for a multifunction operation 
e.g., Business Unit Manager or Divisional Head, or a functional operation e.g., Marketing Manager  (2) 
 Local IT Unit Leader    (3) 
 IT Executive - Shared Services  (4) 
 Other (Please indicate) (5) ____________________ 
 
Q1.3 What percentage of your organisation’s annual expenditure is spent on IT? 
 50 percent or more of budget  (1) 
 40 percent of budget  (2) 
 30 percent of budget  (3) 
 20 percent of budget  (4) 
 10 percent of budget  (5) 
 10 percent or less of budget (6) 
 
Q1.4 What portion of your organisation's total IT expenditure is directly managed by IT shared services? 
 Less than 5 percent  (1) 
 From 6 to 25 percent  (2) 
 From 26 to 50 percent  (3) 
 From 51 to 75 percent  (4) 
 Over 75 percent (5) 
 
Q2 Your organisation 
Q2.1 What type of organisation do you primarily work for? 
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  (1) 
 Mining  (2) 
 Manufacturing  (3) 
 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  (4) 
 Construction  (5) 
 Wholesale Trade  (6) 
 Retail Trade  (7) 
 Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants  (8) 
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 Transport and Storage  (9) 
 Communication Services  (10) 
 Finance and Insurance  (11) 
 Property and Business Services  (12) 
 Government Administration and Defence  (13) 
 Education  (14) 
 Health and Community Services  (15) 
 Cultural and Recreational Services  (16) 
 Personal and Other Services (17) 
 
Q2.2 How many full time equivalent employees does your organisation have? 
 Under 150 employees (1) 
 151 to 500 employees (2) 
 501 to 1000 employees (3) 
 1001 to 5000 employees (4) 
 More than 5000 employees (5) 
 
Q2.3 In what state does your organisation operate (If your organisation conducts business in multiple 
states, please tick the appropriate boxes)? 
 Australian Capital Territory  (1) 
 New South Wales  (2) 
 Victoria  (3) 
 Queensland  (4) 
 South Australia  (5) 
 Western Australia  (6) 
 Tasmania  (7) 
 Northern Territory (8) 
 Other (Please indicate) (9) ____________________ 
 
Q3 Your shared IT services delivery arrangement 
Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services client, e.g., Business 
Unit Is Selected 
Q3.1 Please describe how the following IT services are coordinated in your entire organisation. 
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Centralised within the 
entire organisation or 
other partner 
organisations (2) 
Decentralised by 
department or business 
unit  (0) 
Mixed (1) 
IT purchasing services: Computer systems, 
telecommunications equipment, hardware, and 
software (1) 
      
IT infrastructure and network management 
services: Monitoring of IT infrastructure (2) 
      
Application management: Technical expertise and 
equipment to transform information from one 
format or media to another  (3) 
      
Application services: Design and development of IT 
solutions such as custom applications, networks 
and computer systems  (4) 
      
Distributed and network services: Hosting and 
access to IT infrastructure (hardware, software and 
networks) which enable the hosting of applications 
and the processing of information  (5) 
      
Internet access and backbone services: Connection 
to, and carriage of traffic on, the internet   (6) 
      
IT technical support services: Technical expertise to 
solve IT related problems   (7) 
      
IT technical consulting: Expert opinion on technical 
matters related to the use of IT   (8) 
      
Telecommunication services: Design, operation, 
and maintenance of telecommunication equipment 
and facilities (9) 
      
Processing services: High volume data entry, forms 
processing, and document conversion (10) 
      
Other (Please specify) (11)       
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Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services provider, e.g., 
Corporate IT Department or IT Organisation Is Selected 
Q3.1 Please describe how the following IT services are coordinated in your client organisation. 
 
Centralised within the 
entire organisation or 
other partner 
organisations (2) 
Decentralised by 
department or business 
unit  (0) 
Mixed (1) 
IT purchasing services: Computer systems, 
telecommunications equipment, hardware, and 
software (1) 
      
IT infrastructure and network management 
services: Monitoring of IT infrastructure (2) 
      
Application management: Technical expertise and 
equipment to transform information from one 
format or media to another  (3) 
      
Application services: Design and development of IT 
solutions such as custom applications, networks 
and computer systems  (4) 
      
Distributed and network services: Hosting and 
access to IT infrastructure (hardware, software and 
networks) which enable the hosting of applications 
and the processing of information  (5) 
      
Internet access and backbone services: Connection 
to, and carriage of traffic on, the internet   (6) 
      
IT technical support services: Technical expertise to 
solve IT related problems   (7) 
      
IT technical consulting: Expert opinion on technical 
matters related to the use of IT   (8) 
      
Telecommunication services: Design, operation, 
and maintenance of telecommunication equipment 
and facilities (9) 
      
Processing services: High volume data entry, forms 
processing, and document conversion (10) 
      
Other (Please specify) (11)       
 
Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services client, e.g., Business 
Unit Is Selected 
Q3.2 In coordinating your shared IT activities, what kind of agreement governs your business relationship 
with the IT shared services provider (please tick the appropriate boxes)? 
 No formal Agreement    (1) 
 Letter or memorandum of understanding    (2) 
 Service level agreement – defines the terms and responsibilities of the parties, the agreed levels of 
service, and where applicable, the costs of the service    (3) 
 Formal contract    (4) 
 Don’t know  (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
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Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services provider, e.g., 
Corporate IT Department or IT Organisation Is Selected 
Q3.2 In coordinating your shared IT activities, what kind of agreement governs your business relationship 
with the IT shared services client (please tick the appropriate boxes)? 
 No formal Agreement    (1) 
 Letter or memorandum of understanding    (2) 
 Service level agreement – defines the terms and responsibilities of the parties, the agreed levels of 
service, and where applicable, the costs of the service    (3) 
 Formal contract    (4) 
 Don’t know  (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
 
Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services client, e.g., Business 
Unit Is Selected 
Q3.3 Please check all boxes that apply to the formality of your shared IT services delivery arrangement. 
 The terms of our relationship with the IT shared services provider have been written down in detail.   
(1) 
 Our expectations of the IT shared services provider have been communicated in great detail.   (2) 
 In coordinating our activities with the IT shared services provider, formal contractual terms have been 
developed. (3) 
 The terms of our relationship with the IT shared services provider have been explicitly verbalised and 
discussed. (4) 
 We have formal mechanisms in place to resolve differences or disputes.  (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
 
Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services provider, e.g., 
Corporate IT Department or IT Organisation Is Selected 
Q3.3 Please check all boxes that apply to the formality of your shared IT services delivery arrangement. 
 The terms of our relationship with the IT shared services client have been written down in detail.   (1) 
 Our expectations of the IT shared services client have been communicated in great detail.   (2) 
 In coordinating our activities with the IT shared services client, formal contractual terms have been 
developed. (3) 
 The terms of our relationship with the IT shared services client have been explicitly verbalised and 
discussed. (4) 
 We have formal mechanisms in place to resolve differences or disputes.  (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
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Q3.4 What is the business structure of IT shared services? 
 Intra-organisational arrangement – A single business unit brings together IT functions previously carried 
out by separate business units. (1) 
 Partnership – An association established with two or more organisations that bring competitive 
benefits to your organisation. A partnership is not a separate legal entity so all assets of the partnership 
are owned by the partners jointly. (2) 
 Unincorporated Joint venture – A formal relationship (using a legally-binding agreement) is developed 
between two or more legal entities (organisations). (3) 
 Incorporated joint venture – A separate legal entity is established for the purpose of the joint venture, 
with the joint venturers acquiring shares in the company. (4) 
 
Q3.5 Which statement best describes your IT shared services? 
 Cost centre - An operational focus that minimises risks with an emphasis on operational efficiency. (1) 
 Service centre - While still mininising the risks, aims to create an IT-enabled business strategies to 
support current strategies. (2) 
 Investment centre - A long term focus that aims to create new IT-based business capabilities. (3) 
 Profit centre - Delivers IT services to external marketplace for incremental revenue and for gaining 
valuable experience to become a world-class IT organisation. (4) 
 
Q3.6 What is the funding arrangement? 
 Shared contributions from collaborating partners  (1) 
 Budget development and allocation  (2) 
 Demand-based Pricing - fully allocate the total cost of the IT function across the business units, the unit 
rate charge is typically based on the total cost of the service during the period, divided by the actual 
demand for the service during the period. This leaves the IT function with no residual costs.  (3) 
 Capacity-based Pricing - the total cost of the service during the period, divided by the amount of the 
service available during the period, i.e., it is based on the capacity of the IT function rather than the 
demand of the business units. If the service is over resourced and IT is able to provide more than the 
business units consume, IT will be left with residual costs. (4) 
 Discounted market prices   (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
 
Q3.7 Is the use of the shared service restricted to internal clients or member organisations only? 
 Yes  (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q4 Your decision-right and accountability in IT governance 
Businesses make IT decisions generally about five key areas called decision domains: IT principles, IT 
architecture and standard, IT infrastructure strategies, business applications needs, and IT investment and 
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prioritization. Different parties have the right to make the final decisions in each of these areas, and are 
held accountable for the decisions.     
a) Top Management - Top two tiers of management e.g., ‘C’ Level Executive (CEO, COO, CFO), 
Business Executives, Business Director, etc   
b) Business Unit Leaders - Middle management with overall responsibility for a multifunction 
operation e.g., Business Unit Manager or Divisional Head, or a functional operation e.g., Marketing 
Manager  
c) Business Process Owners & Key End Users 
d) Local IT Unit Leaders 
e) IT Executives - Shared Services 
Q4.1 IT principles are high-level statements about how IT will be used to achieve organisational goals (e.g., 
supporting cost cuts or revenue growth).       
Please allocate 100 points to describe the proportion of the decision made and held accountable by each 
decision party? (Please be sure the total sum to 100%) 
 
Top Management 
(1) 
Business Unit 
Leaders  (2) 
Business Process 
Owners & Key End 
Users  (3) 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders  (4) 
IT Executives - 
Shared Services (5) 
Within your organisation, 
who typically make final 
decisions, individually or as 
part of a group, about IT 
principles? (1) 
     
Within your organisation, 
who are held accountable 
for the outcomes of 
decisions related to IT 
principles? (2) 
     
 
Q4.2 IT architecture concerns the technical guidelines and standards used to achieve a desired level of 
business/academic and technical integration and standardisation.       
Please allocate 100 points to describe the proportion of the decision made and held accountable by each 
decision party? (Please be sure the total sum to 100%) 
 
Top Management 
(1) 
Business Unit 
Leaders    (2) 
Business Process 
Owners & Key End 
Users    (3) 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders    (4) 
IT Executives - 
Shared Services (5) 
Within your organisation, 
who typically make final 
decisions, individually or as 
part of a group, about IT 
architecture? (1) 
     
Within your organisation, 
who are held accountable 
for the outcomes of 
decisions related to IT 
architecture? (2) 
     
 
168 
Q4.3 IT infrastructure strategies address shared IT services used by multiple systems and applications, 
providing a foundation for enterprise-wide IT capabilities (e.g., networks, shared data, and common 
applications).       
Please allocate 100 points to describe the proportion of the decision made and held accountable by each 
decision party? (Please be sure the total sum to 100%) 
 
Top Management 
(1) 
Business Unit 
Leaders   (2) 
Business Process 
Owners & Key End 
Users   (3) 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders   (4) 
IT Executives - 
Shared Services (5) 
Within your organisation, 
who typically make final 
decisions, individually or as 
part of a group, about IT 
infrastructure strategies? 
(1) 
     
Within your organisation, 
who are held accountable 
for the outcomes of 
decisions related to IT 
infrastructure strategies? 
(2) 
     
 
Q4.4 Business application needs involve specifying the requirements of major IT applications and choosing 
applications to meet them.       
Please allocate 100 points to describe the proportion of the decision made and held accountable by each 
decision party? (Please be sure the total sum to 100%) 
 
Top Management 
(1) 
Business Unit 
Leaders    (2) 
Business Process 
Owners & Key End 
Users    (3) 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders    (4) 
IT Executives - 
Shared Services (5) 
Within your organisation, 
who typically make final 
decisions, individually or as 
part of a group, about 
application needs? (1) 
     
Within your organisation, 
who are held accountable 
for the outcomes of 
decisions related to 
application needs? (2) 
     
 
Q4.5 IT investment and prioritization concerns how much the organisation spends on IT investments, what 
it spends on, and how competing needs are reconciled.       
Please allocate 100 points to describe the proportion of the decision made and held accountable by each 
decision party? (Please be sure the total sum to 100%) 
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Top Management  
(1) 
Business Unit 
Leaders     (2) 
Business Process 
Owners & Key End 
Users     (3) 
Local IT Unit 
Leaders     (4) 
IT Executives - 
Shared Services  
(5) 
Within your organisation, 
who typically make final 
decisions, individually or as 
part of a group, about IT 
investment and 
prioritization? (1) 
     
Within your organisation, 
who are held accountable 
for the outcomes of 
decisions related to IT 
investment and 
prioritization? (2) 
     
 
Q5 Your IT governance assessment 
Q5.1 How often do you map your current IT governance structure onto your anticipated IT governance 
structure? 
 Never  (1) 
 Quarterly  (2) 
 Biannually  (3) 
 Annually  (4) 
 Other (Please specify) (5) ____________________ 
 
Q5.2 How often do you utilise formal IT governance tools, such as an IT governance maturity assessment 
tool, to audit your IT governance metrics and accountabilities? 
 Never  (1) 
 Quarterly  (2) 
 Biannually  (3) 
 Annually  (4) 
 Other (Please specify) (5) ____________________ 
 
Q5.3 How often do you evaluate your IT governance awareness and engagement? 
 Never  (1) 
 Quarterly  (2) 
 Biannually  (3) 
 Annually  (4) 
 Other (Please specify) (5) ____________________ 
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Q6 Your shared IT services monitoring mechanisms 
Q6.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about reviewing and 
monitoring your shared IT services? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree (4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) 
Strongly 
Agree (7) 
We have independent 
officer (e.g., internal 
auditor) responsible for 
monitoring compliance 
with the terms of the IT 
services agreement. (1) 
              
Our local IT/business 
unit takes an active and 
direct role in overseeing 
operating policy for the 
IT services. (2) 
              
We have a formal 
workgroup or focus 
group to review specific 
IT services initiatives. (3) 
              
We have a formal 
workgroup or focus 
group to monitor the 
development of IT 
services products. (4) 
              
 
Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services client, e.g., Business 
Unit Is Selected 
Q6.2 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the interactions with 
your IT shared services provider? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree (4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) 
Strongly 
Agree (7) 
We participate in our 
business with positive 
attitude. (1) 
              
We are very interested 
in each other's 
problems. (2) 
              
We encourage each 
other to solve business 
problems. (3) 
              
We share business 
knowledge of core 
business processes if 
necessary. (4) 
              
We exchange 
information that help 
the establishment of 
business planning. (5) 
              
We share 
environmental 
information that affects 
each other's business. 
(6) 
              
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Answer If In relation to IT shared services, what role does your bu... IT shared services provider, e.g., 
Corporate IT Department or IT Organisation Is Selected 
Q6.2 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the interactions with 
your IT shared services client? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree (4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) 
Strongly 
Agree (7) 
We participate in our 
business with positive 
attitude. (1) 
              
We are very interested 
in each other's 
problems. (2) 
              
We encourage each 
other to solve business 
problems. (3) 
              
We share business 
knowledge of core 
business processes if 
necessary. (4) 
              
We exchange 
information that help 
the establishment of 
business planning. (5) 
              
We share 
environmental 
information that affects 
each other's business. 
(6) 
              
 
Q6.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the benchmarking your 
IT shared services arrangement? 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree (3) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree (4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree (6) 
Strongly 
Agree (7) 
We benchmark ‘cost’ 
targets against 
standards of best-
practice. (1) 
              
We benchmark ‘quality’ 
targets against 
standards of best-
practice. (2) 
              
We benchmark 
‘customer satisfaction’ 
targets against 
standards of best-
practice. (3) 
              
We benchmark 
‘timeliness’ targets 
against standards of 
best-practice. (4) 
              
 
 
172 
Q6.4 Does your organisation make use of any of the following IT governance frameworks? 
 Do not use   (1) Use selected elements  (2) 
Use most or all elements 
(3) 
Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT) (1) 
      
Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) (2) 
      
Information Security Management (ISO 27002) (3)       
Quality Management (ISO 9000) (4)       
Other (Please specify) (5)       
 
Q7 Your business value of IT 
Q7.1 Please assess the following statements in relation to the extent that the decision to shared IT services 
is important to create overall business value? 
 
Not at all 
Important (1) 
Very 
Unimportant 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
(3) 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Important (5) 
Very 
Important (6) 
Extremely 
Important (7) 
We are able to refocus 
on core business (1) 
              
We improve the 
capability of IT to 
support the needs of 
business operations      
(2) 
              
We share IT risks within 
approved risk limits      
(3) 
              
We improve the 
management of 
technology and human 
resources (4) 
              
We are able to support 
consolidation or 
integration (5) 
              
We reduce IT 
expenditure (6) 
              
We enhance economies 
of scale in IT resources      
(7) 
              
We reduce overcapacity 
by consolidation of 
systems (8) 
              
We leverage IT 
purchasing (9) 
              
We are able to establish 
a well-functioning IT 
environment (10) 
              
 
 
173 
Q7.2 Please assess the following statements in relation to the extent that the decision to shared IT services 
has contributed to overall business value? 
 
Not at all 
Well   (1) 
Very Unwell    
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unwell    (3) 
Neither Well 
nor Unwell  
(4) 
Somewhat 
Well    (5) 
Very Well    
(6) 
Extremely 
Very Well (7) 
We are able to refocus 
on core business (1) 
              
We improve the 
capability of IT to 
support the needs of 
business operations       
(2) 
              
We share IT risks within 
approved risk limits       
(3) 
              
We improve the 
management of 
technology and human 
resources (4) 
              
We are able to support 
consolidation or 
integration (5) 
              
We reduce IT 
expenditure (6) 
              
We enhance economies 
of scale in IT resources       
(7) 
              
We reduce overcapacity 
by consolidation of 
systems (8) 
              
We leverage IT 
purchasing (9) 
              
We are able to establish 
a well-functioning IT 
environment (10) 
              
 
Q7.3 How important are each of the following as outcomes of your organisation’s IT governance? 
 
Not at all 
Important (1) 
Very 
Unimportant 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
(3) 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Important (5) 
Very 
Important (6) 
Extremely 
Important (7) 
Cost effective use of IT  
(1) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
growth (2) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
asset utilisation (3) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
business flexibility (4) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
compliance with legal 
and regulatory 
requirements (5) 
              
Improved service quality  
(6) 
              
Greater service 
responsiveness (7) 
              
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Q7.4 How successful are each of the following outcomes in relation to your IT governance within your 
organisation? 
 
Extremely 
unsuccessful 
(1) 
Very 
Unsuccessful  
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful  
(3) 
Neither 
Successful 
nor 
Unsuccessful  
(4) 
Somewhat 
Successful  
(5) 
Very 
Successful  
(6) 
Extremely 
Successful 
(7) 
Cost effective use of IT  
(1) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
growth (2) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
asset utilisation (3) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
business flexibility (4) 
              
Effective use of IT for 
compliance with legal 
and regulatory 
requirements (5) 
              
Improved service quality  
(6) 
              
Greater service 
responsiveness (7) 
              
 
Q8 Your comment and participation 
Q8.1 Do you have any additional comments on any of your answers above, or any shared IT services issues 
that you think are important but were not covered in this survey? 
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APPENDIX D1: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT PRINCIPLES 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Large Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 4 2 5 1 3 15 
   Expected Count 1.8 2.0 9.2 1.3 .7 15.0 
   % within PRIN 26.7% 13.3% 33.3% 6.7% 20.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 18.2% 9.8% 14.3% 75.0% 18.1% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.9 .0 -2.5 -.3 3.0  
  3 Federal Count 2 7 40 6 1 56 
   Expected Count 6.7 7.4 34.4 4.7 2.7 56.0 
   % within PRIN 3.6% 12.5% 71.4% 10.7% 1.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 63.6% 78.4% 85.7% 25.0% 67.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.4 -.3 2.7 1.1 -1.9  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 2 6 0 0 11 
   Expected Count 1.3 1.5 6.8 .9 .5 11.0 
   % within PRIN 27.3% 18.2% 54.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 30.0% 18.2% 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.7 .5 -.5 -1.1 -.8  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .1 .1 .6 .1 .0 1.0 
   % within PRIN 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.7 -.4 -1.3 -.3 -.2  
  Total Count 10 11 51 7 4 83 
   Expected Count 10.0 11.0 51.0 7.0 4.0 83.0 
   % within PRIN 12.0% 13.3% 61.4% 8.4% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 2 1 2 1 0 6 
   Expected Count 1.2 .2 3.4 1.0 .2 6.0 
   % within PRIN 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 100.0% 14.3% 25.0% 0.0% 24.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 1.8 -1.3 .1 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 2 0 9 2 0 13 
   Expected Count 2.6 .5 7.3 2.1 .5 13.0 
   % within PRIN 15.4% 0.0% 69.2% 15.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 0.0% 64.3% 50.0% 0.0% 52.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.6 -1.1 1.4 -.1 -1.1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 0 2 0 1 4 
   Expected Count .8 .2 2.2 .6 .2 4.0 
   % within PRIN 25.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 16.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .3 -.4 -.3 -1.0 2.3  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 1 1 0 2 
   Expected Count .4 .1 1.1 .3 .1 2.0 
   % within PRIN 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 25.0% 0.0% 8.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.3 -.2 1.4 -.3  
  Total Count 5 1 14 4 1 25 
   Expected Count 5.0 1.0 14.0 4.0 1.0 25.0 
   % within PRIN 20.0% 4.0% 56.0% 16.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 6 3 7 2 3 21 
   Expected Count 2.9 2.3 12.6 2.1 1.0 21.0 
   % within PRIN 28.6% 14.3% 33.3% 9.5% 14.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 25.0% 10.8% 18.2% 60.0% 19.4% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.2 .5 -2.8 -.1 2.3  
  3 Federal Count 4 7 49 8 1 69 
   Expected Count 9.6 7.7 41.5 7.0 3.2 69.0 
   % within PRIN 5.8% 10.1% 71.0% 11.6% 1.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.7% 58.3% 75.4% 72.7% 20.0% 63.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.2 -.4 3.1 .6 -2.1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 2 8 0 1 15 
   Expected Count 2.1 1.7 9.0 1.5 .7 15.0 
   % within PRIN 26.7% 13.3% 53.3% 0.0% 6.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.7% 16.7% 12.3% 0.0% 20.0% 13.9% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.5 .3 -.6 -1.4 .4  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 1 1 0 3 
   Expected Count .4 .3 1.8 .3 .1 3.0 
   % within PRIN 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 0.0% 1.5% 9.1% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.0 -.6 -1.0 1.3 -.4  
  Total Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
   Expected Count 15.0 12.0 65.0 11.0 5.0 108.0 
   % within PRIN 13.9% 11.1% 60.2% 10.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Small Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 7 1 2 1 2 13 
   Expected Count 4.5 1.0 5.0 1.0 1.5 13.0 
   % within PRIN 53.8% 7.7% 15.4% 7.7% 15.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 77.8% 50.0% 20.0% 50.0% 66.7% 50.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.1 0.0 -2.4 0.0 .6  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .7 .2 .8 .2 .2 2.0 
   % within PRIN 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .5 -.4 .3 -.4 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 1 0 3 1 1 6 
   Expected Count 2.1 .5 2.3 .5 .7 6.0 
   % within PRIN 16.7% 0.0% 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 30.0% 50.0% 33.3% 23.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 -.8 .7 .9 .4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count 1.0 .2 1.2 .2 .3 3.0 
   % within PRIN 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 50.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.3 1.8 1.1 -.5 -.7  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 2 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .7 .2 .8 .2 .2 2.0 
   % within PRIN 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 -.4 1.9 -.4 -.5  
   Count 9 2 10 2 3 26 
   Expected Count 9.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 26.0 
   % within PRIN 34.6% 7.7% 38.5% 7.7% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 9 8 13 6 3 39 
   Expected Count 10.4 6.0 13.7 4.9 3.8 39.0 
   % within PRIN 23.1% 20.5% 33.3% 15.4% 7.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 47.4% 72.7% 52.0% 66.7% 42.9% 54.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.8 1.3 -.4 .8 -.7  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .8 .5 1.1 .4 .3 3.0 
   % within PRIN 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 9.1% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 .9 1.2 -.7 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 4 1 6 3 2 16 
   Expected Count 4.3 2.5 5.6 2.0 1.6 16.0 
   % within PRIN 25.0% 6.3% 37.5% 18.8% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 21.1% 9.1% 24.0% 33.3% 28.6% 22.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -.2 -1.2 .2 .8 .4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 1 4 0 0 8 
   Expected Count 2.1 1.2 2.8 1.0 .8 8.0 
   % within PRIN 37.5% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 9.1% 16.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.2 .9 -1.1 -1.0  
  5 Feudal Count 3 0 0 0 2 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .8 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within PRIN 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 7.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.0 -1.7 -.9 2.3  
  Total Count 19 11 25 9 7 71 
   Expected Count 19.0 11.0 25.0 9.0 7.0 71.0 
   % within PRIN 26.8% 15.5% 35.2% 12.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 16 9 15 7 5 52 
   Expected Count 15.0 7.0 18.8 5.9 5.4 52.0 
   % within PRIN 30.8% 17.3% 28.8% 13.5% 9.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 57.1% 69.2% 42.9% 63.6% 50.0% 53.6% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 1.2 -1.6 .7 -.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 3 0 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.4 .7 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within PRIN 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 3.6% 7.7% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 .4 1.1 -.8 -.8  
  3 Federal Count 5 1 9 4 3 22 
   Expected Count 6.4 2.9 7.9 2.5 2.3 22.0 
   % within PRIN 22.7% 4.5% 40.9% 18.2% 13.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 17.9% 7.7% 25.7% 36.4% 30.0% 22.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -1.4 .5 1.2 .6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 2 6 0 0 11 
   Expected Count 3.2 1.5 4.0 1.2 1.1 11.0 
   % within PRIN 27.3% 18.2% 54.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.7% 15.4% 17.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -.1 .5 1.4 -1.3 -1.2  
  5 Feudal Count 3 0 2 0 2 7 
   Expected Count 2.0 .9 2.5 .8 .7 7.0 
   % within PRIN 42.9% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 28.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.7% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 20.0% 7.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 -1.1 -.4 -1.0 1.6  
  Total Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
   Expected Count 28.0 13.0 35.0 11.0 10.0 97.0 
   % within PRIN 28.9% 13.4% 36.1% 11.3% 10.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
All Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 11 3 7 2 5 28 
   Expected Count 4.9 3.3 15.7 2.3 1.8 28.0 
   % within PRIN 39.3% 10.7% 25.0% 7.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 57.9% 23.1% 11.5% 22.2% 71.4% 25.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 3.5 -.2 -3.8 -.2 2.9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .3 .2 1.1 .2 .1 2.0 
   % within PRIN 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.2 -.5 -.2 -.4 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 3 7 43 7 2 62 
   Expected Count 10.8 7.4 34.7 5.1 4.0 62.0 
   % within PRIN 4.8% 11.3% 69.4% 11.3% 3.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 53.8% 70.5% 77.8% 28.6% 56.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -4.0 -.2 3.2 1.3 -1.6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 3 8 0 0 14 
   Expected Count 2.4 1.7 7.8 1.2 .9 14.0 
   % within PRIN 21.4% 21.4% 57.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 23.1% 13.1% 0.0% 0.0% 12.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 1.2 .1 -1.2 -1.0  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .5 .4 1.7 .2 .2 3.0 
   % within PRIN 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.6 .4 -.5 -.5  
  Total Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
   Expected Count 19.0 13.0 61.0 9.0 7.0 109.0 
   % within PRIN 17.4% 11.9% 56.0% 8.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 11 9 15 7 3 45 
   Expected Count 11.3 5.6 18.3 6.1 3.8 45.0 
   % within PRIN 24.4% 20.0% 33.3% 15.6% 6.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 45.8% 75.0% 38.5% 53.8% 37.5% 46.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.1 2.1 -1.4 .5 -.6  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .8 .4 1.2 .4 .3 3.0 
   % within PRIN 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 8.3% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.0 1.1 .9 -.7 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 6 1 15 5 2 29 
   Expected Count 7.3 3.6 11.8 3.9 2.4 29.0 
   % within PRIN 20.7% 3.4% 51.7% 17.2% 6.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 25.0% 8.3% 38.5% 38.5% 25.0% 30.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.6 -1.8 1.5 .7 -.3  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 1 6 0 1 12 
   Expected Count 3.0 1.5 4.9 1.6 1.0 12.0 
   % within PRIN 33.3% 8.3% 50.0% 0.0% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.7% 8.3% 15.4% 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.5 .7 -1.5 0.0  
  5 Feudal Count 3 0 1 1 2 7 
   Expected Count 1.8 .9 2.8 .9 .6 7.0 
   % within PRIN 42.9% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 28.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 12.5% 0.0% 2.6% 7.7% 25.0% 7.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.1 -1.0 -1.5 .1 2.0  
  Total Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
   Expected Count 24.0 12.0 39.0 13.0 8.0 96.0 
   % within PRIN 25.0% 12.5% 40.6% 13.5% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 22 12 22 9 8 73 
   Expected Count 15.3 8.9 35.6 7.8 5.3 73.0 
   % within PRIN 30.1% 16.4% 30.1% 12.3% 11.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 51.2% 48.0% 22.0% 40.9% 53.3% 35.6% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.4 1.4 -4.0 .5 1.5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 3 0 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.0 .6 2.4 .5 .4 5.0 
   % within PRIN 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 2.3% 4.0% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.1 .5 .5 -.8 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 9 8 58 12 4 91 
   Expected Count 19.1 11.1 44.4 9.8 6.7 91.0 
   % within PRIN 9.9% 8.8% 63.7% 13.2% 4.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.9% 32.0% 58.0% 54.5% 26.7% 44.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.5 -1.3 3.8 1.0 -1.4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 7 4 14 0 1 26 
   Expected Count 5.5 3.2 12.7 2.8 1.9 26.0 
   % within PRIN 26.9% 15.4% 53.8% 0.0% 3.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.3% 16.0% 14.0% 0.0% 6.7% 12.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 .5 .6 -1.9 -.7  
  5 Feudal Count 4 0 3 1 2 10 
   Expected Count 2.1 1.2 4.9 1.1 .7 10.0 
   % within PRIN 40.0% 0.0% 30.0% 10.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 9.3% 0.0% 3.0% 4.5% 13.3% 4.9% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -.1 1.6  
  Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
   Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
   % within PRIN 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX D2: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT INVESTMENT 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Large Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 3 4 6 1 3 17 
   Expected Count 2.0 2.3 10.4 1.4 .8 17.0 
   % within INVE 17.6% 23.5% 35.3% 5.9% 17.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 30.0% 36.4% 11.8% 14.3% 75.0% 20.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 1.4 -2.5 -.4 2.8  
  3 Federal Count 4 7 34 5 1 51 
   Expected Count 6.1 6.8 31.3 4.3 2.5 51.0 
   % within INVE 7.8% 13.7% 66.7% 9.8% 2.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 63.6% 66.7% 71.4% 25.0% 61.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.5 .2 1.2 .6 -1.5  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 0 10 1 0 13 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.7 8.0 1.1 .6 13.0 
   % within INVE 15.4% 0.0% 76.9% 7.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 19.6% 14.3% 0.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 -1.5 1.2 -.1 -.9  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .2 .3 1.2 .2 .1 2.0 
   % within INVE 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.7 -.6 -.3 -.4 -.3  
  Total Count 10 11 51 7 4 83 
   Expected Count 10.0 11.0 51.0 7.0 4.0 83.0 
   % within INVE 12.0% 13.3% 61.4% 8.4% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 2 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 3 0 3 3 0 9 
   Expected Count 1.8 .4 5.0 1.4 .4 9.0 
   % within INVE 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 60.0% 0.0% 21.4% 75.0% 0.0% 36.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.3 -.8 -1.7 1.8 -.8  
  3 Federal Count 1 1 8 0 1 11 
   Expected Count 2.2 .4 6.2 1.8 .4 11.0 
   % within INVE 9.1% 9.1% 72.7% 0.0% 9.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 100.0% 57.1% 0.0% 100.0% 44.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.2 1.2 1.5 -1.9 1.2  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 0 2 1 0 4 
   Expected Count .8 .2 2.2 .6 .2 4.0 
   % within INVE 25.0% 0.0% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 14.3% 25.0% 0.0% 16.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .3 -.4 -.3 .5 -.4  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .2 .0 .6 .2 .0 1.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.2 .9 -.4 -.2  
  Total Count 5 1 14 4 1 25 
   Expected Count 5.0 1.0 14.0 4.0 1.0 25.0 
   % within INVE 20.0% 4.0% 56.0% 16.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 6 4 9 4 3 26 
   Expected Count 3.6 2.9 15.6 2.6 1.2 26.0 
   % within INVE 23.1% 15.4% 34.6% 15.4% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 33.3% 13.8% 36.4% 60.0% 24.1% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.6 .8 -3.1 1.0 1.9  
  3 Federal Count 5 8 42 5 2 62 
   Expected Count 8.6 6.9 37.3 6.3 2.9 62.0 
   % within INVE 8.1% 12.9% 67.7% 8.1% 3.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 33.3% 66.7% 64.6% 45.5% 40.0% 57.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.0 .7 1.9 -.8 -.8  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 0 12 2 0 17 
   Expected Count 2.4 1.9 10.2 1.7 .8 17.0 
   % within INVE 17.6% 0.0% 70.6% 11.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 18.5% 18.2% 0.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .5 -1.6 1.0 .2 -1.0  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .4 .3 1.8 .3 .1 3.0 
   % within INVE 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.0 -.6 .2 -.6 -.4  
  Total Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
   Expected Count 15.0 12.0 65.0 11.0 5.0 108.0 
   % within INVE 13.9% 11.1% 60.2% 10.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Small Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 9 1 4 0 2 16 
   Expected Count 5.5 1.2 6.2 1.2 1.8 16.0 
   % within INVE 56.3% 6.3% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 50.0% 40.0% 0.0% 66.7% 61.5% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.9 -.3 -1.8 -1.9 .2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .3 .1 .4 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.3 1.3 -.3 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 0 0 4 1 1 6 
   Expected Count 2.1 .5 2.3 .5 .7 6.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 50.0% 33.3% 23.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.0 -.8 1.6 .9 .4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .7 .2 .8 .2 .2 2.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 2.3 .3 -.4 -.5  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
   Expected Count .3 .1 .4 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.3 -.8 3.5 -.4  
  Total Count 9 2 10 2 3 26 
   Expected Count 9.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 26.0 
   % within INVE 34.6% 7.7% 38.5% 7.7% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 10 7 16 6 4 43 
   Expected Count 11.5 6.7 15.1 5.5 4.2 43.0 
   % within INVE 23.3% 16.3% 37.2% 14.0% 9.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 52.6% 63.6% 64.0% 66.7% 57.1% 60.6% 
   Adjusted Residual -.8 .2 .4 .4 -.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .5 .3 .7 .3 .2 2.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 9.1% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 1.4 .4 -.5 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 4 1 4 3 2 14 
   Expected Count 3.7 2.2 4.9 1.8 1.4 14.0 
   % within INVE 28.6% 7.1% 28.6% 21.4% 14.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 21.1% 9.1% 16.0% 33.3% 28.6% 19.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -1.0 -.6 1.1 .6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 1 4 0 0 8 
   Expected Count 2.1 1.2 2.8 1.0 .8 8.0 
   % within INVE 37.5% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 9.1% 16.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.2 .9 -1.1 -1.0  
  5 Feudal Count 2 1 0 0 1 4 
   Expected Count 1.1 .6 1.4 .5 .4 4.0 
   % within INVE 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 5.6% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.1 .5 -1.5 -.8 1.0  
  Total Count 19 11 25 9 7 71 
   Expected Count 19.0 11.0 25.0 9.0 7.0 71.0 
   % within INVE 26.8% 15.5% 35.2% 12.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 19 8 20 6 6 59 
   Expected Count 17.0 7.9 21.3 6.7 6.1 59.0 
   % within INVE 32.2% 13.6% 33.9% 10.2% 10.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 67.9% 61.5% 57.1% 54.5% 60.0% 60.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 .1 -.6 -.5 -.1  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .9 .4 1.1 .3 .3 3.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 7.7% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 1.0 1.1 -.6 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 4 1 8 4 3 20 
   Expected Count 5.8 2.7 7.2 2.3 2.1 20.0 
   % within INVE 20.0% 5.0% 40.0% 20.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 14.3% 7.7% 22.9% 36.4% 30.0% 20.6% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.0 -1.2 .4 1.4 .8  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 2 5 0 0 10 
   Expected Count 2.9 1.3 3.6 1.1 1.0 10.0 
   % within INVE 30.0% 20.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.7% 15.4% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 10.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .1 .6 1.0 -1.2 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 2 1 0 1 1 5 
   Expected Count 1.4 .7 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within INVE 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.1% 7.7% 0.0% 9.1% 10.0% 5.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 .4 -1.7 .6 .7  
  Total Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
   Expected Count 28.0 13.0 35.0 11.0 10.0 97.0 
   % within INVE 28.9% 13.4% 36.1% 11.3% 10.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
All Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 12 5 10 1 5 33 
   Expected Count 5.8 3.9 18.5 2.7 2.1 33.0 
   % within INVE 36.4% 15.2% 30.3% 3.0% 15.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 63.2% 38.5% 16.4% 11.1% 71.4% 30.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 3.4 .7 -3.6 -1.3 2.4  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .2 .1 .6 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% .9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.4 .9 -.3 -.3  
  3 Federal Count 4 7 38 6 2 57 
   Expected Count 9.9 6.8 31.9 4.7 3.7 57.0 
   % within INVE 7.0% 12.3% 66.7% 10.5% 3.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 21.1% 53.8% 62.3% 66.7% 28.6% 52.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.0 .1 2.4 .9 -1.3  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 1 11 1 0 15 
   Expected Count 2.6 1.8 8.4 1.2 1.0 15.0 
   % within INVE 13.3% 6.7% 73.3% 6.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 7.7% 18.0% 11.1% 0.0% 13.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.7 1.5 -.2 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 1 1 0 3 
   Expected Count .5 .4 1.7 .2 .2 3.0 
   % within INVE 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 1.6% 11.1% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.6 -.8 1.6 -.5  
  Total Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
   Expected Count 19.0 13.0 61.0 9.0 7.0 109.0 
   % within INVE 17.4% 11.9% 56.0% 8.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 13 7 19 9 4 52 
   Expected Count 13.0 6.5 21.1 7.0 4.3 52.0 
   % within INVE 25.0% 13.5% 36.5% 17.3% 7.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 54.2% 58.3% 48.7% 69.2% 50.0% 54.2% 
   Adjusted Residual 0.0 .3 -.9 1.2 -.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .5 .3 .8 .3 .2 2.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 8.3% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -.8 1.6 .3 -.6 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 5 2 12 3 3 25 
   Expected Count 6.3 3.1 10.2 3.4 2.1 25.0 
   % within INVE 20.0% 8.0% 48.0% 12.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.8% 16.7% 30.8% 23.1% 37.5% 26.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.8 .9 -.3 .8  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 1 6 1 0 12 
   Expected Count 3.0 1.5 4.9 1.6 1.0 12.0 
   % within INVE 33.3% 8.3% 50.0% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.7% 8.3% 15.4% 7.7% 0.0% 12.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.5 .7 -.6 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 2 1 1 0 1 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .6 2.0 .7 .4 5.0 
   % within INVE 40.0% 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 8.3% 8.3% 2.6% 0.0% 12.5% 5.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 .5 -1.0 -.9 1.0  
  Total Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
   Expected Count 24.0 12.0 39.0 13.0 8.0 96.0 
   % within INVE 25.0% 12.5% 40.6% 13.5% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 25 12 29 10 9 85 
   Expected Count 17.8 10.4 41.5 9.1 6.2 85.0 
   % within INVE 29.4% 14.1% 34.1% 11.8% 10.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 58.1% 48.0% 29.0% 45.5% 60.0% 41.5% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.5 .7 -3.5 .4 1.5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .6 .4 1.5 .3 .2 3.0 
   % within INVE 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 1.1 .6 -.6 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 9 9 50 9 5 82 
   Expected Count 17.2 10.0 40.0 8.8 6.0 82.0 
   % within INVE 11.0% 11.0% 61.0% 11.0% 6.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.9% 36.0% 50.0% 40.9% 33.3% 40.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.9 -.4 2.9 .1 -.5  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 6 2 17 2 0 27 
   Expected Count 5.7 3.3 13.2 2.9 2.0 27.0 
   % within INVE 22.2% 7.4% 63.0% 7.4% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 14.0% 8.0% 17.0% 9.1% 0.0% 13.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -.8 1.6 -.6 -1.6  
  5 Feudal Count 3 1 2 1 1 8 
   Expected Count 1.7 1.0 3.9 .9 .6 8.0 
   % within INVE 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.0% 4.0% 2.0% 4.5% 6.7% 3.9% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.2 .0 -1.4 .2 .6  
  Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
   Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
   % within INVE 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
181 
APPENDIX D3: CROSS-TABULATION OF BUSINESS APPLICATION 
NEEDS 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Large Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 2 2 5 1 3 13 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.7 8.0 1.1 .6 13.0 
   % within APPL 15.4% 15.4% 38.5% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 18.2% 9.8% 14.3% 75.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 .2 -1.9 -.1 3.3  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 0 2 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .2 .3 1.2 .2 .1 2.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.6 1.1 -.4 -.3  
  3 Federal Count 4 8 38 6 0 56 
   Expected Count 6.7 7.4 34.4 4.7 2.7 56.0 
   % within APPL 7.1% 14.3% 67.9% 10.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 72.7% 74.5% 85.7% 0.0% 67.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.0 .4 1.7 1.1 -3.0  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 1 4 0 1 8 
   Expected Count 1.0 1.1 4.9 .7 .4 8.0 
   % within APPL 25.0% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 9.1% 7.8% 0.0% 25.0% 9.6% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.2 -.1 -.7 -.9 1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 2 0 2 0 0 4 
   Expected Count .5 .5 2.5 .3 .2 4.0 
   % within APPL 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.4 -.8 -.5 -.6 -.5  
  Total Count 10 11 51 7 4 83 
   Expected Count 10.0 11.0 51.0 7.0 4.0 83.0 
   % within APPL 12.0% 13.3% 61.4% 8.4% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 2 0 2 0 0 4 
   Expected Count .8 .2 2.2 .6 .2 4.0 
   % within APPL 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.6 -.4 -.3 -1.0 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 2 0 8 3 1 14 
   Expected Count 2.8 .6 7.8 2.2 .6 14.0 
   % within APPL 14.3% 0.0% 57.1% 21.4% 7.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 0.0% 57.1% 75.0% 100.0% 56.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.8 -1.2 .1 .8 .9  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 0 2 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .4 .1 1.1 .3 .1 2.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 8.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.3 1.3 -.6 -.3  
  5 Feudal Count 1 1 2 1 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.0 .2 2.8 .8 .2 5.0 
   % within APPL 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 100.0% 14.3% 25.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 0.0 2.0 -.8 .3 -.5  
  Total Count 5 1 14 4 1 25 
   Expected Count 5.0 1.0 14.0 4.0 1.0 25.0 
   % within APPL 20.0% 4.0% 56.0% 16.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 4 2 7 1 3 17 
   Expected Count 2.4 1.9 10.2 1.7 .8 17.0 
   % within APPL 23.5% 11.8% 41.2% 5.9% 17.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.7% 16.7% 10.8% 9.1% 60.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.3 .1 -1.7 -.6 2.8  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 0 2 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .3 .2 1.2 .2 .1 2.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.6 -.5 1.2 -.5 -.3  
  3 Federal Count 6 8 46 9 1 70 
   Expected Count 9.7 7.8 42.1 7.1 3.2 70.0 
   % within APPL 8.6% 11.4% 65.7% 12.9% 1.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 66.7% 70.8% 81.8% 20.0% 64.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.2 .1 1.6 1.2 -2.1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 1 6 0 1 10 
   Expected Count 1.4 1.1 6.0 1.0 .5 10.0 
   % within APPL 20.0% 10.0% 60.0% 0.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 13.3% 8.3% 9.2% 0.0% 20.0% 9.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 -.1 .0 -1.1 .8  
  5 Feudal Count 3 1 4 1 0 9 
   Expected Count 1.3 1.0 5.4 .9 .4 9.0 
   % within APPL 33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 11.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 8.3% 6.2% 9.1% 0.0% 8.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.8 0.0 -1.0 .1 -.7  
  Total Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
   Expected Count 15.0 12.0 65.0 11.0 5.0 108.0 
   % within APPL 13.9% 11.1% 60.2% 10.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Small Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 7 1 1 0 2 11 
   Expected Count 3.8 .8 4.2 .8 1.3 11.0 
   % within APPL 63.6% 9.1% 9.1% 0.0% 18.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 77.8% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% 66.7% 42.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.7 .2 -2.6 -1.3 .9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 1 0 1 3 
   Expected Count 1.0 .2 1.2 .2 .3 3.0 
   % within APPL 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 33.3% 11.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .0 -.5 -.2 -.5 1.3  
  3 Federal Count 1 0 6 1 0 8 
   Expected Count 2.8 .6 3.1 .6 .9 8.0 
   % within APPL 12.5% 0.0% 75.0% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 60.0% 50.0% 0.0% 30.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.6 -1.0 2.6 .6 -1.2  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 1 0 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .3 .1 .4 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 3.5 -.8 -.3 -.4  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 2 1 0 3 
   Expected Count 1.0 .2 1.2 .2 .3 3.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 50.0% 0.0% 11.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.3 -.5 1.1 1.8 -.7  
  Total Count 9 2 10 2 3 26 
   Expected Count 9.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 26.0 
   % within APPL 34.6% 7.7% 38.5% 7.7% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 10 7 12 5 3 37 
   Expected Count 9.9 5.7 13.0 4.7 3.6 37.0 
   % within APPL 27.0% 18.9% 32.4% 13.5% 8.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 52.6% 63.6% 48.0% 55.6% 42.9% 52.1% 
   Adjusted Residual .1 .8 -.5 .2 -.5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .8 .5 1.1 .4 .3 3.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 9.1% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 .9 1.2 -.7 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 6 1 8 3 2 20 
   Expected Count 5.4 3.1 7.0 2.5 2.0 20.0 
   % within APPL 30.0% 5.0% 40.0% 15.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 31.6% 9.1% 32.0% 33.3% 28.6% 28.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 -1.5 .5 .4 .0  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 1 3 1 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .8 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 9.1% 12.0% 11.1% 0.0% 7.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.4 .3 1.2 .5 -.8  
  5 Feudal Count 3 1 0 0 2 6 
   Expected Count 1.6 .9 2.1 .8 .6 6.0 
   % within APPL 50.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 8.5% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.3 .1 -1.9 -1.0 2.0  
  Total Count 19 11 25 9 7 71 
   Expected Count 19.0 11.0 25.0 9.0 7.0 71.0 
   % within APPL 26.8% 15.5% 35.2% 12.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 17 8 13 5 5 48 
   Expected Count 13.9 6.4 17.3 5.4 4.9 48.0 
   % within APPL 35.4% 16.7% 27.1% 10.4% 10.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 60.7% 61.5% 37.1% 45.5% 50.0% 49.5% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.4 .9 -1.8 -.3 .0  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 3 0 1 6 
   Expected Count 1.7 .8 2.2 .7 .6 6.0 
   % within APPL 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 0.0% 16.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 3.6% 7.7% 8.6% 0.0% 10.0% 6.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 .2 .7 -.9 .5  
  3 Federal Count 7 1 14 4 2 28 
   Expected Count 8.1 3.8 10.1 3.2 2.9 28.0 
   % within APPL 25.0% 3.6% 50.0% 14.3% 7.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 25.0% 7.7% 40.0% 36.4% 20.0% 28.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -1.8 1.8 .6 -.7  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 2 3 1 0 6 
   Expected Count 1.7 .8 2.2 .7 .6 6.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 15.4% 8.6% 9.1% 0.0% 6.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.6 1.5 .7 .4 -.9  
  5 Feudal Count 3 1 2 1 2 9 
   Expected Count 2.6 1.2 3.2 1.0 .9 9.0 
   % within APPL 33.3% 11.1% 22.2% 11.1% 22.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.7% 7.7% 5.7% 9.1% 20.0% 9.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .3 -.2 -.9 .0 1.2  
  Total Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
   Expected Count 28.0 13.0 35.0 11.0 10.0 97.0 
   % within APPL 28.9% 13.4% 36.1% 11.3% 10.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
All  Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 9 3 6 1 5 24 
   Expected Count 4.2 2.9 13.4 2.0 1.5 24.0 
   % within APPL 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 4.2% 20.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 47.4% 23.1% 9.8% 11.1% 71.4% 22.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.9 .1 -3.5 -.8 3.3  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 3 0 1 5 
   Expected Count .9 .6 2.8 .4 .3 5.0 
   % within APPL 20.0% 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 14.3% 4.6% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -.8 .2 -.7 1.3  
  3 Federal Count 5 8 44 7 0 64 
   Expected Count 11.2 7.6 35.8 5.3 4.1 64.0 
   % within APPL 7.8% 12.5% 68.8% 10.9% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.3% 61.5% 72.1% 77.8% 0.0% 58.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.2 .2 3.2 1.2 -3.3  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 2 4 0 1 9 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.1 5.0 .7 .6 9.0 
   % within APPL 22.2% 22.2% 44.4% 0.0% 11.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 15.4% 6.6% 0.0% 14.3% 8.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 1.0 -.7 -.9 .6  
  5 Feudal Count 2 0 4 1 0 7 
   Expected Count 1.2 .8 3.9 .6 .4 7.0 
   % within APPL 28.6% 0.0% 57.1% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 0.0% 6.6% 11.1% 0.0% 6.4% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 -1.0 .1 .6 -.7  
  Total Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
   Expected Count 19.0 13.0 61.0 9.0 7.0 109.0 
   % within APPL 17.4% 11.9% 56.0% 8.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 12 7 14 5 3 41 
   Expected Count 10.3 5.1 16.7 5.6 3.4 41.0 
   % within APPL 29.3% 17.1% 34.1% 12.2% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 50.0% 58.3% 35.9% 38.5% 37.5% 42.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 1.2 -1.1 -.3 -.3  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .8 .4 1.2 .4 .3 3.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 8.3% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.0 1.1 .9 -.7 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 8 1 16 6 3 34 
   Expected Count 8.5 4.3 13.8 4.6 2.8 34.0 
   % within APPL 23.5% 2.9% 47.1% 17.6% 8.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 33.3% 8.3% 41.0% 46.2% 37.5% 35.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.2 -2.1 1.0 .9 .1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 1 5 1 0 7 
   Expected Count 1.8 .9 2.8 .9 .6 7.0 
   % within APPL 0.0% 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 8.3% 12.8% 7.7% 0.0% 7.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.6 .1 1.7 .1 -.8  
  5 Feudal Count 4 2 2 1 2 11 
   Expected Count 2.8 1.4 4.5 1.5 .9 11.0 
   % within APPL 36.4% 18.2% 18.2% 9.1% 18.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.7% 16.7% 5.1% 7.7% 25.0% 11.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 .6 -1.6 -.5 1.3  
  Total Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
   Expected Count 24.0 12.0 39.0 13.0 8.0 96.0 
   % within APPL 25.0% 12.5% 40.6% 13.5% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 21 10 20 6 8 65 
   Expected Count 13.6 7.9 31.7 7.0 4.8 65.0 
   % within APPL 32.3% 15.4% 30.8% 9.2% 12.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 48.8% 40.0% 20.0% 27.3% 53.3% 31.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.7 1.0 -3.5 -.5 1.9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 5 0 1 8 
   Expected Count 1.7 1.0 3.9 .9 .6 8.0 
   % within APPL 12.5% 12.5% 62.5% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 2.3% 4.0% 5.0% 0.0% 6.7% 3.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.6 .0 .8 -1.0 .6  
  3 Federal Count 13 9 60 13 3 98 
   Expected Count 20.6 12.0 47.8 10.5 7.2 98.0 
   % within APPL 13.3% 9.2% 61.2% 13.3% 3.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 30.2% 36.0% 60.0% 59.1% 20.0% 47.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.6 -1.3 3.4 1.1 -2.2  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 3 9 1 1 16 
   Expected Count 3.4 2.0 7.8 1.7 1.2 16.0 
   % within APPL 12.5% 18.8% 56.3% 6.3% 6.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 4.7% 12.0% 9.0% 4.5% 6.7% 7.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 .8 .6 -.6 -.2  
  5 Feudal Count 6 2 6 2 2 18 
   Expected Count 3.8 2.2 8.8 1.9 1.3 18.0 
   % within APPL 33.3% 11.1% 33.3% 11.1% 11.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 14.0% 8.0% 6.0% 9.1% 13.3% 8.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.3 -.1 -1.4 .1 .6  
  Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
   Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
   % within APPL 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX D4: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT ARCHITECTURE 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Large Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 2 2 4 1 2 11 
   Expected Count 1.3 1.5 6.8 .9 .5 11.0 
   % within ARCH 18.2% 18.2% 36.4% 9.1% 18.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 18.2% 7.8% 14.3% 50.0% 13.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 .5 -1.8 .1 2.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 4 0 0 6 
   Expected Count .7 .8 3.7 .5 .3 6.0 
   % within ARCH 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 9.1% 7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 .3 .3 -.8 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 2 7 34 6 2 51 
   Expected Count 6.1 6.8 31.3 4.3 2.5 51.0 
   % within ARCH 3.9% 13.7% 66.7% 11.8% 3.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 63.6% 66.7% 85.7% 50.0% 61.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.9 .2 1.2 1.4 -.5  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 1 8 0 0 13 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.7 8.0 1.1 .6 13.0 
   % within ARCH 30.8% 7.7% 61.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 9.1% 15.7% 0.0% 0.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.3 -.6 .0 -1.2 -.9  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .2 .3 1.2 .2 .1 2.0 
   % within ARCH 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.7 -.6 -.3 -.4 -.3  
  Total Count 10 11 51 7 4 83 
   Expected Count 10.0 11.0 51.0 7.0 4.0 83.0 
   % within ARCH 12.0% 13.3% 61.4% 8.4% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 3 0 3 1 0 7 
   Expected Count 1.4 .3 3.9 1.1 .3 7.0 
   % within ARCH 42.9% 0.0% 42.9% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 60.0% 0.0% 21.4% 25.0% 0.0% 28.0% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.8 -.6 -.8 -.1 -.6  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .2 .0 .6 .2 .0 1.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.2 .9 -.4 -.2  
  3 Federal Count 1 1 8 2 0 12 
   Expected Count 2.4 .5 6.7 1.9 .5 12.0 
   % within ARCH 8.3% 8.3% 66.7% 16.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 100.0% 57.1% 50.0% 0.0% 48.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.4 1.1 1.0 .1 -1.0  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 0 1 1 1 4 
   Expected Count .8 .2 2.2 .6 .2 4.0 
   % within ARCH 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 7.1% 25.0% 100.0% 16.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .3 -.4 -1.4 .5 2.3  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .2 .0 .6 .2 .0 1.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.5 -.2 .9 -.4 -.2  
  Total Count 5 1 14 4 1 25 
   Expected Count 5.0 1.0 14.0 4.0 1.0 25.0 
   % within ARCH 20.0% 4.0% 56.0% 16.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 5 2 7 2 2 18 
   Expected Count 2.5 2.0 10.8 1.8 .8 18.0 
   % within ARCH 27.8% 11.1% 38.9% 11.1% 11.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 33.3% 16.7% 10.8% 18.2% 40.0% 16.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.9 0.0 -2.0 .1 1.4  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 5 0 0 7 
   Expected Count 1.0 .8 4.2 .7 .3 7.0 
   % within ARCH 14.3% 14.3% 71.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 8.3% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .0 .3 .6 -.9 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 3 8 42 8 2 63 
   Expected Count 8.8 7.0 37.9 6.4 2.9 63.0 
   % within ARCH 4.8% 12.7% 66.7% 12.7% 3.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 66.7% 64.6% 72.7% 40.0% 58.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.2 .6 1.6 1.0 -.9  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 5 1 9 1 1 17 
   Expected Count 2.4 1.9 10.2 1.7 .8 17.0 
   % within ARCH 29.4% 5.9% 52.9% 5.9% 5.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 33.3% 8.3% 13.8% 9.1% 20.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.0 -.7 -.7 -.6 .3  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .4 .3 1.8 .3 .1 3.0 
   % within ARCH 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.0 -.6 .2 -.6 -.4  
186 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
  Total Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
   Expected Count 15.0 12.0 65.0 11.0 5.0 108.0 
   % within ARCH 13.9% 11.1% 60.2% 10.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Small Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 8 1 2 1 2 14 
   Expected Count 4.8 1.1 5.4 1.1 1.6 14.0 
   % within ARCH 57.1% 7.1% 14.3% 7.1% 14.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 88.9% 50.0% 20.0% 50.0% 66.7% 53.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.6 -.1 -2.7 -.1 .5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 3 0 0 4 
   Expected Count 1.4 .3 1.5 .3 .5 4.0 
   % within ARCH 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 -.6 1.6 -.6 -.8  
  3 Federal Count 0 1 3 1 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.7 .4 1.9 .4 .6 5.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 50.0% 30.0% 50.0% 0.0% 19.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 -.9  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 0 1 0 1 2 
   Expected Count .7 .2 .8 .2 .2 2.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 33.3% 7.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 -.4 .3 -.4 1.8  
  5 Feudal Count 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .3 .1 .4 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.3 1.3 -.3 -.4  
  Total Count 9 2 10 2 3 26 
   Expected Count 9.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 26.0 
   % within ARCH 34.6% 7.7% 38.5% 7.7% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 10 7 15 7 3 42 
   Expected Count 11.2 6.5 14.8 5.3 4.1 42.0 
   % within ARCH 23.8% 16.7% 35.7% 16.7% 7.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 52.6% 63.6% 60.0% 77.8% 42.9% 59.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 .3 .1 1.2 -.9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 2 1 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .8 .5 1.1 .4 .3 3.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 18.2% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.1 2.5 -.1 -.7 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 6 1 5 2 2 16 
   Expected Count 4.3 2.5 5.6 2.0 1.6 16.0 
   % within ARCH 37.5% 6.3% 31.3% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 31.6% 9.1% 20.0% 22.2% 28.6% 22.5% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.1 -1.2 -.4 .0 .4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 1 3 0 0 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .8 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within ARCH 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 9.1% 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 .3 1.2 -.9 -.8  
  5 Feudal Count 2 0 1 0 2 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .8 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within ARCH 40.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 28.6% 7.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -1.0 -.7 -.9 2.3  
  Total Count 19 11 25 9 7 71 
   Expected Count 19.0 11.0 25.0 9.0 7.0 71.0 
   % within ARCH 26.8% 15.5% 35.2% 12.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 18 8 17 8 5 56 
   Expected Count 16.2 7.5 20.2 6.4 5.8 56.0 
   % within ARCH 32.1% 14.3% 30.4% 14.3% 8.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 64.3% 61.5% 48.6% 72.7% 50.0% 57.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 .3 -1.4 1.1 -.5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 2 4 0 0 7 
   Expected Count 2.0 .9 2.5 .8 .7 7.0 
   % within ARCH 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 3.6% 15.4% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 1.2 1.2 -1.0 -.9  
  3 Federal Count 6 2 8 3 2 21 
   Expected Count 6.1 2.8 7.6 2.4 2.2 21.0 
   % within ARCH 28.6% 9.5% 38.1% 14.3% 9.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 21.4% 15.4% 22.9% 27.3% 20.0% 21.6% 
   Adjusted Residual .0 -.6 .2 .5 -.1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 1 4 0 1 7 
   Expected Count 2.0 .9 2.5 .8 .7 7.0 
   % within ARCH 14.3% 14.3% 57.1% 0.0% 14.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 3.6% 7.7% 11.4% 0.0% 10.0% 7.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 .1 1.2 -1.0 .4  
  5 Feudal Count 2 0 2 0 2 6 
   Expected Count 1.7 .8 2.2 .7 .6 6.0 
   % within ARCH 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.1% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 20.0% 6.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -1.0 -.1 -.9 1.9  
  Total Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
   Expected Count 28.0 13.0 35.0 11.0 10.0 97.0 
   % within ARCH 28.9% 13.4% 36.1% 11.3% 10.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
All Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 10 3 6 2 4 25 
   Expected Count 4.4 3.0 14.0 2.1 1.6 25.0 
   % within ARCH 40.0% 12.0% 24.0% 8.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 52.6% 23.1% 9.8% 22.2% 57.1% 22.9% 
   Adjusted Residual 3.4 .0 -3.7 -.1 2.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 2 1 7 0 0 10 
   Expected Count 1.7 1.2 5.6 .8 .6 10.0 
   % within ARCH 20.0% 10.0% 70.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 7.7% 11.5% 0.0% 0.0% 9.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -.2 .9 -1.0 -.9  
  3 Federal Count 2 8 37 7 2 56 
   Expected Count 9.8 6.7 31.3 4.6 3.6 56.0 
   % within ARCH 3.6% 14.3% 66.1% 12.5% 3.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 61.5% 60.7% 77.8% 28.6% 51.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.9 .8 2.2 1.7 -1.2  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 1 9 0 1 15 
   Expected Count 2.6 1.8 8.4 1.2 1.0 15.0 
   % within ARCH 26.7% 6.7% 60.0% 0.0% 6.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 21.1% 7.7% 14.8% 0.0% 14.3% 13.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.0 -.7 .3 -1.3 .0  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 2 0 0 3 
   Expected Count .5 .4 1.7 .2 .2 3.0 
   % within ARCH 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.6 .4 -.5 -.5  
  Total Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
   Expected Count 19.0 13.0 61.0 9.0 7.0 109.0 
   % within ARCH 17.4% 11.9% 56.0% 8.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 13 7 18 8 3 49 
   Expected Count 12.3 6.1 19.9 6.6 4.1 49.0 
   % within ARCH 26.5% 14.3% 36.7% 16.3% 6.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 54.2% 58.3% 46.2% 61.5% 37.5% 51.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 .5 -.8 .8 -.8  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 2 2 0 0 4 
   Expected Count 1.0 .5 1.6 .5 .3 4.0 
   % within ARCH 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 16.7% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.2 2.3 .4 -.8 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 7 2 13 4 2 28 
   Expected Count 7.0 3.5 11.4 3.8 2.3 28.0 
   % within ARCH 25.0% 7.1% 46.4% 14.3% 7.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 29.2% 16.7% 33.3% 30.8% 25.0% 29.2% 
   Adjusted Residual 0.0 -1.0 .7 .1 -.3  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 2 1 4 1 1 9 
   Expected Count 2.3 1.1 3.7 1.2 .8 9.0 
   % within ARCH 22.2% 11.1% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 8.3% 8.3% 10.3% 7.7% 12.5% 9.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.2 -.1 .2 -.2 .3  
  5 Feudal Count 2 0 2 0 2 6 
   Expected Count 1.5 .8 2.4 .8 .5 6.0 
   % within ARCH 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 8.3% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 25.0% 6.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .5 -1.0 -.4 -1.0 2.3  
  Total Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
   Expected Count 24.0 12.0 39.0 13.0 8.0 96.0 
   % within ARCH 25.0% 12.5% 40.6% 13.5% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 23 10 24 10 7 74 
   Expected Count 15.5 9.0 36.1 7.9 5.4 74.0 
   % within ARCH 31.1% 13.5% 32.4% 13.5% 9.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 53.5% 40.0% 24.0% 45.5% 46.7% 36.1% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.7 .4 -3.5 1.0 .9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 2 3 9 0 0 14 
   Expected Count 2.9 1.7 6.8 1.5 1.0 14.0 
   % within ARCH 14.3% 21.4% 64.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 4.7% 12.0% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.6 1.1 1.2 -1.3 -1.1  
  3 Federal Count 9 10 50 11 4 84 
   Expected Count 17.6 10.2 41.0 9.0 6.1 84.0 
   % within ARCH 10.7% 11.9% 59.5% 13.1% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.9% 40.0% 50.0% 50.0% 26.7% 41.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.0 -.1 2.6 .9 -1.2  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 6 2 13 1 2 24 
   Expected Count 5.0 2.9 11.7 2.6 1.8 24.0 
   % within ARCH 25.0% 8.3% 54.2% 4.2% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 14.0% 8.0% 13.0% 4.5% 13.3% 11.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .5 -.6 .6 -1.1 .2  
  5 Feudal Count 3 0 4 0 2 9 
   Expected Count 1.9 1.1 4.4 1.0 .7 9.0 
   % within ARCH 33.3% 0.0% 44.4% 0.0% 22.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 13.3% 4.4% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 -1.1 -.3 -1.1 1.8  
  Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
   Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
   % within ARCH 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX D5: CROSS-TABULATION OF IT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Large Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 2 3 4 1 3 13 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.7 8.0 1.1 .6 13.0 
   % within INFR 15.4% 23.1% 30.8% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 27.3% 7.8% 14.3% 75.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .4 1.1 -2.5 -.1 3.3  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 2 0 0 4 
   Expected Count .5 .5 2.5 .3 .2 4.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 9.1% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 
   Adjusted Residual .8 .7 -.5 -.6 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 3 7 36 5 1 52 
   Expected Count 6.3 6.9 32.0 4.4 2.5 52.0 
   % within INFR 5.8% 13.5% 69.2% 9.6% 1.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 30.0% 63.6% 70.6% 71.4% 25.0% 62.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.3 .1 1.9 .5 -1.6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 0 9 1 0 13 
   Expected Count 1.6 1.7 8.0 1.1 .6 13.0 
   % within INFR 23.1% 0.0% 69.2% 7.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 30.0% 0.0% 17.6% 14.3% 0.0% 15.7% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.3 -1.5 .6 -.1 -.9  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .1 .1 .6 .1 .0 1.0 
   % within INFR 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.7 -.4 -1.3 -.3 -.2  
  Total Count 10 11 51 7 4 83 
   Expected Count 10.0 11.0 51.0 7.0 4.0 83.0 
   % within INFR 12.0% 13.3% 61.4% 8.4% 4.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 2 0 4 1 0 7 
   Expected Count 1.4 .3 3.9 1.1 .3 7.0 
   % within INFR 28.6% 0.0% 57.1% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 0.0% 28.6% 25.0% 0.0% 28.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.6 .1 -.1 -.6  
  3 Federal Count 2 0 8 1 1 12 
   Expected Count 2.4 .5 6.7 1.9 .5 12.0 
   % within INFR 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 8.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 40.0% 0.0% 57.1% 25.0% 100.0% 48.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.1  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 1 0 1 1 0 3 
   Expected Count .6 .1 1.7 .5 .1 3.0 
   % within INFR 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 20.0% 0.0% 7.1% 25.0% 0.0% 12.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 -.4 -.8 .9 -.4  
  5 Feudal Count 0 1 1 1 0 3 
   Expected Count .6 .1 1.7 .5 .1 3.0 
   % within INFR 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 100.0% 7.1% 25.0% 0.0% 12.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 2.8 -.8 .9 -.4  
  Total Count 5 1 14 4 1 25 
   Expected Count 5.0 1.0 14.0 4.0 1.0 25.0 
   % within INFR 20.0% 4.0% 56.0% 16.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 4 3 8 2 3 20 
   Expected Count 2.8 2.2 12.0 2.0 .9 20.0 
   % within INFR 20.0% 15.0% 40.0% 10.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.7% 25.0% 12.3% 18.2% 60.0% 18.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 .6 -2.0 .0 2.4  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 2 0 0 4 
   Expected Count .6 .4 2.4 .4 .2 4.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 8.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 .9 -.4 -.7 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 5 7 44 6 2 64 
   Expected Count 8.9 7.1 38.5 6.5 3.0 64.0 
   % within INFR 7.8% 10.9% 68.8% 9.4% 3.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 33.3% 58.3% 67.7% 54.5% 40.0% 59.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.2 -.1 2.2 -.3 -.9  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 0 10 2 0 16 
   Expected Count 2.2 1.8 9.6 1.6 .7 16.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 0.0% 62.5% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.7% 0.0% 15.4% 18.2% 0.0% 14.8% 
   Adjusted Residual 1.4 -1.5 .2 .3 -1.0  
  5 Feudal Count 1 1 1 1 0 4 
   Expected Count .6 .4 2.4 .4 .2 4.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 6.7% 8.3% 1.5% 9.1% 0.0% 3.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 .9 -1.5 1.0 -.4  
  Total Count 15 12 65 11 5 108 
   Expected Count 15.0 12.0 65.0 11.0 5.0 108.0 
   % within INFR 13.9% 11.1% 60.2% 10.2% 4.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
Small Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 8 1 1 1 1 12 
   Expected Count 4.2 .9 4.6 .9 1.4 12.0 
   % within INFR 66.7% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 88.9% 50.0% 10.0% 50.0% 33.3% 46.2% 
   Adjusted Residual 3.2 .1 -2.9 .1 -.5  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 0 2 0 1 4 
   Expected Count 1.4 .3 1.5 .3 .5 4.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 11.1% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 33.3% 15.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 -.6 .5 -.6 .9  
  3 Federal Count 0 1 5 0 1 7 
   Expected Count 2.4 .5 2.7 .5 .8 7.0 
   % within INFR 0.0% 14.3% 71.4% 0.0% 14.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 33.3% 26.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.3 .8 2.1 -.9 .3  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 0 0 2 1 0 3 
   Expected Count 1.0 .2 1.2 .2 .3 3.0 
   % within INFR 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 50.0% 0.0% 11.5% 
   Adjusted Residual -1.3 -.5 1.1 1.8 -.7  
  Total Count 9 2 10 2 3 26 
   Expected Count 9.0 2.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 26.0 
   % within INFR 34.6% 7.7% 38.5% 7.7% 11.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 9 7 14 7 3 40 
   Expected Count 10.7 6.2 14.1 5.1 3.9 40.0 
   % within INFR 22.5% 17.5% 35.0% 17.5% 7.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 47.4% 63.6% 56.0% 77.8% 42.9% 56.3% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 .5 .0 1.4 -.8  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .5 .3 .7 .3 .2 2.0 
   % within INFR 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 9.1% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 
   Adjusted Residual -.9 1.4 .4 -.5 -.5  
  3 Federal Count 5 1 5 2 2 15 
   Expected Count 4.0 2.3 5.3 1.9 1.5 15.0 
   % within INFR 33.3% 6.7% 33.3% 13.3% 13.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 26.3% 9.1% 20.0% 22.2% 28.6% 21.1% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 -1.1 -.2 .1 .5  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 1 5 0 0 9 
   Expected Count 2.4 1.4 3.2 1.1 .9 9.0 
   % within INFR 33.3% 11.1% 55.6% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 9.1% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .5 -.4 1.4 -1.2 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 2 1 0 0 2 5 
   Expected Count 1.3 .8 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within INFR 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 7.0% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 .3 -1.7 -.9 2.3  
  Total Count 19 11 25 9 7 71 
   Expected Count 19.0 11.0 25.0 9.0 7.0 71.0 
   % within INFR 26.8% 15.5% 35.2% 12.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 17 8 15 8 4 52 
   Expected Count 15.0 7.0 18.8 5.9 5.4 52.0 
   % within INFR 32.7% 15.4% 28.8% 15.4% 7.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 60.7% 61.5% 42.9% 72.7% 40.0% 53.6% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 .6 -1.6 1.4 -.9  
  2 IT monarchy Count 1 1 3 0 1 6 
   Expected Count 1.7 .8 2.2 .7 .6 6.0 
   % within INFR 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 0.0% 16.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 3.6% 7.7% 8.6% 0.0% 10.0% 6.2% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 .2 .7 -.9 .5  
  3 Federal Count 5 2 10 2 3 22 
   Expected Count 6.4 2.9 7.9 2.5 2.3 22.0 
   % within INFR 22.7% 9.1% 45.5% 9.1% 13.6% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 17.9% 15.4% 28.6% 18.2% 30.0% 22.7% 
   Adjusted Residual -.7 -.7 1.0 -.4 .6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 1 7 1 0 12 
   Expected Count 3.5 1.6 4.3 1.4 1.2 12.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 8.3% 58.3% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.7% 7.7% 20.0% 9.1% 0.0% 12.4% 
   Adjusted Residual -.3 -.6 1.7 -.4 -1.3  
  5 Feudal Count 2 1 0 0 2 5 
   Expected Count 1.4 .7 1.8 .6 .5 5.0 
   % within INFR 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.1% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 5.2% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 .4 -1.7 -.8 2.2  
  Total Count 28 13 35 11 10 97 
   Expected Count 28.0 13.0 35.0 11.0 10.0 97.0 
   % within INFR 28.9% 13.4% 36.1% 11.3% 10.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Size  Relationship   Shared Services Delivery Arrangement (SSDA) 
        Intra-
service 
Service Corporate Supra-
Corporate 
Iso-
Corporate 
 Total 
All Provider 1 Business monarchy Count 10 4 5 2 4 25 
   Expected Count 4.4 3.0 14.0 2.1 1.6 25.0 
   % within INFR 40.0% 16.0% 20.0% 8.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 52.6% 30.8% 8.2% 22.2% 57.1% 22.9% 
   Adjusted Residual 3.4 .7 -4.1 -.1 2.2  
  2 IT monarchy Count 2 1 4 0 1 8 
   Expected Count 1.4 1.0 4.5 .7 .5 8.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 10.5% 7.7% 6.6% 0.0% 14.3% 7.3% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 .1 -.4 -.9 .7  
  3 Federal Count 3 8 41 5 2 59 
   Expected Count 10.3 7.0 33.0 4.9 3.8 59.0 
   % within INFR 5.1% 13.6% 69.5% 8.5% 3.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 61.5% 67.2% 55.6% 28.6% 54.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -3.7 .6 3.1 .1 -1.4  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 3 0 11 2 0 16 
   Expected Count 2.8 1.9 9.0 1.3 1.0 16.0 
   % within INFR 18.8% 0.0% 68.8% 12.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 15.8% 0.0% 18.0% 22.2% 0.0% 14.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .2 -1.6 1.1 .7 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
   Expected Count .2 .1 .6 .1 .1 1.0 
   % within INFR 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .9% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.2 -.4 -1.1 -.3 -.3  
  Total Count 19 13 61 9 7 109 
   Expected Count 19.0 13.0 61.0 9.0 7.0 109.0 
   % within INFR 17.4% 11.9% 56.0% 8.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Client 1 Business monarchy Count 11 7 18 8 3 47 
   Expected Count 11.8 5.9 19.1 6.4 3.9 47.0 
   % within INFR 23.4% 14.9% 38.3% 17.0% 6.4% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 45.8% 58.3% 46.2% 61.5% 37.5% 49.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -.4 .7 -.5 1.0 -.7  
  2 IT monarchy Count 0 1 1 0 0 2 
   Expected Count .5 .3 .8 .3 .2 2.0 
   % within INFR 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 0.0% 8.3% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 
   Adjusted Residual -.8 1.6 .3 -.6 -.4  
  3 Federal Count 7 1 13 3 3 27 
   Expected Count 6.8 3.4 11.0 3.7 2.3 27.0 
   % within INFR 25.9% 3.7% 48.1% 11.1% 11.1% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 29.2% 8.3% 33.3% 23.1% 37.5% 28.1% 
   Adjusted Residual .1 -1.6 .9 -.4 .6  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 4 1 6 1 0 12 
   Expected Count 3.0 1.5 4.9 1.6 1.0 12.0 
   % within INFR 33.3% 8.3% 50.0% 8.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.7% 8.3% 15.4% 7.7% 0.0% 12.5% 
   Adjusted Residual .7 -.5 .7 -.6 -1.1  
  5 Feudal Count 2 2 1 1 2 8 
   Expected Count 2.0 1.0 3.3 1.1 .7 8.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 8.3% 16.7% 2.6% 7.7% 25.0% 8.3% 
   Adjusted Residual 0.0 1.1 -1.7 -.1 1.8  
  Total Count 24 12 39 13 8 96 
   Expected Count 24.0 12.0 39.0 13.0 8.0 96.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 12.5% 40.6% 13.5% 8.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Total 1 Business monarchy Count 21 11 23 10 7 72 
   Expected Count 15.1 8.8 35.1 7.7 5.3 72.0 
   % within INFR 29.2% 15.3% 31.9% 13.9% 9.7% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 48.8% 44.0% 23.0% 45.5% 46.7% 35.1% 
   Adjusted Residual 2.1 1.0 -3.5 1.1 1.0  
  2 IT monarchy Count 2 2 5 0 1 10 
   Expected Count 2.1 1.2 4.9 1.1 .7 10.0 
   % within INFR 20.0% 20.0% 50.0% 0.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 4.7% 8.0% 5.0% 0.0% 6.7% 4.9% 
   Adjusted Residual -.1 .8 .1 -1.1 .3  
  3 Federal Count 10 9 54 8 5 86 
   Expected Count 18.0 10.5 42.0 9.2 6.3 86.0 
   % within INFR 11.6% 10.5% 62.8% 9.3% 5.8% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 23.3% 36.0% 54.0% 36.4% 33.3% 42.0% 
   Adjusted Residual -2.8 -.6 3.4 -.6 -.7  
  4 IT Duopoly Count 7 1 17 3 0 28 
   Expected Count 5.9 3.4 13.7 3.0 2.0 28.0 
   % within INFR 25.0% 3.6% 60.7% 10.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 16.3% 4.0% 17.0% 13.6% 0.0% 13.7% 
   Adjusted Residual .6 -1.5 1.4 .0 -1.6  
  5 Feudal Count 3 2 1 1 2 9 
   Expected Count 1.9 1.1 4.4 1.0 .7 9.0 
   % within INFR 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 7.0% 8.0% 1.0% 4.5% 13.3% 4.4% 
   Adjusted Residual .9 .9 -2.3 .0 1.8  
  Total Count 43 25 100 22 15 205 
   Expected Count 43.0 25.0 100.0 22.0 15.0 205.0 
   % within INFR 21.0% 12.2% 48.8% 10.7% 7.3% 100.0% 
   % within SSDM 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX E: PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES OF GROUP COMPARISONS 
Shared Services Relationship – Provider 
Quality of Measurement Model 
Inter-Construct Correlations and Reliability Measures 
    Correlations of among Constructs 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronachs 
Alpha 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted Construct 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
0.967 0.962 0.748 Business Value 0.865       
0.969 0.952 0.913 Gap Assessment 0.402  0.955      
0.889 0.836 0.667 Independent Review 0.656  0.496  0.816     
0.940 0.924 0.725 Joint Working 0.735  0.269  0.675  0.851    
0.927 0.911 0.617 Profession-wide Oversight 0.759  0.635  0.792  0.672  0.786   
1.000 1.000 1.000 Structural Gap -0.211  -0.088  -0.082  -0.027  -0.081  1.000  
 
Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings 
 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
BVP1 0.878 0.367 0.581 0.626 0.671 -0.160 
BVP2 0.916 0.377 0.594 0.716 0.720 -0.130 
BVP3 0.843 0.429 0.606 0.652 0.712 -0.176 
BVP4 0.895 0.321 0.597 0.617 0.690 -0.203 
BVP5 0.876 0.338 0.585 0.634 0.673 -0.170 
BVP6 0.784 0.271 0.467 0.426 0.532 -0.182 
BVP7 0.864 0.369 0.584 0.585 0.682 -0.193 
BVP8 0.878 0.347 0.517 0.654 0.606 -0.217 
BVP9 0.831 0.308 0.514 0.642 0.601 -0.269 
BVP10 0.878 0.334 0.606 0.752 0.652 -0.136 
GA1 0.339 0.948 0.446 0.198 0.563 -0.096 
GA2 0.389 0.960 0.511 0.268 0.624 -0.098 
GA3 0.418 0.958 0.463 0.294 0.627 -0.063 
IR1 0.466 0.530 0.764 0.469 0.681 -0.051 
IR2 0.682 0.232 0.775 0.694 0.557 -0.125 
IR3 0.451 0.475 0.871 0.511 0.689 -0.030 
IR4 0.452 0.454 0.850 0.442 0.682 -0.032 
JW1 0.555 0.133 0.474 0.839 0.504 0.009 
JW2 0.623 0.144 0.514 0.872 0.532 -0.012 
JW3 0.603 0.198 0.561 0.886 0.592 0.018 
JW4 0.523 0.217 0.547 0.850 0.469 0.069 
JW5 0.750 0.305 0.602 0.894 0.624 -0.104 
JW6 0.647 0.344 0.723 0.760 0.673 -0.078 
POA1 0.675 0.556 0.720 0.596 0.881 -0.104 
POA2 0.695 0.463 0.704 0.695 0.867 -0.016 
POA3 0.752 0.437 0.682 0.653 0.822 -0.187 
POA4 0.703 0.427 0.718 0.645 0.840 -0.140 
POB1 0.499 0.666 0.556 0.379 0.744 -0.063 
POB2 0.363 0.480 0.477 0.300 0.586 0.130 
POB3 0.448 0.559 0.540 0.352 0.759 0.005 
POB4 0.448 0.547 0.484 0.394 0.746 0.013 
SG1 -0.211 -0.088 -0.082 -0.027 -0.081 1.000 
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Quality of Structural Model 
Path Coefficient 
                                            
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
(Two-
tailed) 
P Value 
(One-tailed) 
Gap Assessment -> Business Value -0.035 -0.054 0.039 0.039 0.895 0.372  0.186  
Independent Review -> Business Value -0.021 -0.062 0.047 0.047 0.438 0.662  0.331  
Joint Working -> Business Value 0.414 0.412 0.071 0.071 5.797 0.000  0.000  
Profession-wide Oversight -> Business Value 0.506 0.499 0.093 0.093 5.463 0.000  0.000  
Structural Gap -> Business Value -0.163 -0.162 0.043 0.043 3.775 0.000  0.000  
 
Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs 
                                            R² included R² excluded f² 
Gap Assessment 0.695 0.694 0.00 
Independent Review 0.695 0.695 0.00 
Joint Working 0.695 0.618 0.25 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.695 0.633 0.20 
Structural Gap 0.695 0.669 0.09 
 
Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² 
BVP1 0.493 BVP9 0.476 IR4 0.539 POA2 0.649 
BVP2 0.587 BVP10 0.573 JW1 0.592 POA3 0.531 
BVP3 0.524 GA1 0.769 JW2 0.647 POA4 0.589 
BVP4 0.493 GA2 0.774 JW3 0.681 POB1 0.454 
BVP5 0.488 GA3 0.743 JW4 0.634 POB2 0.252 
BVP6 0.285 IR1 0.346 JW5 0.681 POB3 0.490 
BVP7 0.445 IR2 0.236 JW6 0.410 POB4 0.475 
BVP8 0.484 IR3 0.592 POA1 0.689 SG1 0.000 
 
Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² 
Business Value 0.485 
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Shared Services Relationship – Client 
Quality of Measurement Model 
Inter-Construct Correlations and Reliability Measures 
    Correlations of among Constructs 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronachs 
Alpha 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted Construct 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
0.955 0.948 0.682 Business Value 0.826       
0.934 0.895 0.825 Gap Assessment 0.432  0.908      
0.911 0.869 0.722 Independent Review 0.528  0.571  0.849     
0.936 0.917 0.708 Joint Working 0.496  0.297  0.401  0.841    
0.888 0.855 0.501 Profession-wide Oversight 0.642  0.626  0.657  0.631  0.708   
1.000 1.000 1.000 Structural Gap 0.050  0.210  0.200  -0.006  0.211  1.000  
 
Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings 
 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
VP1 0.764 0.291 0.439 0.369 0.465 0.079 
VP2 0.804 0.341 0.427 0.420 0.481 0.095 
VP3 0.880 0.395 0.459 0.432 0.556 0.024 
VP4 0.855 0.339 0.418 0.459 0.548 0.001 
VP5 0.864 0.433 0.498 0.494 0.589 0.008 
VP6 0.768 0.259 0.346 0.314 0.432 0.004 
VP7 0.867 0.455 0.544 0.365 0.611 0.082 
VP8 0.838 0.381 0.465 0.365 0.550 0.051 
VP9 0.755 0.328 0.416 0.359 0.507 0.037 
VP10 0.854 0.301 0.319 0.505 0.530 0.037 
GA1 0.367 0.916 0.551 0.271 0.582 0.279 
GA2 0.455 0.922 0.529 0.290 0.631 0.109 
GA3 0.336 0.887 0.472 0.243 0.473 0.207 
IR1 0.380 0.492 0.789 0.285 0.532 0.184 
IR2 0.422 0.436 0.756 0.468 0.541 0.226 
IR3 0.509 0.498 0.923 0.309 0.585 0.130 
IR4 0.471 0.517 0.917 0.311 0.575 0.154 
JW1 0.418 0.150 0.257 0.818 0.460 0.015 
JW2 0.390 0.253 0.300 0.859 0.531 -0.094 
JW3 0.395 0.297 0.348 0.891 0.580 0.013 
JW4 0.422 0.181 0.358 0.823 0.518 -0.095 
JW5 0.518 0.335 0.413 0.875 0.613 0.088 
JW6 0.318 0.279 0.334 0.777 0.456 0.025 
POA1 0.502 0.457 0.554 0.639 0.790 0.141 
POA2 0.571 0.343 0.361 0.589 0.768 0.138 
POA3 0.451 0.380 0.402 0.700 0.793 0.164 
POA4 0.492 0.444 0.489 0.704 0.808 0.177 
PO1 0.348 0.525 0.445 0.076 0.590 0.116 
PO2 0.410 0.448 0.554 0.214 0.628 0.241 
PO3 0.395 0.542 0.480 0.210 0.621 0.074 
PO4 0.416 0.488 0.485 0.229 0.617 0.142 
SG1 0.050 0.210 0.200 -0.006 0.211 1.000 
195 
Quality of Structural Model 
Path Coefficient 
                                            
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
(Two-
tailed) 
P Value 
(One-tailed) 
Gap Assessment -> Business Value 0.033 0.060 0.045 0.045 0.728 0.468 0.234 
Independent Review -> Business Value 0.190 0.191 0.077 0.077 2.487 0.014 0.007 
Joint Working -> Business Value 0.142 0.148 0.066 0.066 2.158 0.032 0.016 
Profession-wide Oversight -> Business Value 0.425 0.429 0.084 0.084 5.059 0.000 0.000 
Structural Gap -> Business Value -0.083 -0.084 0.042 0.042 1.979 0.049 0.025 
 
Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs 
                                            R² included R² excluded f² 
Gap Assessment 0.454 0.453 0.00 
Independent Review 0.454 0.435 0.03 
Joint Working 0.454 0.443 0.02 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.454 0.395 0.11 
Structural Gap 0.454 0.447 0.01 
 
Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² 
VP1 0.235 VP9 0.258 IR4 0.684 POA2 0.418 
VP2 0.258 VP10 0.297 JW1 0.531 POA3 0.508 
VP3 0.309 GA1 0.651 JW2 0.623 POA4 0.523 
VP4 0.345 GA2 0.594 JW3 0.684 PO1 0.213 
VP5 0.393 GA3 0.593 JW4 0.550 PO2 0.229 
VP6 0.185 IR1 0.425 JW5 0.604 PO3 0.233 
VP7 0.377 IR2 0.329 JW6 0.488 PO4 0.264 
VP8 0.303 IR3 0.673 POA1 0.519 SG1 0.000 
 
Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² 
Business Value 0.296 
196 
Organisation Size – Large 
Quality of Measurement Model 
Inter-Construct Correlations and Reliability Measures 
    Correlations of among Constructs 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronachs 
Alpha 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted Construct 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
0.970 0.966 0.766 Business Value 0.875       
0.205 0.876 0.160 Gap Assessment 0.191  0.400      
0.905 0.857 0.707 Independent Review 0.799  0.085  0.841     
0.955 0.943 0.778 Joint Working 0.762  0.286  0.748  0.882    
0.924 0.906 0.608 Profession-wide Oversight 0.836  0.256  0.809  0.814  0.779   
1.000 1.000 1.000 Structural Gap -0.213  -0.093  -0.079  -0.056  -0.098  1.000  
 
Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings 
 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
BVP1 0.881 0.142 0.679 0.663 0.705 -0.142 
BVP2 0.918 0.224 0.735 0.733 0.795 -0.131 
BVP3 0.867 0.320 0.692 0.655 0.737 -0.193 
BVP4 0.893 0.049 0.726 0.685 0.732 -0.175 
BVP5 0.892 0.156 0.711 0.698 0.726 -0.165 
BVP6 0.796 0.023 0.607 0.505 0.629 -0.183 
BVP7 0.873 0.136 0.732 0.625 0.760 -0.202 
BVP8 0.889 0.229 0.666 0.649 0.711 -0.258 
BVP9 0.853 0.156 0.703 0.648 0.741 -0.239 
BVP10 0.883 0.213 0.728 0.781 0.762 -0.182 
GA1 -0.079 -0.148 0.090 0.004 -0.059 0.190 
GA2 0.061 0.514 0.129 0.178 0.108 0.015 
GA3 0.039 0.441 0.114 0.172 0.106 0.222 
IR1 0.554 0.126 0.679 0.602 0.681 -0.067 
IR2 0.774 0.075 0.897 0.718 0.710 -0.064 
IR3 0.696 0.104 0.896 0.651 0.694 -0.087 
IR4 0.640 -0.013 0.872 0.534 0.644 -0.049 
JW1 0.579 0.187 0.614 0.863 0.674 -0.003 
JW2 0.691 0.389 0.648 0.910 0.722 -0.098 
JW3 0.672 0.273 0.684 0.927 0.752 -0.015 
JW4 0.590 0.191 0.624 0.889 0.642 0.028 
JW5 0.765 0.320 0.686 0.898 0.772 -0.100 
JW6 0.696 0.126 0.683 0.801 0.720 -0.083 
POA1 0.790 0.272 0.712 0.772 0.896 -0.122 
POA2 0.777 0.224 0.762 0.783 0.879 -0.037 
POA3 0.760 0.126 0.728 0.764 0.850 -0.130 
POA4 0.742 0.162 0.727 0.731 0.828 -0.131 
POB1 0.570 0.260 0.535 0.480 0.741 -0.162 
POB2 0.444 0.076 0.464 0.431 0.552 0.180 
POB3 0.515 0.246 0.535 0.495 0.738 -0.101 
POB4 0.462 0.251 0.472 0.457 0.693 -0.023 
SG1 -0.213 -0.093 -0.079 -0.056 -0.098 1.000 
197 
Quality of Structural Model 
Path Coefficient 
                                            
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
(Two-
tailed) 
P Value 
(One-tailed) 
Gap Assessment -> Business Value -0.009 -0.060 0.042 0.042 0.209 0.834 0.417 
Independent Review -> Business Value 0.308 0.327 0.097 0.097 3.177 0.002 0.001 
Joint Working -> Business Value 0.173 0.178 0.093 0.093 1.858 0.065 0.032 
Profession-wide Oversight -> Business Value 0.434 0.412 0.084 0.084 5.162 0.000 0.000 
Structural Gap -> Business Value -0.137 -0.124 0.038 0.038 3.565 0.000 0.000 
 
Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs 
                                            R² included R² excluded f² 
Gap Assessment 0.768 0.768 0.00 
Independent Review 0.768 0.740 0.12 
Joint Working 0.768 0.759 0.04 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.768 0.724 0.19 
Structural gap 0.768 0.750 0.08 
 
Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² 
BVP1 0.508 BVP9 0.561 IR4 0.599 POA2 0.670 
BVP2 0.643 BVP10 0.642 JW1 0.648 POA3 0.597 
BVP3 0.567 GA1 -0.563 JW2 0.742 POA4 0.555 
BVP4 0.566 GA2 -0.643 JW3 0.781 POB1 0.452 
BVP5 0.577 GA3 -0.211 JW4 0.702 POB2 0.208 
BVP6 0.418 IR1 0.212 JW5 0.696 POB3 0.448 
BVP7 0.563 IR2 0.599 JW6 0.497 POB4 0.388 
BVP8 0.557 IR3 0.622 POA1 0.703 SG1 0.000 
 
Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² 
Business Value 0.560 
  
198 
Organisation Size – Small 
Quality of Measurement Model 
Inter-Construct Correlations and Reliability Measures 
    Correlations of among Constructs 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronachs 
Alpha 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Construct 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
0.950 0.942 0.657 Business Value 0.810       
0.911 0.869 0.773 Gap Assessment 0.154  0.879      
0.879 0.813 0.647 Independent Review 0.361  0.348  0.804     
0.919 0.895 0.654 Joint Working 0.444  0.038  0.380  0.808    
0.872 0.839 0.471 Profession-wide Oversight 0.544  0.367  0.560  0.503  0.686   
1.000 1.000 1.000 Structural Gap 0.042  0.029  0.102  -0.010  0.152  1.000  
 
Outer Model Loadings and Cross Loadings 
 
Business 
Value 
Gap 
Assessment 
Independent 
Review 
Joint 
Working 
Profession-
wide 
Oversight 
Structural 
Gap 
BVP1 0.781 0.186 0.359 0.304 0.464 0.055 
BVP2 0.848 0.016 0.199 0.441 0.396 0.095 
BVP3 0.816 0.165 0.333 0.381 0.429 0.098 
BVP4 0.840 0.217 0.391 0.401 0.548 0.051 
BVP5 0.871 0.186 0.275 0.355 0.513 -0.051 
BVP6 0.847 0.119 0.351 0.398 0.521 -0.033 
BVP7 0.730 0.020 0.148 0.210 0.269 -0.008 
BVP8 0.850 0.130 0.315 0.319 0.459 0.056 
BVP9 0.799 0.103 0.267 0.376 0.378 0.088 
BVP10 0.706 0.027 0.202 0.366 0.319 -0.011 
GA1 0.093 0.838 0.259 0.032 0.225 0.016 
GA2 0.187 0.958 0.339 0.049 0.411 0.026 
GA3 0.050 0.837 0.331 -0.018 0.241 0.049 
IR1 0.260 0.279 0.773 0.161 0.427 0.082 
IR2 0.327 0.215 0.659 0.476 0.353 0.137 
IR3 0.276 0.327 0.887 0.255 0.491 0.037 
IR4 0.275 0.294 0.878 0.275 0.521 0.058 
JW1 0.387 -0.090 0.186 0.795 0.321 0.002 
JW2 0.266 -0.027 0.252 0.797 0.377 -0.043 
JW3 0.319 0.060 0.337 0.840 0.484 0.016 
JW4 0.354 0.107 0.326 0.798 0.375 -0.130 
JW5 0.475 0.067 0.360 0.877 0.465 0.082 
JW6 0.279 0.062 0.396 0.737 0.426 -0.015 
POA1 0.356 0.345 0.522 0.448 0.770 0.109 
POA2 0.485 0.206 0.344 0.505 0.805 0.114 
POA3 0.467 0.219 0.366 0.585 0.810 0.110 
POA4 0.469 0.197 0.461 0.620 0.840 0.128 
POB1 0.193 0.361 0.332 -0.094 0.477 0.136 
POB2 0.254 0.235 0.391 0.046 0.528 0.059 
POB3 0.266 0.315 0.373 0.023 0.556 0.097 
POB4 0.358 0.314 0.363 0.137 0.594 0.100 
SG1 0.042 0.029 0.102 -0.010 0.152 1.000 
199 
Quality of Structural Model 
Path Coefficient 
                                            
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Value 
(Two-
tailed) 
P Value 
(One-tailed) 
Gap Assessment -> Business Value -0.027 -0.052 0.042 0.042 0.646 0.519  0.260 
Independent Review -> Business Value 0.058 0.081 0.059 0.059 0.989 0.324  0.162 
Joint Working -> Business Value 0.212 0.226 0.069 0.069 3.082 0.002  0.001 
Profession-wide Oversight -> Business Value 0.418 0.410 0.076 0.076 5.521 0.000  0.000 
Structural Gap -> Business Value -0.025 -0.045 0.033 0.033 0.763 0.446  0.223 
 
Effect Size of Exogenous Constructs 
                                            R² included R² excluded f² 
Gap Assessment 0.338 0.337 0.00 
Independent Review 0.338 0.335 0.00 
Joint Working 0.338 0.309 0.04 
Profession-wide Oversight 0.338 0.248 0.14 
Structural Gap 0.338 0.337 0.00 
 
Indicator Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² Indicator Q² 
BVP1 0.189 BVP9 0.145 IR4 0.572 POA2 0.497 
BVP2 0.233 BVP10 0.202 JW1 0.473 POA3 0.486 
BVP3 0.303 GA1 0.472 JW2 0.510 POA4 0.557 
BVP4 0.269 GA2 0.447 JW3 0.596 POB1 0.125 
BVP5 0.274 GA3 0.591 JW4 0.474 POB2 0.161 
BVP6 0.065 IR1 0.375 JW5 0.594 POB3 0.177 
BVP7 0.193 IR2 0.079 JW6 0.408 POB4 0.222 
BVP8 0.175 IR3 0.603 POA1 0.504 SG1 0.000 
 
Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy (Q²) 
Indicator Q² 
Business Value 0.205 
 
